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Sade has had many titles over the centuries. He was ‘Marquis’, a noblesse d’épée, 
sitting in his château atop Lacoste; ‘Wolf-man’, on the run from the authorities, a cause 
célèbre for his notorious sexual adventures; ‘Citizen’, a turncoat royalist, a functionary within 
the bureaucracy of the new French Assembly, eulogizer of the revolutionary heroes, Marat 
and Le Pelletier; and ‘Divine’, a patron saint of Romantic poets like Flaubert and Baudelaire, 
and later, the same for the Surrealists. Sade has yet to be given the name: ‘Scientist’. In my 
dissertation I lay out the ground work for defending this choice of designation by situating 
Sade and a sampling of his works within a defining period in the history of the object of 
scientific inquiry: from the eve of the 1789 French Revolution until its dénouement following 
the death of Robespierre. The three works of focus are Les 120 Journées (1785), Aline et 
Valcour, ou le Roman philosophique (1795) and La Philosophie dans le Boudoir (1795); and 
each one is strategically selected to bring to light singular events, marking important changes 
in humankind’s relationship with the natural world. 
This intense focus on Sade magnifies many times over the position Foucault had 
already assigned him in Les Mots et les chose (1966) when, in offering his own version of the 
evolution of the object of scientific inquiry from the Classical to the Modern Age, he isolates 
Sade as a heuristic bridge linking the two eras of his focus, using Sade’s erotic novels Justine 
(1791) and Juliette (1797) to support his argument. However overly pithy Foucault’s 
application of Sade may have been, it is felt that he lays a sufficient groundwork, one that I 
take up in my dissertation and push to even further depths. More than simply conforming to 
Foucault’s employment of Sade as the “midwife” to Modern science, I do two things of 
notable difference:  
1) I take up the challenge Foucault set in the “Foreword to the English Edition” of Les 
Mots et les chose when he professes “embarrassment” over not being able to account for how 
“[…] instruments, techniques, institutions…” (p. xiii) of empirical sciences came to match in 
complexity those individuals and societies that would come to use them. On the one side, 
Foucault expresses a clear limitation; on the other, he offers up what he believes is half of 
what it takes to get at this limitation: 
“I left the problem of cause to one side. I chose instead to confine myself to describing the 
transformation themselves, thinking that this would be an indispensable step if, one day, a 
theory of scientific change and epistemological causality was to be constructed” (p. xiv).  
This dissertation offers up a heuristic framework to account for the relationship between both 
these sides Foucault can only adumbrate: the side of an emergent scientific knowledge and 
the ontological status of the producers of this knowledge. 
            2) I position Sade as a representative of an older scientific tradition, one 
overshadowed in Foucault’s emphasis on Sade and Modern science. Since Iwan Bloch 
compared Les 120 Journées to Psychopathia Sexualis, Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s 1886 
manual of sexology, dedicated to documenting qualitatively all possible sexual deviancies in 
human behavior, most readings of Sade in the History of Science have taken him to be on the 
modern most end of the timeline of the History of Science (Foucault, 1966; Harari and 
Pellegrin, 1973; Morris, 1990; Vila, 1998; Polat, 2000; Quinlan, 2006; Quinlan, 2013). Some 
writers in recent years, however, have had the acuity to highlight older scientific influences 
on Sade’s oeuvre. Armelle St-Martin is one such example, who has written extensively on the 
influence of Italian science on Sade. Such a focus is a departure from a trend that sees 
English empiricism defining the scientific mindset in France that, it is believed, would have 
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influenced Sade’s ideas. This would have included the “spirit of exactitude and method” (p. 
91) D’Alembert (1751) speaks of in his panegyrics of Bacon, Locke and Newton in Discours 
préliminaire de l’Encyclopédie de Diderot or Voltaire’s popularization (1763) of all things 
English in Dictionnaire philosophique. The legacies of both these perspectives have weighed 
heavily on Caroline Warman’s reading of Sade, who sees him (2002) through a more 
“positive” prism of “sensationist materialism” in Sade: from materialism to pornography. St-
Martin sees Sade’s scientific orientation directed rather towards much older and ulterior 
forms of scientific “objects”, ones much less “positive”. Casamaggi and St-Martin see 
pneumatological themes like miasmas and corruptions in Histoire de Juliette, arriving from 
Sade’s own explorations in such places as amongst the swamps and famously licentious 
denizen of Venice, the namesake for that special contagion: “maladies vénériennes”.  
Both these departures from Foucault’s conceptualization imply the need to articulate 
what I call a “negative” trajectory within the History of Science. This term plays an important 
part in how I engage with Sade and his contemporaries and its explication constitutes a 
significant aim throughout the course of my dissertation. Sade’s own inquiry into the object 
of scientific inquiry came at a time of great upheaval and he relied on one approach hitherto 
capable of articulating such “negativity”: metaphysics. The very notion of metaphysics was 
anathema for many, such as D’Alembert who even labeled it a despicable science in the 
relevant entry in L’encyclopédie de Diderot. This dissertation will situate Sade within this 
battle over the future of science in what was that all crucial period of history when the die 
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0.1 “Scientist Sade”: A Theoretical Framework 
The least surprising thing to come out of efforts over the past two decades to make of 
the literature of the Marquis de Sade something of significance in the History of Science is 
the one thing that would be most shocking for those stumbling upon the topic from outside 
the field. An honorific to this shock could read as follows: Sade: scientist emeritus of Natural 
Philosophy/ Laboratory: Liberty Tower, the Bastille/ Specialization: Onanism. But the 
assertion that littérature pornographique deserves today a scientific designation is wholly 
unsurprising in the History of Science. In The Enlightenment, Roy Porter speaks of the 
flexibility of Enlightenment science in such matters even suggesting that those prejudicial 
against discussing science without numbers, tables and measurements should take it up with 
the Philosophes themselves:  
[They] criticized all such simple-minded extremes [of rationality and irrationality], because they were above all 
critics, aiming to put human intelligence to use as an engine for understanding human nature, for analyzing man 




What is most surprising concerning recent scholarship on “Scientist Sade”, however, is a far 
more technical matter. What the many conclusions emerging out of interpretations of Sade’s 
work have revealed is an unresolved equivocation at the heart of understanding Modern 
Science especially the history of its methods and practices. Two authors in recent years have 
captured this equivocation in offering two very different positions concerning Sade and his 
role in the History of Science. They are Caroline Warman, in Sade: from materialism to 
pornography (2002); and Armelle St-Martin in her 2007 essay, “Sade’s System of Perversity 
and Italian Medicine”. Both set Sade against two intellectual traditions that, although mostly 
accommodating in theory today, were in the eighteen-century sources of great partisan 
tension over questions concerning what science was and what role it had in society. Warman 
holds a position widely held as dogma within discourses in Modern science while St-Martin 
                                                          
1
 Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1990), 3. 
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does so on one that is largely uninfluential, one considered a theoretical relic of a bygone age. 
Despite these positions being far too disparate to be considered equally valid in framing Sade, 
the scientist, they have coexisted rather comfortably within Sade Studies, proving perhaps 
that the underlying difference rests within something of a theoretical blind spot. Much of 
what this essay will aim to do is shed light on how this blind spot is relevant for 
understanding Sade and show how this blind spot is confined only to modern eyes. More to 
the point, not only would Sade and the philosophers of his generation have been familiar with 
both positions being suggested here but they would have also taken up a passionate position 
for one of them - to the outright exclusion of the other. Sade’s choice out of these two options 
will be the subject of this dissertation and soon it will be clear that this choice aligns much 
closer with how St-Martin places Sade in the History of Science even though it is the form of 
how Warman places him that is considered more authoritative within scholarship on Sade and 
science. As a preliminary demonstration of these two positions, vociferously contested in 
Sade’s age - but raising no controversy amongst historians of science today - it is worth 
summoning two titans of the period: Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond D’Alembert, whose 
disagreement will set the parameters for how Sade will be considered between Warman and 
St-Martin’s conceptualisations. The disagreement also restates once again the significance of 
littérature pornographique in the History of Science, it being a mode of erudition that Sade 
deployed to powerful use. 
Le rêve de d’Alembert is a work of Enlightenment literature that qualifies as not only 
a major text of science but also one with its own episodes pornographiques. One of Denis 
Diderot’s aims in this work was to fictionalize an actual heated debate that had led to a 
“falling-out” of sorts with a longtime ally, the mathematician, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, 
whose relentless pursuit of knowledge matched only Diderot’s in degree of intensity. In their 
collaboration on that signature work of the Enlightenment, Diderot’s Encyclopédie, both 
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stared down with great peril the religious and political Censors of their time. But by the time 
Le rêve was written in 1760 Diderot had come to reject d’Alembert’s strident faith in “fact”-
driven empiricism. In the plot of the novel, Diderot rendered his former ally, coherent only as 
a dreamer of dreams, designating his new ally, Théophile de Bordeu - the author of the 
vitalist work, Recherches sur les glandes - d’Alembert’s reliable interpreter. Diderot’s literary 
choices here reflect a shift towards Bordeu’s views on life sciences, one of whose underlying 
principles Anne C. Vila gave the trenchant description as being like an “erection”. Here she 
uses the words of an apologetic, somewhat bashful, Bordeu to demonstrate the point:  
[…] I am using the term erection because I have not found anything more expressive to convey the idea of what 




 In her analysis of the expression: “rêve en descendant” (Le rêve…, 127-129) Vila uncovers 
the pornographic end to this “swelling” in the climax of d’Alembert’s own masturbatory act 
that “stimulates the source of his own microscopic animaculae”;
3
 his friend, Madame de 
l’Espinasse, as per Vila’s commentary, could only wonder “why his heart beats without fear” 
and “how she can take his pulse when his hands are hidden somewhere”.
4
 The controversial 
debate surrounding the status of these “animaculae” in d’Alembert’s semen, belongs to a 
similar one mentioned by Vila concerning “polyps”, entities, whose constitution defy the 
“positive” arrangement of what should have otherwise been understood then as the 
organism’s central nervous system; polyps move though lacking such a system!
5
 Speaking 
through the character Mademoiselle de L’Espinasse, Diderot defends a view of “animaculae” 
that had become out-of-vogue at the time of writing Le rêve: 
"Voltaire may make as much fun as he likes about it, but the Eel-monger [John Needham, an English scientist] 
is right—I believe my eyes, I see how many of them there are! How they come and go! How they wriggle 
around! […] Less than the drop which I took up on the point of a needle compared to the limitless space which 
                                                          
2
 Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century 
France, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 69. 
3
 Ibid, 75. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid, 69.  
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surrounds me. An indefinite succession of animalcules in the fermenting atom, the same indefinite succession of 




Voltaire laughed as any biologist today would at such a notion as “spontaneous generation”, 
expressed by the eel-monger, a cameo of the eighteenth-century biologist who expounded on 
such a theory: John Needham. Voltaire’s laughter is the case of increasing preference for an 
expressiveness of newer and more sophisticated constellations of scientific “facts”, ones 
whose complexity and systemization purportedly guaranteed their claims to truthfulness. 
Concurring with Voltaire, the materialist Julian Offray de La Mettrie rebukes Needham in 
“L’Homme plante” for “daring to conclude from observations made on a single species that 
the same phenomena must be found in another”
7
 is a telling example of an argument that 
would contradict Diderot’s position of defense. La Mettrie upheld the botanist Claude Joseph 
Geoffroy as an exemplar of one who makes conclusions only after multiple experimentations 
and discovery of specific parts:  
[…] as far as I can judge from [Geoffroy’s] work on the structure and the principle uses of flowers, [he] did 




But Diderot’s primary focus was on a general metaphysics, one, where objects and their 
aspects were tied to some common consideration. Any specificity assigned objects as 
d’Alembert and La Mettrie would both advocate either multiplies metaphysics ad infinitum 
with each newly discovered object becoming the limit of itself, i.e., parameters of its own 
metaphysics; or renders the term metaphysics null altogether. Mary Terrall takes note of these 
two alternatives when analyzing the bowdlerized form of the entry: “Métaphysique”, written 
by d’Alembert for inclusion in the Encyclopédie. The term ends up reduced to either 
“codified rules underlying [singular] practices”
9
 or the discarded portion of a censored 
                                                          
6
 Denis Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, (Côte de la Fabrique: Libraire Générale Française, 1984), 8-9. 
(Emphasis added) 
7
 Julian Offray de La Mettrie, ‘Man as Plant’, Machine Man and Other Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 80. 
8
 Ibid, 80-81. 
9
 Mary Terrell, ‘Metaphysics, Mathematics, and the Gendering of Science’, The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 251. 
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version of the word: “[…] limit[ing] the object of metaphysics to empty and abstract 
considerations about time, space, matter and spirit, it is despicable science”,
10
 respectively. 
Diderot’s rebuttal in Le rêve is anything but a counterattack meant to match d’Alembert point 
of fact by point of fact - it is purposely non-analytic and devoid of the kind of positive 
argumentation the likes of d’Alembert would herald as the discourse fit for science. Diderot 
tranquilizes d’Alembert in prose; makes him sleep and then subjects him to what can only be 
called a “wet dream”, all for the purpose of dissolving the “positive” boundaries surrounding 
not only his annunciations but also himself, the annunciator. The claim to dissolve “positive” 
objects is a significant feature of littérature pornographique. This literary tradition was 
known for the depths it explored in the subterranean regions of the world, hidden beneath 
what would have been considered custom and dogma - and for the world known by scientists, 
beneath scientific formalisms. This dissolution of “positivity” raises the possibility of a 
metaphysical alternative, one present amidst these other two that form from metaphysics’ 
entry into the Modern age (i.e., multiplication or nullification). This alternative will be 
foundational to how the argument in this dissertation develops; and the contrast with these 
other two will provide the needed depth of field to see its relevance cast over the entire 
intellectual milieu of the period. The terms: “positivity” and “negativity” will respectively fill 
in for these first two and now this alternative metaphysics and together will constitute 
indispensable tools for reading Sade amongst his peers and interpreters in posterity. These 
terms will be shown at the end of this section to approximate how Warman and St-Martin 
insert Sade into the History of Science. As will soon be shown, contrary to general consensus 
(the one represented by positions like Warman’s), Sade is not the kind of Modern that many 
scholars have made him out to be. 





 The “positivity” emerging out of the kinds of debates on metaphysics just witnessed 
had an important impact on future scientific methods. Martin S. Staum saw the resonating 
influence of the Encyclopédie in scientific developments in neurology in the nineteenth 
century:  
[s]ensation itself was an active function [inalienable] from its physiological correlates - the brain, the entire 




Metaphysics would be pushed further to even greater specificity in the nascent scientific 
disciplines of the Modern period. However, before this could be done, metaphysics needed its 
decisive turn towards multiplication and nullification, those orientations following a course 
towards “positivity”. Nowhere is this turn more salient than in La Mettrie’s appropriation of 
Albrecht von Haller’s concept of “irritability”, a property of reactivity Haller proposed 
animated all living tissues and organs. One reason to highlight the theoretical quarrel that 
ensured between these two significant thinkers of the Enlightenment is to show how 
contiguous to the turn towards “positivity” is the point left behind, the point, from which a 
metaphysics of “negativity” will be developed in this dissertation. Staum captures in one 
swoop the dual properties of a metaphysics of “positivity”, ones La Mettrie forced upon 
Haller’s conceptualisation of organic life:   
La Mettrie had stood Haller on his head to arrive at a monism that was not entirely mechanical. The animist and 
vitalist physicians would also use inexplicable principles allowing degrees of spiritual activity sometimes 




Staum tells how La Mettrie saw fit to barricade monism - that formulation of metaphysics fit 
to capture generality in the widest possible sense - in the very narrow extremities of matter 
where only multiplications abound, multiplications spoken of earlier as originating from the 
push towards specificity. Nullification is not too far removed from La Mettrie’s intended 
meaning either as it was Haller’s justifiable worry that infusing spirituality at the extreme 
edge of matter not only made the question of God irrelevant (and thus raised the spectre of 
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atheism) but also undermined metaphysics itself as it is only work on objects at these extreme 
points that has any value. This was certainly the growing belief amongst the practitioners of 
the “positive” sciences of the time. In this paper, the monism that La Mettrie “stood on its 
head” will be reinverted so that it returns to the original position Haller had intended, a 
position of general “spirituality”. Although at this point such a strategic move may appear 
obscure, spoken in a language that unsettles expected standards of reasoned argumentation, 
by the time this dissertation is completed, this theoretical decision will be wholly justified. To 
add some theoretical vigor to the term “spirituality”, pneumatology will be used in its stead. 
This expression has a rich intellectual tradition in the period of study, one that even veers 
towards relevance in the History of Science. In Chapter 3.2 the theoretical benefit of this 
conceptualisation will come to fruition when Sade and his methods are considered alongside 
contemporaries Joseph Priestley and Jeremy Bentham, and theirs. It will be shown that Sade 
holding intellectual company with these two scientists of the period qualifies greatly the 
claim he belongs to the modern most side of the ledger of the History of Science.
13
 
 As was earlier shown, Diderot resorted to erotic measures to dissolve not only the 
formalisms inherent in d’Alembert’s “positive” method (i.e., his annunciations) but also his 
self as practitioner (i.e., the annunciator) (p. 3). The practices of scientists were as equally 
beholden to metaphysical fluctuations as were their methods. Generality and specificity have 
just as much bearing on inquirer of objects of science as do the objects of scientific inquiry 
themselves and this duality will be an important thread, developing throughout this 
dissertation. Furthermore, pneumatology will be developed to give this duality the semblance 
of metaphysical unity. But for the time being it is more important to demonstrate how it is 
that those in posterity have taken Sade, the scientific practitioner, to be on the Modern most 
side of the historical ledger. One theorist of significantly high repute to broach this issue is 
                                                          
13
 Bentham’s association with Priestley will also qualify him within the spectrum of science of the 
Enlightenment as he is typically placed unambiguously on the Modern (nineteenth century) most side. Research 
by Steven Schaeffer will be indispensable to demonstrate this point. 
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Michel Foucault in Les mots et les choses (1966). In this work, Foucault traces the evolution 
of the “object” of scientific inquiry from the Classical to the Modern Age and suggests that 
the threshold of success for Modern science began with the character, Juliette, from Sade’s 
novel, Histoire de Juliette, ou les Prospérités du vice (1797). Sade narrates her adventures in 
“vice” and the reader discovers only fortune, fame and success. Foucault equates her sister, 
Justine, from La Nouvelle Justine ou les Malheurs de la vertu (1797), to that other time 
marker in Les mot et les choses, that one marking off the Classical Age from the Renaissance, 
the hapless Don Quixote of Miguel de Cervantes’ work. For Don Quixote and Justine all 
life’s efforts end in failure at a point Foucault identifies as the horizon of “representation”. 
Here Foucault frames their failure as specific desires facing off against what can only be the 
generality of the world; and losing:  
[…] desire and representation communicate only through the presence of Another who represents the heroine to 
himself as an object of desire, while she herself knows nothing of desire other than its diaphanous, distant, 




What travails Don Quixote and Justine in the world is also what travails pre-Modern 
scientists, who stand against a similar backdrop of generality and stand helpless before it. In 
the case of Juliette, however, Foucault describes a character, whose desire rises to the surface 
of representation and penetrates its veneer as if generality is forced to cede its position to 
specificity.
15
 In Part 2 of Les Mots et les chose Foucault has the perspicuity to recognize what 
this metaphysical adjustment entails and it happens to resemble multiplication just outlined at 
that advance stage of a metaphysics of positivity. (But now of course the focus is on practices 
rather than methods.) Foucault calls the adjustment “man doubling over on himself” and 
forming the bases of “positive contents of language, labour, and life”,
16
 of whose outputs 
include productions of Modern science. The respective failure and success Sade intimates in 
                                                          
14
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
228-229. 
15
 Ibid. ‘[a]fter him [Sade], violence, life and death, desire and sexuality will extend, below the level of 
representation, an immense expanse of shade […] in our discourse, in our freedom, in our thought’. (Full 
Quotation)  
16
 Ibid, 345. 
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Justine and Juliette will be a central theme of this dissertation and Foucault deserves credit 
for being one of the first to recognize the link. Foucault suggesting that Sade demonstrates 
what Modern science is is not the same thing as making him out to be a Modern and this 
dissertation will present Sade as being anything but on the side of a metaphysics of 
“positivity”. In fairness to Foucault, just because he uses Sade as a forward marker for the 
Modern age does not mean he claims Sade fits the formal requirements of being Modern, 
equipped with the appropriate mindset or repertoire of skills. This error is more symptomatic 
of many in the general field of Sade Studies than Foucault’s concatenation of “Sade” and 
“Modern”. If anything Sade was a product of the Classical age and never left its orbit 
although he did engage with what he would have seen as the development of the Modern age 
in both his pornographic writings and personal involvement with the narrative of the French 
Revolution. In the following passage Foucault adumbrates a relationship between knowledge 
and knowers that is highly “negative”, one he describes as “isomorphic” and belonging to the 
Classical age: 
[…] that system was in fact sufficiently constricting to cause the visible forms of knowledge to trace their 
kinships upon it themselves, as though methods, concepts, types of analysis, acquired experiences, minds, and 
finally men themselves, had all been displaced at the behest of a fundamental network defining the implicit but 




Notably, the modern duality of knower and knowledge being specific, or discrete, is not yet 
the case in this epistemological formulation and Sade, the practitioner of science, happens not 
to share this make-up. As a way of introducing Sade to those, who may be less familiar with 
his scientific credentials - and more familiar with his licentious scandals - it is worth 
itemizing some important aspects of his biography and highlighting those aspects that rise to 
the level of scientific relevance. But before considering his biography it is worth making a 
decisive statement about Sade’s position in the history of littérature pornographique. How 
this position has been framed by contemporary theorists is fraught with glaring interpretive 
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 Michel Foucault, op. cit., 83.  
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problems. These problems will be considered opportune as they proffer points of contrast, 
from which to develop content that will prove to be theoretically valuable in this dissertation. 
 Robert Darnton confirms that the term “pornography” has been used mostly 
anachronistically by those theorists, who impose a nineteenth-century reading of the word 
when applying it to an eighteen-century milieu:  
But Frenchmen in the eighteenth century did not […] distinguish a genre of “pure” pornography from erotic 
fiction, anti-clerical tracts and other varieties of “philosophical books.” The notion of pornography […] was 
developed in the nineteenth century, when librarians sorted out books that they considered dirty and put them 
under lock and key in taboo sections [… t]he legislation on the book trade under the Old regime [however] 





One of the misreadings concerns its application to Sade and his oeuvre and here again the 
problem of “positivity” raised in this introdution is salient. Pornography really became a 
fixture of science in the mid-nineties with the seminal work of cultural historians like 
Margaret C. Jacobs and Lynn Hunt; and from this period the pornographique tended in a 
‘materialist’ direction. In her essay, ‘The Materialist World of Pornography’, Jacobs elevated 
pornographic discourse to being that “missing link between the social and the 
metaphysical”,
19
 seeing it belonging to either one of two camps: the ‘naturalist’; or the 
‘materialist’, with the latter, she claimed, becoming the dominant mode after 1650.
20
She 
argued that ‘naturalistic’ pornography was highly metaphysical and assuming of such beliefs 
as the dimorphism of gender in body and mind,
21
 summing up all such reflections as treating 
human sexuality as “barn and farmyard”.
22
 The “materialist” variant, in contrast, had a de-
naturalizing effect: “[…] stripping bodies of textures, color and smell, imbuing them with 
only motion and de-centring this motion away from the exclusive site of “virile engines”, 
                                                          
18
 Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), 87-88. (Emphasis added) 
19
 Margaret C. Jacobs, ‘The Materialist Word of Pornography’, The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and 
the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800 (New York: Zone Books, 1996), 160. 
20
 Ibid, 162. 
21
 Ibid, 172. 
22
 Ibid, 164. 
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even inviting active and energized female participants as well”.
23
 All what this added up to 
was a multiplication of the possibilities of desire. Lynn Hunt would continue this line of 
argument in her exploration of political pornography during the French Revolution. She 
further developed the “egalitarian implications of atomism”,
24
 developed in Jacobs’ 
interpretation of Hobbesian and Cartesian materialism, adding new atoms to the mix, ones of 
“active Citizenness”,
25
 introduced by the Revolution. In her book, The Family Romance of 
the French Revolution, Hunt sees Sade as exceptional in reaching even beyond simply 
ridiculing social types such as clerics, aristocrats, political figure and prostitutes; he was 
establishing a theoretical overview for an entirely new political order; one where 
brotherhoods and sisterhoods of incest replaced conventional morality based on familial and 
religious sentiment
26
 and, of course, all the concomitant desires, e.g., homosexuality, 
pedophilia, tribadism, bestiality and so on. Based on this interpretation of pornography in the 
History of Science, Sade is a producer of desires and society itself, and henceforth is adding 
something supernumerary and ‘positive’ to the natural world. This dissertation will depart 
from such a presentation as each new “positive” point amounts to a new specificity, whose 
ability to possess desire depends entirely on some kind of dramatization. Even in how Sade 
practiced what this dissertation asserts is his “scientific” ruminations his orientation was 
anything but “positive” as will now be demonstrated. 
 Both the scientific methods and practices of Sade in this dissertation will be accepted 
as possessing a high degree of “negativity”. As for his methods, Sade was highly 
interdisciplinary and had a keen interest in subterranean themes of the natural and human 
worlds, ones that presuppose monistic unity and defy categorizations of knowledge. From the 
contents of one of the crates Sade sent home from one of his trips to Italy during a rare stint 












of not being in jail in his thirties Neil Schaeffer in his biography on Sade cites Paul Bourdin’s 
observation that Sade had broad interests in history, anthropology, chemistry, natural history, 
mythology, botany and art - with predilections for marginal objects related to death and sex: 
It is a veritable ark. Out of it comes […] metals, idols, rough stones and carved stones from Vesuvius, a 
handsome funerary urn perfectly intact […] a piece of nitrous sulfate, seven sponges, a collection of shells, a 




These amoral interests and their disjunctive distributions run counter to trends in the 
Enlightenment that focus on the improvability of humankind and the unity of human 
knowledge, respectively. These disparate priorities approximate the pessimistic end of a 
“pessimism-to-optimism” scale, one, which happens to also run parallel to the “negative-to-
positive” one being developed now. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often taken as the exemplar of 
pessimism in the Enlightenment and the codex to this “negativity” is Discours sur l'Origine 
de l'Inégalité (1755) where he shows the prospect of social progress and enlightenment to be 
buried under a reality of human barbarism and degeneration, manifest in the very social 
institutions that purport enlightenment. For optimism in the Enlightenment project, it was the 
confidence Marquis de Condorcet exuded in writing Tableau général de la science qui a pour 
objet l’application du calcul aux sciences politiques et morales (1793). In this work de 
Condorcet expressed hope in the “positive” development of all social institutions, expressed 
even as he was in line to climb the guillotine. Sade will be clearly placed on the Rousseauian 
side of this scale. Gilbert Lély (1961) in The Marquis de Sade: A Definitive Biography 
corroborates the point that Sade was a pessimist:  
The universe [in Justine] is nothing but violence and cruelty, the author tells us. Thus we see that quite apart 
from the sensual and positivistic attitude of the time, in the very first work, which he published, Sade took a 




For practices, Sade’s relationship with knowledge has the isomorphism Foucault has just 
described and erotic focus of Diderot’s choice of Bordeu as intellectual ally. Schaeffer 
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suggests a way of thinking about Sade and scientific experimentation that is “negative” in 
conceptualisation. He considers the significance of experiments like that one Sade developed 
in his famous “hydraulic theory of sexual energy”; the results he shared with his wife in that 
famous “Vanille et Manille” letter during a bout with a prostate-urinary infection while 
imprisoned in the Bastille. His description of the symptomology matches the “swelling” and 
“increasing force” of Bordeu’s earlier descriptions: 
Picture a gun charged with a ball, and such a ball whose nature is to grow larger in proportion to its stay in the 
gun; if you shoot the gun after a few days, the explosion will be mild; if you allow the ball to grow larger, being 




In another experiment - this time from outside the confines of prison walls - Sade conducts a 
series of trials with that potentially lethal aphrodisiac, Spanish Fly, during his encounter with 
the four prostitutes, who became actors in that notorious “Marseilles Affair” (that led to his 
third stint in prison and set the pattern of him being a recidivist jailbird). Schaeffer argues the 
dosage Sade used was more for exploring sensations and biochemistry (especially gastrology) 
than the sexual expediency it would have afforded in making the women more compliant to 
Sade’s erotic wishes.
30
 In addition, Schaeffer takes account of the seduction of his sister-in-
law, Anne-Prospére, and his escapade with her to Italy, which precipitated the transformation 
of a patient and mostly tolerant mother-in-law, Madame de Montreuil, into a relentless enemy, 
who would pursue Sade with the letter of the law for most of the remainder of his life.
31
 This 
action can be seen as an exploration of incest, a topic of scandal but also wide intrigue as a 
curious anthropological question. All these experiments take explanations of science to be 
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pessimistically linked to sexual desire and have a reflexivity that defy standards of objectivity 
that would otherwise separate scientists from their “positive” findings. In method and 
practice Sade is clearly not on the Modern side of the historical ledger and this once again 
raises the issue of how Warman and St-Martin place him in the History of Science. 
 Caroline Warman is one to set Sade to a “positive” scientific tradition. Although she 
does a good job of taking from the surfeit of scholarship on Sade since 1945 those 
redeemable moments when Sade is able to be seen through a scientific lens, the equivocation 
claimed is at the heart of understanding Modern science appears in her argument. For one, 
she highlights such notables as Marcel Hénaff and his refusal to see Sade distinguishing 
literature and science:  
[…] le corps sadien c’est le corps […] le lettre n’est pas le sens premier, mais ce que se soustrait à la métaphore, 




As well, she singles out Annie Le Brun and her recognition that Sade links scientific research 
with his own metabolic investment as a researcher, describing Sade’s notorious plagiarizing 
of his scientist contemporaries, e.g., Voltaire, d’Holbach and d’Alembert as “en faisant brûler 
toutes les abstractions au feu des passions”.
33
 By now it is clear that Sade is exhibiting in 
these two episodes the kind of epistemological isomorphism, shown to be characteristic of a 
metaphysics of “negativity”. Nevertheless, Warman makes “positivity” her working model 
for reading Sade into the History of Science, doing so with her double-barreled concept of 
“sensational materialism”. Each part in this conceptualization is really pushed as far forward 
as specificity would be in multiplication and nullification (p. 4). If La Mettrie packed 
irritability at these points, it is only because, without something superadded, “objects” are 
stretched out so thin they reach terminuses of inertness. Warman even acknowledges this but 
finds traction in the scaling effects of ‘analogy’, a bridge between disparities like matter/ 
culture, science/ literature, the maintenance of whose gaps would have been detrimental to 
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her presentation of Sade and his oeuvre offering a ‘literal’ reading of the world.
34
 And to 
‘analogy’ she must add a dynamic force, one she calls “the drama of matter”, including “on 
stage” reenactments of such forces as attractions, repulsions, hydraulics and electricity. These 
are the kinds of dei ex machina common to materialists like La Mettrie, who recognized the 
need to animate matter in their materialist systems with some enlivening - often erotic - force 
of their own. ‘Analogy’ and ‘drama’ fit a literary mold and are inherently “positive”. They 
not only occupy the inert point at the edge of specificity but they are also themselves the 
stand-alone entities within a metaphysics of multiplication. “Sensationism” for one posits 
one-to-one relationships between perceptions of the outside world and the corresponding 
ideas in conscious experience and the strength of ideas draws in the entire unity as would be 
the case for Locke and his “tabula rasa”. The corollary here is that ideas of what things are 
become substitute realities - just as it has been the case for multiplications. If ideas in 
positions like these become the be-all-and-end-all of use value than nullification has also 
been reached. For “materialism”, the guiding principle in Sade’s time was atomism, 
foundational to Enlightenment science ever since Robert Boyle introduced 
corpuscularianism, which presupposed atoms of matter relate one with another insensitively 
on one-to-one “cause and effect” bases. Insensitivity barricades “effects” in the objects in 
question making “causes” ulterior forces rather than distributions of relations amongst 
sensitive matter. If these objects were corpuscles they would be universes onto themselves 
and multiplication is here again being suggested. And if it is the ideas formed from 
witnessing corpuscles-cum-objects that are of concern than what has just been said about 
sensationism applies as well, mutatis mutandis. This dissertation asserts that these are the 
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kinds of metaphysical conundrum that Sade did not encounter because his metaphysics 
followed a “negative” course rather than a “positive” one. To get at this “negative” course it 
is worth consulting Armelle St-Martin; after all she is one of the first to make use of such a 
theoretical construct. 
In her 2007 essay, “Sade’s System of Perversity and Italian Medicine”, St-Martin sees 
Sade being very much unlike La Mettrie despite some common comparisons. In her analysis 
in L’Histoire de Juliette of Sade’s arch-libertine, Saint-Font, St-Martin appears to be 
speaking to Diderot and Bordeu’s own reflections on nondescript entities whose only 
“positive” attribute is an erotic generality that could be linked to all three kingdoms of 
nature.
35
 As it was for Saint-Font and his experimentation with “maleficent molecules” with 
the aim of spreading disease and prolonging death, the corruption of his own being was 
necessarily participatory in the manner of the duality already presented. St-Martin asserts that 
Saint-Fond’s “molecules” - and their greater role in that obsolete pneumatological trope of 
“corruption” - originated from Sade’s 1775 journey to Italy when he encountered for the first 
time such medical treatises as Dr. Barthélemy’s famous work, Dissertation ou mémoire 
historique de l’épidémie qui régna dans Florence.
36
 St-Martin made of Sade’s 
experimentations one part of a rubric pair: the “esoteric”, contrasting with another, the 
“scientific”,
37
 both happening to work just as well for framing Diderot and d’Alembert (and 
La Mettrie’s) antipodal positions vis-à-vis Needham’s “animaculae”. These rubrics are: 
statements a) in “context of a negative progression caused by specific forces”
 38
 - or, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, “negativity”; and b) of “uncertainty that accompanies all 
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 - “positivity”. Clearly a more vigorous rubric is needed to express 
“negativity” than the nondescript “esoteric” that St-Martin proposes. The preceding section 
has shown that in the History of Science even the most technical vocabulary of science is 
open to a multiplicity of meanings. A simple investigation of a concept like animaculae has 
been sketched out to show an entire spectrum of interpretative potential that depends on the 
metaphysical perspective of the inquirer. A metaphysics of “negativity” was introduced and, 
even though its counterpart, a metaphysics of “positivity”, is often subsumed in the highly 
unmetaphysical concept of “fact”-based science, metaphysics was preserved in such notions 
as multiplication and nullification. In the next section, how a metaphysics of “negativity” is 
to be developed in this dissertation will be the subject of investigation. As it turns out the 
equivocation following a simple scientific term like animalculae also does so a concept to be 
introduced as Sade’s dominate mode of scientific investigation. This term is sensibilité. 
0.2 “Sade and Sensibilité” 
Warman sought “dramatization” as a way to enliven the inertness at the further most 
point in a metaphysics of “positivity”. In Culture of Pain when David B. Morris takes note of 
Sade’s exploration of pain and pleasure increasingly taking on medical form - replacing 
medieval theology as the new “master discourse” for understanding the human condition
40
- 
he depends as well on dramatization to state his case. Speaking of the four libertines, 
impersonating demons; their victims, damned souls in that “Hell Game” in the final scene of 
Les 120 Journée, Morris sees Sade substituting the hellfire of theology with nerve impulses 
and electric fluids of a physiological order.
41
 Reflecting on another episode in Sade’s oeuvre, 
Morris interprets the following words, delivered by the character, Noirceuil, in L’Histoire de 
Juliette, as pain and pleasure falling under the order of “sensitivity”:  
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[…] atoms emanating from these foreign objects strike them aslant, crookedly, sting them, repulse them, and 





“Sensitivity” in this essay will be defined as the superaddition of “drama” to specific objects 
at the positive most end of the “negative-to-positive” spectrum. Sean L. Quinlan in “Sade and 
Sensibility: Will, Nerves and Altered States in Sade’s L’Histoire de Juliette” continues along 
Morris’ lines, emphasizing how Sade deployed “sensitivity” to express his metaphysical 
position: 
[they] were like little white cords arranged in pairs […] flat […] round […] carrying messages to and fro the 





Then, later on, Quinlam switches to a more “negative” orientation, citing in Sade’s analysis 
of death the unity connecting all “three kingdoms”, the same kind of unity Diderot 
emphasized in his defense of Needham’s animaculae:  
So rend away hack and hew, torment, break, wreck, massacre, burn, grind to dust, melt, in a world reshape into 




The equivocation between “positivity” and “negativity” here is captured in how Quinlan 
subsumes both under the rubric “sensibility” in the essay title. What is needed now is a more 
precise manner of articulating the aspectual differences in the usage of the terminologies 
“sensitivity” and “sensibility”. Quinlan is not incorrect to ground sensibility in physiology as 
Haller seems to have done just this when he used the term to distinguish what irritability did 
to enliven tissues and organ from what sensibility did only to “organs supplied with nerves” 
that had “the ability to produce sensation”
45
 (but of course Haller was not using the terms in 
the extreme specific way as La Mettrie would have done). It turns out that an important 
attempt has been made in recent years to cover these divergent metaphysical fields of 
“negativity” and “positivity”, an attempt, pegging sensibilité to the “negative” side of the 
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spectrum. It is worth turning to Jessica Riskin, who, in Science in the Age of Sensibility: The 
Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment makes sensibilité a relevant topic in the 
History of Science, something this dissertation aims to do as well. 
 A sharp contrast in orientation comes through in how Vila and Riskin present Sade as 
a scientist in his time. Vila asserts that Sade - through his fictional libertines - sought out 
tirelessly even more intense sensations and “facts” about the body’s reactive properties.
46
 She 
emphasizes both his keenness in keeping up-to-date with medical advancements and 
flexibility in peppering his metaphysical arguments with the most germane of scientific 
terminologies of the time. Presenting a very different position on Sade’s scientific practices, 
Riskin broaches the topic of sensibilité and presents it in an entirely different manner than 
what has just been presented as its synonymy with “sensitivity”. Sensibilité for Riskin is a 
salient “renunciation of [the] understanding”
47
 that comes from dependence on positive “facts” 
and she identified those who take up such renunciations as moral scientists. She gives the 
example of the young lawyer, Maximilien Robespierre, and the precedent he set in his legal 
victory in defending de Vissery de Bois-Valé’s right to erect a lightning rod on the roof of his 
house. She links this micro-debate on electricity during the trial to that greater one pitting 
Benjamin Franklin against his nemesis, Jean-Antoine Nollet, finding the parallel in 
Robespierre and Franklin’s belief in the perilous “interpretability of facts” that comes with 
truth claims such as those given by the prosecution and Nollet, respectively. If a prosecutor 
has the subtlety to convince a judge that electricity can jump from metal to wood and cause a 
house fire; and then win his case; all Nollet needs to do to explain the nature of electricity is 
to produce “facts” that supports his mechanical position, regardless of whether they are 
actually true or not. To inoculate truth statements from the arbitrariness that comes whenever 
explanations meet private (specific) interests, Robespierre and Franklin recommended 
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limiting knowledge to general notions and wide acceptance, in other words, those parameters 
of “negativity” established in the previous “Theory” section.
48
 Riskin places Sade in the 
“negative” camp; she even calls him a “moral radical”.
49
 She takes note of how Sade saw 
new sensations and ideas, emerging from the hypothetical addition of a new sense to the 
preexisting repertoire of five. She reads in Sade’s position here the “moral spectrum” of 
senses Diderot made famous in his 1749 Lettre sur les aveugles,
50
 arguing that Sade worked 
backwards from conventions, assumptions and “facts” when he proposed:  
[…] our laws, our virtues, our vices, our gods, would be contemptible in the eyes of a society having two or 




Sensibilité in this dissertation will be shown to be on the opposite end of the spectrum from 
raison and because it is so it will be presented as a mode of investigating the world that is 
highly corrosive to not only statements of “facts” but also constitutions of specificity 
(individualism) that make these statements possible. (This relationship will be central to the 
notion of pneumatology to be developed.) Sensibilité will have the relational focus to be both 
folksy (i.e., able to unite with Common Sense wisdom) and imaginative (i.e., able to unite 
with objects at distances). It is worth giving an example of this latter focus as imagination is 
privileged in sensibilité. In addition, the example demonstrates how amongst the moral 
scientists of the period of study there is a plurality of voices, some of whom fall on the side of 
“positivity”. David Hume is an example and he will be shown to be an integral part in 
shaping the argument in this dissertation.  
David Hume is often credited for having laid the foundation for the moral sciences, 
which are precursors of what is known today as “human sciences”. Built into A Treatise of 
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Human Nature are the seeds of those two sets of principles, used for exploring the human 
subject as an object of science. In his thought experiment on the colour blank between two 
known shades of blue, Hume argue it is possible, absent prior experience with the impression 
of this blank, for imagination to intervene and fill in the gap. However, this was an 
exceptional case for him, arguing that “first ideas are supposed to be derived from 
impressions” arriving from observations from first-hand experiences.
52
 The loophole Hume 
leaves open here amidst what is otherwise the security of empirical (“positive”) knowledge is 
the same one Sade and his ilk would later exploit in their respective scientific studies. The 
next step going forward is to justify the existences of the kinds of objects formed by such a 
moral force as imagination, those objects very much unlike what Hume characterizes as “first 
ideas […] from impressions”. 
0.3 Objects 
The typical treatment of objects in the tradition of “positivity” has followed the 
pattern of handling ideas and impressions in one-to-one relationships just as Hume has shown. 
Even before and after this example, consultations with the theories of Locke and Condillac 
would respectively confirm this point more broadly. This dissertation will depart from this 
epistemological tradition and propose an alternative befitting the camp of philosophers, to 
which Sade belonged. The following three propositions will act as guides for exploring this 
alternative: 
1) Objects” are imbued with differing degrees of “negativity” and “positivity”; 
2) No distinction will be made between “objects” occupying physical and psychic 
fields; 
3) Passion is the solvent that dissolves “objects”. 
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The following three sub-sections will establish the most important methodological points for 
how Sade will be considered amongst his peers and interpreters in posterity. In addition, 
engaging with more recent philosophical reflections on themes pertinent to those discussed in 
this introduction will demonstrate the enduring relevance of Sade. 
“Objects” are imbued with differing degrees of “negativity” and “positivity” 
Rousseau, that philosophe, famous for his capacity for sensibilité, confirms the 
existences of “objects” that lack the kinds of “positive” contours that were just attributed to 
Locke, Hume and Condillac. The equivocation, to which this introduction has dedicated its 
theoretical focus, appears once again in that planned but never completed work by Rousseau, 
Morale sensitive, ou Le Matérialisme du sage, and the source of the equivocation is found in 
Rousseau’s conceptions of “objects”. Vila suggests that what Rousseau meant by materialism 
was the “positive” regime of calibration for the promotion of health and happiness, citing the 
pertinent “objects” from a passage from Rousseau’s Confessions: 
Rousseau imagined undertaking through the impressions made upon his sensitive system by such external forces 




It is better to situate these “objects” as parts of that much older scientific tradition, the “non-
naturals” of Galenic physiology, whose materiality can in no way be of the same “positivity” 
beginning to take hold in object formations in science in Rousseau’s time. The terms 
“materialism” and “sensitivity” designated as “positive” earlier on in this introduction swing 
for Rousseau sharply towards “negativity”. Resolving the contradictory uses of these terms is 
possible only when “objects” are taken as imbued with differing degrees of “negativity” and 
“positivity”, something which will be accepted in this dissertation. But this claim has 
theoretical precedence in the period of study and it is worth introducing a significant 
discussant to this point: Baron d’Holbach. 
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In his sweeping sociological survey of polytheism and monotheism in Système de la 
Nature, Vol. 2, d’Holbach sees in the evolution of each one an incremental shift away from 
pure “action” towards something that would increasingly take on “object” form. Beginning 
with polytheistic societies like the ancient Greeks he saw their multiple deities, laws and 
attributions of natural phenomena all coming under a “negative” order of such designations 
as “soul of the universe” or “universe as God”.
54
 But in their idol-worship he saw how  





This was a beginning of a siphoning off of “action” from the absolute “negativity” of what 
action necessarily is. As for the later development, monotheism, d’Holbach described 
“leisurely” metaphysicians and theologians as “subtilly” partitioning off “nature from herself” 
and from nature’s “energy” creating an “incomprehensible being” “personified”, one part 
“congenial” when favorable to man, the other “inimical” when unfavorable.
56
 This being 
would evolve into that God set “positively” apart yet endowed with “negative” qualities 
worthy of worship: “infinitude”, “omnipresence” and “omnipotence”; and all the while still 
purportedly capable of interacting with material (“positive”) objects in the natural and human 
worlds. The conundrum, which this interaction entails: a squabble over how it can even be 
possible for something immaterial to interact let alone create something material, was really 
an early debate over the problem of objects in metaphysics. In his chapter “Examination of 
the Proofs of the Existence of the Divinity, as given by [the theologian Samuel] Clark”, 
d’Holbach throws down the gauntlet to his readers by backstopping the whole concern of this 
interaction in motion: 
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[…] in making their gods immutable, render them immoveable, consequently they cannot act […] If God be the 
author of all things, as well as of the motion and of the combination of matter, he is unceasingly occupied in 




However, what is more interesting, and an untapped line of inquiry, is not how such a divine 
entity can even interact with its creation (though this is still today a valid concern) but rather 
how humankind can even conceive of and interact with “objects” of such negative qualities 
and, what’s more, what it is that gives these negatives-cum-positives any value at all. 
D’Holbach shows his “materialist” true colors in missing such a line of inquiry when he 
denigrates the question being elicited here:  
Theology, after all, has seldom done more than personify this eternal series of motion; the principle of mobility 




Cannot the same thing be said of materialists, who allow this same manner of personification 
for the specific qualities they transcribe into their own conceptions of nature as has already 
been sufficiently demonstrated in discussions of “dramatization”? In L’idée d’énergie au 
tournant des Lumières (1770-1820) Michel Delon confirms this criticism this way: 
[L’énergie] bouscule les manichéismes moraux et esthétiques et les dualisme littéraire dépasse une opposition 
statique du plaisir et de la douleur, du bien et du mal, de la beauté et de la laideur. L’ideé d’énergie aide le 
matérialiste à réunifier la matière et le movement, le corps et l’âme, et le spiritualiste à repenser les rapports 




It is on the very constitution of objects where “sensibility” and “sensitivity” have already 
been shown to diverge so handling “objects” differently is just what is needed for showing 
just how Sade’s oeuvre is different. Delon distinguishes Sade from many of his eighteenth-
century contemporaries, who fall victim to “l’operation par laquelle l’idéalisme récupérait les 
acquis de la physique modern”; Delon argues that Sade is different because his “œuvres […] 
n’est pas une aérolithe, hapax […]”.
60
 Sade set apart in this way places him in a position to 
offer unique reflections. 
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 A modern reflection of “objects” imbued with different degrees of “negativity” and 
“positivity” has been given by John Haugeland in Having Though: Essays on the 
Metaphysics of the Mind. Haugeland distinguishes between “objects” in the world that belong 
to reproducible set patterns of application - he calls them “tokens” of a digital format - and 
those ones that are not:  
[Analog:] Variations are smooth or continuous, without “gaps”. There are no click-stops, or forbidden 
intermediate positions on a slide rule or a rheostat […] This is everyone’s aboriginal intuitive idea of analog 
systems; unlike [digitalized] switches, abacuses, or alphabetic inscriptions, every setting or shape (within the 




Objects will be given an “analog” handling in this dissertation because it is believed in 
digitalized form they are beholden to the same inertness coming on the “positive” most point 
in a metaphysics of “positivity”, the point of specificity where dramatization is needed to 
animate. Haugeland even corroborates this point himself when he argues human relations 




“No distinction will be made between “objects” occupying physical and psychic fields”: 
The philosophical tradition of seeing synonymy in “objects” of the mind and world is 
well encapsulated in Proposition 7 of “Of the Mind” in Ethics when Spinoza claims: “the 
order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”.
63
 The 
problem to which Spinoza offers his solution can be summed up as the interference “objects” 
pose in psychic-to-physical reductions (or vice versa). A more contemporary attempt at a 
solution to the problem, which happens also to be a significant stumbling block in the unity 
between natural and human sciences is that famous test of supervenience. Haugeland 
describes the test this way:  
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[…] a way of tightening the grip that the physical has on the possible, without having to say that only 





It can be said that the epistemological problem of uniting physical and psychic events is due 
to the objects involved being necessarily specific. Heidegger confirms the inertness of 
specificity in his lamentation of the “scandal of philosophy”, which for him was the problem 
of philosophers continuously setting out to prove the world by trying to establish relations 
between Being-present-at-hand of inner Consciousness and Being-present-at-hand of outer 
Things.
65
 Simply put, the sceptical concern for the material world not existing comes by way 
of a salient lack of an indubitable anchor holding these relations in tandem. Any delay, or gap, 
no matter its minuteness amounts to a kind of hearsay - or, better an “interpretation”. “Dasein 
always comes ‘too late’”
66
 is how Heidegger put it. Even after the presentation of his 
“positive” “Ontological Interpretation” Heidegger recognized the persistence of the problem 
of “interpretation” in his conception of the “eclipse”: 
 [t]he existential Interpretation of Dasein’s historicality is constantly getting eclipsed unawares. The obscurities 




Even though he failed to overcome the “eclipse”, he suggests a way forward in his emphasis 
on the “negative” concept “motion”, which presupposes some “untangling” of objects on 
both sides of the epistemological divide, the physical and psychic one. Heidegger’s take on 
“motion” dialogues in an interesting way with D’Holbach’s presentation raised in the 
previous sub-section.    
A solution, more fitting to the context of Sade is given by Riskin in her discussion of 
the scientific debate surrounding the behavior of electricity seen through that famous 
eighteen-century invention, the Leyden jar. Riskin summarizes two competing methods of 
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explanation: the Franklinist and Nolletist, and even gives a period version of what constituted 
the problem of reductionism supervenience in more recent years has aimed to correct: 
Adopting a calculus of moral certainties was not only wise but good: it had moral benefits, while an insistence 
on absolute, mathematical certainty was morally detrimental. A person who subordinated quantitative evaluation 
to concrete purposes, who understood all values as meaningful only in relations to other values, was thereby 
integrated into a world of interacting agents: electrically overcharged and undercharged bodies, market 
exchanges of money for goods. In contrast, one who saw the world in terms of discrete, absolute values was 
blind to the interaction of its parts and carried out his reckoning in abstracted isolation.
68
  
In her analysis of the issue Risken anticipates proposition #3, which is next to come in this 
section, when she posits as a solution to the conundrum of the unity of physical and psychic 
events: a focus on “appetites, desires and tendencies”.
69
 If - as was stated - physical and 
psychic events are irreconcilable because the objects involved are necessarily specific - moral 
events are not because they decline towards generality or - put another way - they emphasize 
relationality. To look again on the problem Heidegger encountered in the previous paragraph, 
sensibilité offers objects the theoretical possibility to hold positions in synonymy and 
simultaneity, doing so on account of the scope of generality made possible by a metaphysics 
of “negativity”. It is as if at a certain ecliptic point of alignment, all objects inorganic, organic 
and conceptual alike stand at some nadir where any proximal shift leftwards or right (i.e., any 
shift towards specificity) constitutes a cracking open of the floodgates to the necessity of 
having to confront all in contingency and infinitude (or in toto in coevality). Coevality is the 
failed point of “interpretation”. 
“Passion is the solvent that dissolves ‘objects’” 
In their collaborative work, “What Would an Adequate Philosophy of Social Science 
Look Like (?)”, Brian Fay and J. Donald Moon establish a cognate of the disjunction just 
developed between the physical and psychic: the physical and social in their definition of 
“intentional content”:  
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[…] a given movement counts as a vote, a signal, a salute […] only against the background of a set of applicable 




They go on to say that it is only by means of a “conceptual solvency of a ‘natural science of 
man’”
 71
 that there is any hope of unity, being achieved between the physical and social 
beyond mere interpretation. With a theoretical apparatus to allow for “solvency”, i.e., the 
possibility to decline from “positivity” to “negativity”, the solvent to be used in this 
dissertation can now be introduced: passion.  Theoretically, passion has a long history in the 
study of what constitutes objects in the world. Spinoza for one saw passion as the 
metaphysical action that worked against the canopy, containing the aggregate of all physical 
actions (and perforce all causes and effects) - the canopy, which was God at “rest”. In 
Spinoza’s words “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things (Proposition 18 
in ‘Of God’)”.
 72
 Absolute restfulness is absolute “positivity” and Spinoza confirms this point 
when he laments passion’s “negative” influence on knowledge in the scholium to Proposition 
3 of “Of the Affects”: 
 […] the passions are not related to the mind except insofar as it has something which involves negation, or, 





If inertness precedes movement; and what Spinoza calls “adequate” knowledge precedes all 
other forms both are moored to some divine fixture at “rest”; are foundationally “positive”; 
and are built by Spinoza using mathematical scaffolding. More recently, Sartre blames 
inertness on what he sees as the failure of Heidegger’s metaphysical system. In L’Ȇtre et le 
Néant, Sartre intuits the salient lack of “motion” in the Heidegger’s system, one Sartre 
(through Hazel E. Barnes) claims ends up only as “suspension”.
74
 Sartre demonstrated this 
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point by showing how Heidegger got entangled in the web of his own two-way 
conceptualization:  
Man is a being of distances. In the movement of turning inward which traverses all of being, being arises and 





Sartre goes on to use passion as the solvent to dissolve this “suspension”, which is really a 
state of motion not too different than the “positive” quality of Spinoza’s concept of “rest”. 
Even though his theoretical model is outside the purview of how Sade and his ilk will be 
considered in this dissertation, Sartre deserves credit for at least having the intuition to see a 
need to prioritize passion: 
[a]ll [the inner workings of the relationship between the self and the external world] happens as if the For-itself 
had a Passion to lose itself in order that the affirmation “world” might come to the In-itself. Of course this 




The failures of Spinoza and Heidegger fall on the same inertness developed in this 
introduction at the “positive” most end of the “negative-to-positive” spectrum presented, the 
end populated exclusively by specific objects. Objects need to be able to be discussed without 
falling into specificity and the final component before this dissertation can begin is offering a 
“negative” conception of objects. This will be presented as a heuristic, which will be called 
the “posteriority-anteriority-interiority” complex. 
“Objects” throughout this dissertation will be defined as entities with some level of 
strength and tightness of boundary (i.e., gradients of “positivity”), entities that play a role in 
the operation of dynamic systems: entities mythical and metaphysical; of a physical, event 
and conceptual constitution; or possessing aspectual, qualitative or quantitative values - in the 
latter case, reducible to mathematical and geometric forms. Implied here is that these 
“objects” are by no means equal in their “positivity”. “Objects” are also all those, for which 
the aforementioned series of “objects” has meaning (i.e., the inquirers) and the unity between 
these two positions will be held together by the conceptualization of pneumatology 
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introduced in this dissertation. Developing a way to distinguish the different grades of 
“negativity” and “positivity” will be one of the aims of this dissertation. Any grading scheme 
must take into account the influence of “negativity”, with whose increased intensification 
“positive” boundaries become less fixed and resonate with a stronger dimension of 
relationality. The scheme must be able to account for different modulations of relationality, 
whose changes arrive due to different passionate engagements with objects in the world. 
“Objects” will be developed using a three-staged heuristics that help situate their 
variability at different stages of history. The “object” imbued with the highest degree of 
“negativity” will be the one guided by taxis, which, according to the Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary is the “reflex translational or orientational movement by a freely motile and 
usually simple organism in relations to a source of stimulation (as a light or a temperature or 
chemical gradient”.
77
 This movement is posterior because the object of desire sought is 
highly indirect vis-à-vis the object doing the seeking. The next, less negative object will be 
the one guided by tropism, which is a direct turning towards a stimulus (e.g., food) - situated 
to the front, or anterior. Higher-order organisms with high degrees of motility belong to this 
category. An organism related to an object of desire in high posteriority (taxis) actually stands 
at a further distant from this object compared to one related in higher anteriority despite the 
fact that in hard distance the object in posteriority may even be more proximate than the one 
in anteriority. In this dissertation, the terms “distance” and “proximity” will replace 
“generality” and “specificity” as the theoretical device to be operationalized because the 
former pair captures more precisely the interactional nuance of “desiring” objects, although 
the orientations of “negativity” and “positivity” apply to both the same. Finally, the third 
heuristic, “interiority”, will be shown to mark a particular orientation towards objects, one 
emerging from a crucial turning-point in human history, one emerging during the French 
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Revolution. The significance of this turn will be corroborated by Foucault, who has already 
spoken of the pivotal turn from the Classical to the Modern age and in The History of 
Sexuality even speaks of the emergence of a new species in this same period, describing it - in 
Carla Freccero’s summary - not as a “specific identities or practices” but “changing official 
discourses” and “modalities of power”.
78
 He frames his assertion around the peculiar 
development of homosexuality out of historical sodomy. Although too involved a theoretical 
construct to develop at this point, what can be said about sodomy - as it pertains to the 
“negative-positive” spectrum just developed - is that if reproductive sexuality is orientated 
towards “positivity” sodomy will be orientated towards “negativity” and this will have 
important implications for the kinds of conclusions to come out at the end of this dissertation. 
This presentation of “negativity” raises the last important issue related to passion and it 
happens to be a namesake of this dissertation: discovery.  
The choice of underpinning this dissertation under the rubric: “discovery” is also in 
keeping with the avoidance of the problem of objects, established in this introduction. To say 
Sade avoids the problem of “interpretation” is no new proposition. Warman cited Hénaff 
earlier taking Sade’s writing to be “literal” because it “se soustrait à la métaphore” and 
“résiste au régime de l’interprétation”. What’s more, Sade avoids outright the body; it 
becomes itself its own terminus as Hénaff explains: 
Take a (human) body, strip it of all its symptoms, free this impassive matter of all expression, give a detailed 
description of its parts, just as you would a machine’s, and connect it to other bodies, for no grander purpose 
than sexual gratification. In this way, at one stroke you will drain the metaphorical reservoir, eliminate the 





The removal of the human body from sexual gratification necessarily shifts the purview 
beyond the “positive” privilege humankind is typically given especially concerning sexuality 
and its teleological end: generation. The opening up of the possibility of handling sexuality in 
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much broader and more “negative” terms requires a new conceptualisation. In this 
dissertation “discovery” dethrones the privilege given sexuality where it resides in individual 
bodies and ascends to the most “negative” conceptualisation of sexuality possible, one able to 
possibly incorporate in its range all four kingdoms: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal and 
the human. In other words, in Sade vanquishing “proximal” concerns for sexuality from 
individuals and species (e.g., tribes of humankind); he shifts the focus to much more “distal” 
themes. Although counterintuitive considering his notoriety as a pornography/ philosopher 
this dissertation will ultimately present Sade without sex. 
         *      *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     * 
0.4 The Works of Sade 
One of the strategic decisions to be made in this dissertation is to focus exclusively on 
what have often been called Sade’s minor works: Les 120 Journées de Sodome (1785), Aline 
et Valcour ou le Roman philosophique (1793) and Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795). All 
three span important phases of the French Revolution and their chronological positions help 
draw out vital themes concerning the social, political and intellectual changes afoot during 
the Revolution. Notably absent in this dissertation will be Sade’s major works La Nouvelle 
Justine, ou les malheurs de la vertu (1797) and Histoire de Juliette, ou les Prospérités du vice 
(1797), which together constitute a metaphysical diptych and are Sade’s most advanced and 
global statement of metaphysics in his oeuvre. Limitations of scope aside, two other reasons 
for bracketing these works out in this dissertation are as follows: a) these works lack the 
historical immediacy of the minor ones in being written later in Sade’s life when he had the 
benefit of hindsight to reflect more systematically on the themes he encounters during the 
most active period of his writing career; b) the works have already been used by Foucault in 
his own conceptualisation of the evolution of the object of scientific inquiry from the 
Classical to the Modern age in Les mots et les chose. It is a more worthwhile endeavor to find 
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a new test for deploying Sade in the History of Science and to see how it is that the works, 
written in real-time during actual events of the French Revolution, either corroborate or 
depart from Foucault’s thesis. In many ways, this dissertation sets up the parameters for a 
much more in-depth look at Justine and Juliette, parameters quite skeletal in Foucault’s 























Chapter One  
Epistemology of a Reverie 
1.1 Metaphysical Autobiographies 
Upon setting out to write what would be the final work of his illustrious literary career, 
Rousseau made the point of clarifying his intention not to undertake the same exercise Michel 
de Montaigne had done in his 1588 essay, “De l’experiencia”, which ended up actually being 
one of his final works. In his “Première Promenade” in his Les rêveries du promeneur 
solitaire Rousseau distinguished his project this way:  
I undertake the same enterprise Montagne did, but for a direct contrary purpose; he wrote his Essays only for 
others, I my Reveries intirely for myself. If in my more advanced age and on the verge of dissolution I remain 
[…] in the same disposition I shall reflect on reading these Reveries, the pleasure I experienced on writing them; 
and thus, recalling pastime shall redouble my existence. Even in spite of mankind, I shall yet enjoy the charms 





What is the meaning behind this adamant exclusion of his potential readers from concern for 
the aim of his book? And what is Rousseau saying, by way of a subtle criticism, of 
Montaigne’s effort to enlighten his readers? The answers to these questions happen to 
concern not only Sade’s life and work but also the problem of “objects” established in the 
introduction.  
Rêveries was really the next phase of a writing approach Rousseau had begun in his 
Confessions. He had set about curtailing the custom in literature of making of an author’s 
biography something of direct appeal to an audience at large, one including in its ranks critics, 
admirers and those of their progeny, who would one day be future readers. What then did this 
curtailment entail? It had always been the case that “biographies” of celebrated figures were 
essentially those of members of the audience as well (if the anachronism of such a term 
“biography” can be momentarily allowed). In essence, kings, saints and legendary heroes 
never had total control over what ended up on pages as “biographical” details whether written 
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by an interlocutor or posthumously by a chronicler; and if it was the case of an 
“autobiographical” exercise like that of Saint Augustine and his Confessiones, biographical 
details were meant to exemplify an ideality worth emulating, in Augustine’s case piety and 
obedience, the highest aim for every good (audience) member within the community of 
believers.
81
 Rousseau presented himself foibles and all, a list including such notables as his 
sexual proclivities to passive whipping acquired from being disciplined by his babysitter, 
Mlle Lambercier; his sexual encounter with his “Mama”, Madame de Warens; his admission 
of abandoning all five of his illegitimate children to lives of poverty in orphanages; and those 
narrations of dysfunction he shared with friends and associates like Diderot, Voltaire and one 
could have included Hume to the list had Rousseau appended a “Livre XIII” to his 
Confessions. The opening statement of his Confessions did more than just prepare his readers 
for the unsavory aspects of his own biography; he introduced a literary format whereby the 
traditional distance between author and audience appears to merge:  
Simply myself. I know my own heart and understand my fellow man. But I am made unlike any one I have ever 
met; I may be no better, but at least I am different. Whether Nature did well or ill in breaking the mould, in 




However, when writing Rêveries, this heightened concentration of Rousseau’s position as 
author ended up as severance with his audience, a severance commentators have often 
expressed in morbid terms as mental illness, with the typical symptomology: hypochondria, 
hallucinations, schizophrenia and mania, making the list. The epistemological feature of these 
rêveries will prove indispensable in how Sade dialogues with Rousseau and his metaphysical 
project; and how he goes on to extend it. 
In a 1783 letter in the early period of his literary career, Sade complained to his wife 
about how prison rules at Vincennes banned Confessions from entering his cell. This was so 
despite Sade’s claim Rousseau’s strict and severe ethics and religion motivated him towards 
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 and, more peculiarly, despite the fact other scientific texts of strident 
atheism could enter with little care or oversight. Sade notes the contradiction:  
To refuse me Jean-Jacques’ Confessions, now there’s an excellent thing, above all after having sent me 





This executive decision by prison authorities to deny Sade access to Confessions while 
allowing atheistic works to flow in freely appears at first glance to be contradictory until one 
considers the epistemological exuberance not shared with these other texts. This exuberance 
is deeply incompatible with regimes of order be they religious, legal or otherwise - much 
more so than what could constitute challenging scientific discourse but discourse easily 
assimulated within some institutional framework. This exuberance was central to not only 
how Sade developed as a writer but also how he should be located within the scientific 
discourse of his age. Rousseau and Montaigne are good departure points for engaging with 
Sade as the two made of reveries something of scientific concern but, more importantly for 
the beginning portion of this chapter, their work challenges some of the ready-made 
assumptions assumed to inform understanding of the History of Science in the Enlightenment 
and Sade’s placement therein. The germaneness of Montaigne’s work proves that enduring 
influence of a French tradition of skeptical epistemology. As for Rousseau, his approach of 
sensibilité in his scientific writings offer unique reflections on key terms in the History of 
Science such as “objects” and materialism. 
1.2 Armelle St-Martin and the History of the Evanescent Object of Science 
Well-versed in texts of Greek but more strongly Latin antiquity; immersed in the 
scientific and philosophical trends of the Renaissance, Montaigne is an enduring symbol of 
how older sources of knowledge could resonate in the scientific and philosophical milieu of 
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the French Enlightenment. Such a homegrown “other” source of knowledge challenges in 
some ways St-Martin’s thesis on the scientific origins of Sade’s oeuvre. In her collaboration 
with Valerio Cantafio Casamaggi in Sade et l’Italie, she foregrounds Sade’s “other” 
knowledge of science in his two voyages to Italy:  
[…] car si le Voyage […] peut être considéré comme la seulement authentique œuvre de jeunesse du marquis, sa 





It is certainly true that Sade learned a great many things in Italy that would have been 
difficult to acquire in a scientific climate in France trending towards fact-driven empirical 
approaches under the aegis of the likes of Condillac, the Encyclopedistes and Voltaire, their 
“propagandist-in-chief”. However, countertrends did exist that could have set Sade on his 
scientific pursuit even without ever having met on his travels Barthélemy Mesny, whom St-
Martin designated as one of Sade’s major influences. But St-Martin’s contention does “beg 
the question”: was it not the case that Sade arrived in Italy already knowing what he had in 
mind to discover? St-Martin even suggests as much when she links Sade’s Italian voyage to 
that unique feature of his own genealogy: an ancient relative of the Sade family, Laure de 
Noves, the “love object” in Petrarch’s famous sonnets
86
 and subject of dreams for a young 
Sade; and “[d]ès son enfance, le marquis sera imprégné de la culture, de la langue et de l’art 
italiens”.
87
 Schaeffer describes one dream sequence recounted by Sade later in one of his 
letters to his wife, which included the following passage from Petrarch’s sonnet: “O you who 
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suffer, come, this is the way/ Come to me, if you can see your way free.”
88
 Schaeffer would 
make of this incestual longing and desire to take his ancient relative, Laure, from those other 
men who possessed her in life and in lyric something of a significant resonance: 
Sade would make Laure his own muse. His drive to write, precisely like his feverish and often perverse 





Here knowledge is seen anchored at its beginning to something born of dreams, appearing as 
a reverie. The wisdom of the art critic Heinrich Wölfflin, delivered in a later century, gives 
the pithy reminder that knowledge comes by way of neither a turning point (St-Martin) nor 
novelty (Voltaire):  
The observation of nature is an empty notion as long as we do not know in what form the observation took 




And this, in a nutshell, is the very message Montaigne wanted to convey in his essay, “De la 
experiencia”. In the work Montaigne sets forth on his own journey of discovery from the very 
same position Rousseau would in both his Confessions and Rêveries: from the point of his 
own self and that knowledge he possessed. M.A. Screech reminds the reader of the particular 
cosmological orientation that would have informed Montaigne’s self:  
[a]ll individual human beings (as the scholastic philosophers put it) bore in themselves the entire “form” of the 




This is the sort of “negative” quality established in the introduction as saturating Sade’s 
oeuvre; and St-Martin is at her best when she exports ancient Italian science, handmaid to this 
scholastic tradition, as she does in her essay, “Sade’s System of Perversity and Italian 
Medicine” where she juxtaposes Galenic medical terms like “miasma” and “corruption” and 
Saint-Fond’s experimentations with “malevolent molecules”. However, the problem arrives 
for her when she gets entangled in the “negativity-positivity” of the vector she so incisively 
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adumbrates throughout her work. Had she relied on someone like Montaigne for an extension 
in degree of “negativity”, an extension very much appropriate to Sade’s scientific research, 
she could have been not so bound to the periodicity of Sade’s own writing. It is worth 
drawing out in full the justification of this assertion. 
In De la medicine chez Sade: Disséquer la vie, narrer la mort St-Martin situates Sade 
in the fluid debate concerning the origin of life in eighteenth-century embryology. In her 
exegeses at those three critical theoretical junctions in the embryological debate: 
“animalculisme”, “ovisme” and “épigenèse”, St-Martin is careful to emphasize Sade’s 
engagement with all three; and refusal to choose a favorite: 
Si Sade n’avait eu une comprehension étendue des phénomènes de la generation, il n’aurait jamais pu retourner 
si habiliment à son profit ces discour; en effet, l’animalculisme est pressuré au point où il renvoire à la fois à 
l’amour et au meurtre de sa progéniture, l’ovisme permet de travailler scientifiquement la haine envers la mére 
et bien entendu la théorie du mélange des deux semences [épigenèse], meme abordée de biais et diluée à des 




This is in keeping with her method of holding Sade to his unique “negative” scientific 
method, of whose description no “positive” word can ever be spoken, i.e., the moment Sade 
chooses any one of these three options for explaining definitively the origin of life, the 
“negativity” immediately becomes something “positive”. It is due to this apparent 
equivocation that those in posterity, who pan Sade’s scientific contribution as risible and 
inconsistent, really misunderstand the purpose of his research and the principle of his method. 
Picking up on the point mentioned in the introduction concerning Le Mettrie missing the 
“negative” ground to Needman’s description of animalculae - Le Mettrie beholden to his 
penchant for facts derived from experimentation and observation - St-Martin offers an 
alternative for understanding La Mettrie’s science; she denigrates his approach in 
experimentation while redeeming him in his “fictions”. After describing La Mettrie’s flair for 
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seasoning his scientific texts with literature and even poetry for maximum polemical (and 
dramatizing) effects, St-Martin locates where his strength really lies:  
[… u]n contemporain comme La Mettrie prouve à Sade que la science est loin d’être incompatible avec la 
fiction […] la cas lamettrien signife aussi qu’un fait positif transposé dans le lieu de la creation est poreux aux 




This partial critique of La Mettrie could apply to Sade for similar reasons and, though St-
Martin does not say so explicitly, Sade himself was inundated by proportionalities of 
“positivity” by the very fact all three embryological positions he worked with presupposed 
gendered “positivities”: “male” sperm and “female” ova even without needing to choose from 
any one of the positions. This limited perspective becomes troublesome for St-Martin 
especially concerning “épigenèse”, which she argued would have been useful to Sade for the 
obsolescence sperm-ova “hérédité” obtruded upon the divinely created homunculi of 
preformationism. Sade certainly was not the kind of atheist to negate God and the nuance of 
his position was enough to even convince Klossowski in an inverse matter that Sade must on 
account of his reveries be a theist. Le Brun states her case against Klossowski’s thesis in Sade, 
Mon Prochain where he claimed, in atheism’s failure, Sade is led back to normative 
Christianity:  
In this sense only […] could Sade definitely be considered an “insane man” […] “Beneath the mask of atheism”, 
writes Klossowski, as if to show us how deluded was the man who strove to rid himself and us of all illusions. 
And Klossowski succeeds, taking advantage of the deliberate absence of perspective in the Sadian world in 





Recourse to Montaigne brings Sade to a deeper degree of “negativity” that would not only 
forfeit the need to take from this “mélange des deux semences” a “God denying atheism” but 
also set up the location from where to undermine the claim for theism Klossowski advances. 
This assertion will now be justified. 
Screech gives a good account of the depth of Montaigne’s “negativity”:  
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[a]nd (more remarkably) Montaigne discovered that to think about women and their sexuality could also tell you 




And this view is far from exceptional in the conceptualization of gender in the Renaissance. 
Thomas Laqueur observes how, despite Renaissance anatomists’ impeccable understanding 
of the inner mechanics of male and female genitalia, there was a preference to see the two 
systems rather as a morphological inversion of one another - the uterus, ovaries and vagina 
became inverse reflections of the scrotum, testes and penis, respectively.
96
 By placing the 
cardinal significance on morphological similitude - and saying it is so despite the availability 
of “mechanics” - Laqueur almost anticipates the arrival of a “mechanical” alternative. 
Renaissance anatomists would only have to wait a little longer for Descartes to arrive on the 
scene and “mechanics”, handiwork of skilled artisans, would become the basis for a new 
metaphysical norm. The embryological debate St-Martin engages concerning Sade is born of 
this “mechanical” tradition with the difference being that the “positivity” ends up much 
sharper, aimed more penetratingly at physical matter. Arguably Sade’s “negativity” takes up 
an antecedent position, far enough back to even engage Montaigne and his own curious 
discourse of “ovisme”. Citing Erasmus’ Adages, Montaigne tells the story of a man from 
Delphi, who had a peculiar talent for telling eggs apart from distinguishing features and 
linking them to the brooding hen, to which each belonged.
97
 Montaigne derives from this 
anecdote the deeper implication regarding particularities and generalities:  
[…] unlikeness obtrudes into anything we make […] Likeness does not make things ‘one’ as much as unlikeness 




He then goes on to articulate the problem “unlikeness” brings to legislators, judges, 
philosophers and theologians of his age, whose vocations depend on the “positivities” derived 
from the unlikenesses they see in the world: 
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The multiplicity of our human inventions will never attain to the diversity of our cases. Add a hundred times 
more: but never will it happen that even one of all the many thousands of cases which you have already isolated 
and codified will ever meet one future case to which it can be matched and compared so exactly that some detail 
or some other specific item does not require a specific judgment. There is hardly any relation between actions 




As it was for Sade, Montaigne believed the overarching unifier was nature: “[n]ature always 
gives us happier laws than those we give ourselves”;
100
 but, a pious, (monotheistic) Catholic, 
Montaigne held nature was the creation of the Christian God. And it is at this junction where 
Sade is far more relevant an atheist than the type St-Martin discusses in reference to 
“épigenèse”. D’Holbach was cited earlier describing monotheism: “‘leisurely’ 
metaphysicians and theologians as ‘subtilly’ partitioning off ‘nature from herself’ and from 
nature’s ‘energy’ creating an ‘incomprehensible being’” (p. 23). It is from the transition from 
polytheism to theism where Iwan Bloch in his 1899 work, Marquis de Sade: His Life and 
Work elucidates a polytheistic “negativity” breaching the monotheistic veneer, the kind 
Klossowski is so adamant to uphold. Bloch recaps that same evolution from “idolatry” to 
“metaphysics” d’Holbach traced earlier, but inserts the figure of Satan less a monotheistic 
opposite to God, i.e., Satan being substantially “positive”; and more the encapsulation of the 
whole of the polytheistic spirit threatening the monotheistic one. Bloch states:  
[t]he height of religious sexual mysticism was reached in the so-called “Satan’s Church”. Satan here become the 
“Personification of the Physical Mysterium of Copulation” as protest against the exclusive mastery of 
“Metaphysical Mysticism of Idolatry” […] Satan-Satyr, Satan-Pan, and Satan-Phallus was the ancient God of 
instincts and corporeal passions, equality honored by the highest and lowest in spirit, inexhaustible source of joy 




Bloch supports this assertion by describing the plethora of defiled sacred objects; utterances 
of extreme blaspheme and even narrations of Black Masses, citing even one example in 
Juliette.
102
 Le Brun would years later confirm Bloch’s line of inquiry in her notion of “vital 
atheism”:  
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[only Sade] was capable of canceling this crisis of representation concerned only with representing the crisis [… 
only he] could preserve us from the deception of a thought originally designed for unmasking, but which had 




The reach of Sade’s “negativity” arguably recedes even further behind the lines of polytheism 
and into the natural world but for now it suffices to say that in unraveling “negativity” in 
reverse in the abbreviated historical survey just presented, Sade is speaking to much more 
than just the theoretical concerns of the science of this age; he is also engaging with its 
history and adumbrating the evanescent object of science that moves throughout. The story of 
an egg has been shown to have a long history in the history of Western science (and will be a 
reoccurring theme in this dissertation) but it is only in these pagan rites where concern for its 
origin is most “negative” - in the act of copulation. St-Martin - along with the vector she 
adumbrates - deserves credit for at least cracking open this line of inquiry concerning objects, 
ones imbued with different proportionalities of “negativity” and “positivity”. 
1.3 Rousseau and the Mechanism of Object Formation in his Science of “Sensibilité”  
 
 The question of “objects” plays an important role in Rousseau’s science of sensibilité. 
But as a scientific method St-Martin sees the scope of sensibilité covering only diverse ranges 
of locations:  





Not content to base this claim on her own insight St-Martin cites a familiar source, one used 
earlier to subtly draw out that critique of d’Alembert’s blind faith in “positive” knowledge in 
Diderot’s d’Alembert’s Dream: Théophile de Bordeu: 
Ainsi, l’animal est un vaste réseau sensible [… c]’est sous ce point de vue general qu’il semble qu’on doive 
suivre les fonctions de la vie, qui se tiennent les unes aux autres d’une manière admirable, et qui dependent 
toutes de l’influence ou de l’action de la fibre animal ou sensible, diversement repliée, contournée, appuyée, 




In the introduction it was stated that it was not the range of locations that was the problem for 
sensibilité but its diversity of meaning including that one inappropriate pairing: the 
                                                          
103
 Annie Le Brun, op. cit., 212. 
104
 Armelle St-Martin, op. cit., 167. 
105
 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
44 
 
contradiction, seen in Vila and Riskin’s respective “celebrations” and “renunciations” of 
“facts”. If statements: “A object is B object” and “A object is not B object” are mutually 
exclusive, according to Aristotle’s Law of Non-contradiction, with presentations of “objects” 
now containing different proportions of “negativity” and “positivity”, “facts” really become 
choices of orientation in either one of these two directions. It is in this way that the apparent 
contradiction emerging in Vila and Riskin’s use of “facts” finds some resolution. Rousseau’s 
notion of “morale sensitive” has already been introduced amidst this confusion and it is to its 
clarification that this section now turns.  
If the previous section was interested in offering a historical survey of the “object” of 
scientific inquiry, this section will consider the mechanism of this “object’s” production. It 
will also set up the preliminaries to develop Sade’s unique treatment of this mechanism, who 
in overwhelming Rousseau, ultimately manages to alter the constitution of this mechanism 
with interesting ramifications for science. (This alteration will be shown as Sade’s 
transmutation of Rousseau’s virtue into vice but the specifics will be taken up later.) Riskin’s 
handling of sensibilité will be shown to be more useful towards this end than Vila’s. Vila 
does well presenting sensibilité’s pathological tendencies when unhinged in individuals but 
presents it in a much more limited scope compared with Riskin, who sees the wider historical 
potential for sensibilité to produce social “pathos”, “pathos” defined here as “suffering”, 
using the older definition of the word.
106
 In a footnote concerning the attribution of blame for 
the spasms of violence produced by the French Revolution, Riskin clears up a misconception 
concerning “culprit” Rousseau that mistakenly put him on the side of a Burkean argument,
107
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While [Francois] Furet attributed the absolutism of social unity in Rousseau’s ideal polity to his “atomization” 
of the social world, [Jean] Starobinski emphasized instead Rousseau’s rejection of atomic reduction. Rousseau, 
according to Starobinski invoked the “immediate union” of fluid [in a crystal], whose absolute oneness was 
measured by their transparency, as a better model than pulverized crystal [in mirror], the inferiority of whose 




The subtle attention paid here to the respective materialities of crystals and mirrors is 
important as it preserves not only the “negative” space intended for relations, i.e., 
Starobinski’s unions of crystals; but also those “positive” aggregates that form “object” 
mirrors. And what are these “positive objects” then? They are mirrors, comprised of 
pulverized pieces that have flaked off of reductive sciences. These pieces - in atomized states 
- combine to create opaque objects but ones that project back like a mirror. These mirrors 
present the “organizers” of these “objects” beholden to their own reflections as “doubles” just 
as Foucault would have it in his discussion of the emergence of Modern science.
110
 This 
“crystal” will be in fact an important feature in this dissertation; its contrast with the “mirror” 
will be fully clarified in Chapter 6.1. But for now the question of reveries once again figures 
importantly as both the manner and substance of Rousseau’s presentation of “morale 
sensitive” are held under their sway despite the basis of the argumentation, being stated as 
materialistic. How this is so needs explaining. Also, it is easier to assess reveries’ affect in 
Sade’s work by first making Rousseau the starting point. 
 The tumultuous relations Rousseau maintained with many amongst the members of 
the literary coterie in Paris, centered on his relationship with the character, Baron von Grimm, 
who could be taken as the chief antagonist in Les Confessions. The conflict between the two 
men that would dominate the work from “Livre VIII: 1750-1752” onward really begins with 
a “reverie” and a very peculiar transformation. At about the time Rousseau had finally made a 
                                                          
108




 See Chapter 9, ‘Man and His Double’ in The Order of Things for a more detailed account. 
46 
 
name for himself with the success of his opera, The Village Soothsayer, Grimm, a neophyte 
to the Paris scene and beneficiary of his association with Rousseau, had a morbid spell of 
melancholy caused by unrequited love, one so strong he was incapacitated for a period. 
Rousseau, along with a friend Abbé Rayal, had to help nurse him back to health, and back to 
his senses. Strangely enough, it was this episode that propelled Grimm to fame. Rousseau 
explains how Grimm tried in vain to woo Marie Fel, lady of fellow Encyclopèdiste Louis de 
Cahusac: 
This incident did not fail to make a stir, and it really would have been a marvelous story if an opera girl’s hard-
heartedness had caused a man to die of despair. This magnificent passion made Grimm fashionable; so he was 
considered a prodigy of love, friendship, and devotion of every sort. This reputation caused him to be sought 
after and fêted in high society, and so took him far from me, who had never been anything but a makeshift. I 




Making a trifle out of such a display, one treacherous towards de Cahusac, would be the 
guiding repulsion that set Rousseau on his course to sketch out the topography of his works 
Émile, La nouvelle Héloïse and the Contrat social. Grimm’s story of unrequited love 
demonstrates well how it is possible that something substantively “positive” can emerge from 
as “negative” a phenomenon as a “reverie”. To Grimm’s “love-sickness”, i.e., a physiological 
reaction to the obstruction of a physical yearning, was superadded a quality of theatricity, 
whose performative value takes on the status of something advantageous and singular, a 
“positive object”. Rousseau worried about the threat such artificiality posed to the integrity of 
the human body and “soul” and fretted about the very possibility that nature itself could be 
supplanted in the manner the hapless Cahusac was by Grimm and those spectators, who 
lionized his display of apparent “sublime” love. In response Rousseau developed his 
“materialist” system, “morale sensitive”, to promote natural remedies for health and well-
being - or to use Vila’s expression, to promote “moral hygiene”. As stated earlier the aim of 
this section is to lay out the mechanisms of the two systems Grimm and Rousseau both 
present in this curious anecdote. However, the two systems have ready-made designations 
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and, though not yet stated, will ground discussions from now on in real historical categories: 
the “negative” school of the “Physiocrats”; and the “positive” school of the “Ideologues”.  
 In the epilogue to Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 
1650-1750 Jonathan I. Israel, determined to present a united front between Spinoza and 
Rousseau concerning a shared perspective on nature, finds the link in Rousseau’s educational 
program for Émile. Though satisfied with only very low degrees of corroboration in both 
systems and generally far too enthusiastic to see Spinoza’s shadow over every aspect of the 
Enlightenment canon, Israel does see the monistic reach of Rousseau’s views on education, 
which, for our purposes, telescopes nicely Rousseau and Grimm’s respective involvements in 
the “Marie Fel Affair” into the conditions informing Rousseau’s pedagogical choices for 
Émile:  
Émile grows into a youth who represents Rousseau’s social ideals of the ‘natural man’ whose life is based on the 
authentic needs and aspirations of men and who lack the frivolity, vices, empty courtesy, addiction to fashion 




The choices, Rousseau presents here, also correspond with contrasting assumptions and 
practices of once again that more general theoretical pairing of the time: the Physiocrats and 
Ideologues. Foucault is one intellectual with sufficient discernment to recognize in each of 
these schools more than just opposing “positive” and “negative” trajectories; he also intuits in 
their hazy midst some shared inception. He brings the two almost to the point of convergence 
in an analogy from the plastic arts:  
[a]ll that is perceived positively and, as it were, in relief, in one of these two interpretations is perceived 






 capture the vagaries of this interplay but the pedagogical tenets 
Rousseau develops for Émile have a kind of “plain dealing” that strips down the “fashionable” 
complexity of even Foucault’s own analysis. Rousseau also developed his “materialist” 
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system of moral hygiene aware of the same dueling concerns about formulation as many of 
his contemporaries did including theorists like the Physiocrat Quesnay and the Ideologue 
Condillac. The Physiocrats backstopped wealth at nature, in Foucault’s words:  
[…] agriculture [but any primary resource industry, e.g., fish stocks for a coastal city] is a manufacturing of 





It follows from this that wealth and its proper distribution within a judiciously calibrated 
economic system depended on certain actor profiles, whose qualities were actually subjects in 
Émile’s own inculcation: “honesty”:  
[…] the creation of value is therefore not a means of satisfying a greater number of needs; it is the sacrifice of a 




“plain dealing”:  
[…] it is not the trade that has produced the superfluity of goods [even when hauled from afar], the excess must 




and “self-reliance”:  
[…] ground rents must capture the “net product” of a lived area: “remuneration for all […] work” and 





Foucault’s “economisms” aside, the underlying impetus in this model is sensibilité; its 
“negativity” is established strictly on the basis of relations. And as for the alternative 
character profiles: “frivol”, “fashion” and “flattery” of the educational programs Rousseau 
resisted - qualities Grimm came to embody in Les Confessions - Foucault gives a satisfactory 
summation in his section “Utility” when he described how Ideologues saw value emerging 
from conditions “unstable”: “[…] modifiable with men’s [relative and changing] appetites, 
desires and needs”;
119
 “unequal”:  
[…] despite the fact that each element traded has an intrinsic value - more value is acquired than was originally 
possessed [… i]nstead of two immediate utilities, one has two others which are considered to satisfy larger 
needs; 
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and “ungrounded”:  
[…] all these positive elements which constitute value are based upon a certain state of need present in men, and 




Foucault called the mechanism of this value: “articulation of exchange”; and it is not a great 
leap to see an ambitious sycophant like Grimm striving to express himself in a manner just as 
“articulate”. His spell of love-sickness, the streams of amorous sonnets flowing from languid, 
semi-conscious lips constitute a further manner of this “articulation”, one of a popular (love) 
trope, winning Grimm admission into the Parisian salon. But an economic explanation for 
“articulation of exchange” actually offers the widest possible perspective for how “positive 
objects” are produced. In Wealth of Nations Smith notably assigns erudition its own 
“divisions of labour”
121
 and fashion, by this same logic, deserves a designation of its own 
amongst a certain class of people. Smith offers here the purest yet broadest description of 
what constitutes “positive objects” and how they are produced: 
Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object when the whole 
attention of their minds is directed towards a single object than when it is dissipated among a variety of things. 
But, in consequence of the division of labour the whole of every man’s attention comes naturally to be directed 
towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that some one or other of those 
who are employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of 




Rousseau developed his educational program to counter the world of Smith’s trenchant 
description and if Émile was Rousseau’s apprentice; Julie would be his master and queen.  
Five or so years after the “Marie Fel Affair” Rousseau set in motion his final retreat 
from Parisian high society and it came with a decisiveness that surprised even those with 
whom he was parting company: he left for the Hermitage “not wait[ing] for the return of the 
fine weather” and did so “with loud derision” from the d’Holbach circle who expected him to 
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“return with his tail between his legs” after only “three months of solitude”.
123
 Vila linked 
Rousseau’s “return to nature” as part of a greater trend amongst some Physiocrats, who felt 
hampered by economic arguments that neglected to tackle “hygienic” concerns; she 
highlights Tissot in particular: 
[he] argues in favour of correcting the current social conditions that have led to a concentration of wealth, 
bodies, and moral/cultural authority in the cities, while the countryside has been depopulated and devalorized. 
Tissot, however, gives a peculiarly medical twist to the Physiocratic “back to the country” campaign: placing 
hygiene before economics, he argues that the necessary first step in social reform is to improve health of 




“Going back to the country” was no abstract argument for Rousseau though. His return to the 
Hermitage was an attempt to capture a spirit he had left behind in 1742 when he first left for 
Paris to pursue his music career; it was the spirit of his transient years when he lived with his 
“Mama”, Madame de Warens, in her country cottage in Les Charmettes, Chambery. The 
hygienic programme he had hoped to develop in his Morale sensitive, ou Le Matérialisme du 
sage (a book that was never written, however) had its inception in this period and the role his 
“Mama” played in the program really is a defining feature though one passed over in Vila’s 
analysis. (The role “Mama” played in Rousseau’s system will be the subject of the next 
section.) But for now the way Vila discusses the hygienic programmes of Tissot and 
Rousseau raises interesting comparisons. For Tissot, she described him as being as interested 
in curbing the ebullience of “mental faculties”
125
 as he was the superfluous expenditures of 
sperm in masturbation as stated in his L’onanisme. Dissertation sur les maladies produites 
par la masturbation. Rustic health discouraged excess of all kinds and, in Vila’s words, was 
“insensible” in the manner of a hardy peasant:  
[he is] so naturally impassive or insensible that ‘the loss of the people dearest to him hardly touches him at all; 
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For Rousseau, Vila presents him as anything but “insensible”. The hygienic problem he sets 
up for Julie and delivers through the “insensible” Wolmar, Julie’s husband, from the 
beginning of Part Two of La nouvelle Héloïse, is only as successful as it gives allowances for 
Julie’s sensibilité to pulsate freely through all the micro-channels of this highly managed 
community of Clarnes. A pulsation that happens to also be the anodyne for Julie’s former 
“still heartbroken” lover from Part One, Saint-Preux, though one prescribed with the clinical 
touch of Wolmar. In what Vila’s calls his “image replacement” therapy Wolmar takes those 
two “objects”: the “fatal spot” where the former lovers first fell into passion and the “kiss”, 
the fateful precipice, and remakes them into something promoting the hygiene of the whole 
community:  
[Wolmar] executes a new kiss between the old lovers in the grove with the express intent of […] replacing 




But herein lies the apparent contradiction in the mechanism of Rousseau’s materialist system 
that he intended to publish in the Morale sensitive, ou Le Matérialisme du sage. Wolmar 
embodies this peasant wisdom that came in from behind Julie to stabilize her sensibilité and, 
ipso facto, make her the centre and beginning of life for her community. If Julie be the fons et 
arigo of life in Clarnes, how does it follow that it is impassive objects, embodied by this 
“folksy” Wolmar, that are the true sources? This apparent contradiction is also on display in 
the regime of “austerity”
128
 Wolmar established for Julie: 
[Julie] was formed to know and taste every pleasure […] is able to enjoy that supreme pleasure peacefully […] 




With a “negative-positive” scale in place, one situated within a greater “posteriority-
anteriority-interiority” complex, it is now possible to see a scaled sensibilité rather than a 
dichotomous choice between either “sensible” or “insensible”. The “objects” of Rousseau’s 
materialism are highly “negative” and are contained in relations of high tropism, 
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characteristic of the “anterior phase” as outlined in the introduction. Even the directness of 
those character profiles: “honesty”, “plain-dealing” and “self-reliance” developed in Émile’s 
educational programme and the Physiocrats’ own economic policy confirm a like “tropism”. 
These objects contrast with the much more “positive” ones of Grimm and Smith’s 
presentation and their formations will be the focus of Chapter 3.1 when “anteriority” begins 
to shift in the direction of “interiority”. The cornucopian description Rousseau gives of the 
canopy Wolmar provides for Julie is both Émile, in full manhood, and the full 
implementation of the Physiocrats’ land reform:  
Our table is furnished with nothing but viands of our own growth, our dress and furniture are almost all 
composed of the manufactures of the country: nothing is despised with us because it is common, nor held in 
esteem because it is scarce. As every thing that comes from abroad is liable to be disguised, or adulterated, we 
confine ourselves, as much through nicety as moderation, to the choice of the best home-commodities, the 
quality of which is never suspect. Our meals are plain, but choice; and nothing is wanting to make ours a 
sumptuous table, but the transporting it a hundred leagues off; in which case ever thing would be delicate, every 





The objects of Rousseau’s materialism, developed in his concept of “morale sensitive”, have 
their origin in this Clarens micro-economy but more profoundly in Rousseau’s time at 
Chambery estates. Despite being saturated in a “negative” backdrop, “objects” for Rousseau 
and the Physiocrats still end up with their own high dosage of “positivity” and henceforth are 
even substantively comparable in some ways to those formed by the mechanism laid out 
earlier by Smith (p. 49); and embraced by the Ideologues. And how is this so? Rousseau and 
the Physiocrats’ choices have a latent “positivity”, recalling d’Holbach’s earlier words to the 
effect: what is either “congenial” or “inimical” to “man” (p. 23). These are clearly not the 
conclusions Sade would arrive at even though the ground of his exploration is much closer to 
Rousseau and the Physiocrats than say Smith and the Ideologues.  
1.4 Towards the Plenum of a New Immateriality: Rousseau and Residue from 
Chambery Estates 
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 It was suggested early on in this chapter that Rousseau’s posture in Confessions vis-à-
vis his audience was one of increasing convergence. With his materialism explained, it is now 
not too difficult to imagine how it is that by the time Rousseau wrote Dialogues, ou Rousseau 
Juge de Jean-Jacques (1772-76) he had attained in his authorial positionality full synonymy 
with this audience. In this work Rousseau really takes on the identity of Julie in La nouvelle 
Héloïse as if he had vicariously learned in full the lessons of Wolmar and could now be the 
horizon for the universes of all his readers, just like its “General Will” laid out in his Contrat 
Social. In the eponymously titled section of the “Troisième Dialogue” Rousseau presents 
himself and “the People” as one and the same: 
Voilà ce qu’il n’a point cru, je vous assure. Il a dû s’attendre aux cruelles vengeances de tous ceux qu’offensent 
la vérité, & il s’y est attend. Il savoit que les Grands, les Visers, les Robins, les Financiers, les Médecins, les 
Prêtres, les Philosophes & tous les gens de parti qui sont de la société un vrai brigandage […] Si cet home ne fût 
point né, J.J., malgré l’audace de ses censures eût vécu dans l’infortune & dans la gloire, & les maux don’t on 





Given the intricacy of his materialism, a statement like this is more than just political 
grandstanding of a megalomaniacal “proto-revolutionary” that some have made him out to be. 
Rather it works on a particular self-positioning built on a structure, stemming first from 
Émile’s education then the system of Clarnes estates and finally, and more fundamentally, the 
person of Madame de Warens in her country cottage in Chambery. One of the distinctions 
Israel made concerning Rousseau’s monism is that unlike Spinoza’s Rousseau maintained 
two substances: a material and an immaterial. In Rousseau’s words (through Israel):  
‘Matter in motion according to fixed laws,’ […] ‘point me to an intelligence’ and also ‘some common end 




This section will explore this usage of “immateriality” with the impertinent hope of draining 
it of the mechanical imprint it bears in being the materialist “other” of Cartesian dualism and 
recruit the term for a new expressiveness, exploiting its inherent grammatical resistance to 
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materialism, whose dismantling of course is one of the challenges this dissertation has set for 
itself. Just as important is the maintenance of that self-referentiality holding Rousseau to his 
notion of “General Will”, characteristic of the period of his Dialogues. Montaigne from his 
antecedent position will have a supporting role in all of this but ultimately the aim is to have a 
structure in place well suited for Sade to arrive with his own manner of extension. 
A peculiar feature of Rousseau’s contrat social is its departure from most theoretical 
starting points that seek to explain authentic social organizations from positions of proximity. 
Hobbes is one of the first to begin this way when he conceived of equality in the human 
domain as a generality of “self-regards”:  
For such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more 
eloquent or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their 
own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than 
unequal. 133 
 
In the opening to the first part of Leviathan Hobbes offers up a mechanic’s guide to what 
constitutes humanity from biology all the way up to society, and although Hobbes describes 
the formative basis as built “at a distance”, this distance is one that barricades objects in the 
similar proximity Boyle places “corpuscles” that fill out all scales of phenomena: 
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not 
say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial 
life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, 
giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that 
rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a 





In the middle of the next century the moral philosopher, David Hume, in A Treaties of 
Human Nature, shifted from Hobbes’ mechanical emphasis (and the impotence mechanical 
reductionism entailed) and introduced social organizations guided by “passions”, something 
coming to the core of this dissertation’s position. Hume proposed a two-tier system of human 
sentiment, one built of two seemingly contradictory trajectories: the imagination tending to 
                                                          
133
 Ibid, 107. (Emphasis added) 
134
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1999), 1-2.  
55 
 
bypass comparisons in closest proximity and particularity, reaching instead towards those 
more distant and general; and the passions, which respond “livelier” to objects closer than 
those ones more distant. Comparisons, according to Hume, engendered social artifice and 
inauthenticity while “passions” were authentic, though they never seemed to touch down on 
any bedrock of consciousness; in this way they appear “relational”, in the orbit of 
“negativity”. Hume summarized the inauthenticity of comparison in this analogy:  
When we love the father or master of a family, we think little of his children or servants. But when these are 
present with us, or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them, the nearness and contiguity in this case 





The comparisons of Hume’s concern are social expectations and mores, mobile and receding 
further and further into greater generalities representable in those material and conceptual 
objects comprising all social structures be they economic, political or religious. The manner, 
in which these comparisons mold human conduct and intentionality, gives them a use-value 
that cannot be too dissimilar from how “division of labor” improved pins in Smith’s “pin 
factory”: a new manner of accommodation of the “master’s” children or a new courtesy given 
his wife are sure to pay dividends of a much more “negative” currency. Rousseau builds his 
“General Will” out of passion occupying the distal space Hume actually reserves for 
“comparisons”:  
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in 




Again, what is inverted here is how Hume had built passion out of proximity to individual 
subjectivity. In that telling example from his Treatise where a passer-by on the seashore bears 
witness to a sinking ship and feels “sympathy” for the suffering, proximity is presented as 
outpacing distal comparisons.
137
 The extent of Rousseau’s inversion of Hume’s scheme is 
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apparent when comparing the grammatical subtleties of those philosophical expressions used 
in Rousseau’s Dialogues: “amour de soi-même” and “amour proper”. Whereas “love of one-
self” is built on a natural distance of “love” being adjectively modified by the conjunctional 
phrase “of the reflexive (any) ‘third-person singular’”, “love” in “amour proper” is possessed 
solely by whomever the “own” is modifying. Citing Rousseau, Vila confirms this definitional 
nuance but also elucidates the respective emanations and terminations both forms end up 
becoming:  
Amour de soi-même […] is an instinctive urge to ‘extend one’s being and one’s enjoyment’; amour proper, by 
contrast, a ‘desire generated’ mode of self-love that prompts humans to reflect and compare themselves 




“Amour de soi-même”, along with what can only be related to “General Will”, possesses 
what will be shown to be a “plenum” shape. As the “plenum” will have an important role in 
developing the metaphysics of both Rousseau and Sade, conceptualizing it out of themes 
already developed in this dissertation is the best way to justify its use.  
In the history of cosmology the “plenum” connotes a “negative” space - not that kind 
opened up by Newton in this presentation of the “vacuum” - rather it was much closer to 
something like pure motion. Descartes conceptualises space as what can only ever be jam 
packed with total matter, the perception of space being only what is perceived as the relative 
position of this matter at differing intervals of motion. Descartes accounts for this 
discrepancy of space, by first introducing “internal” place, which he calls the location of 
“vulgar” motion, vulgar in that motion is only considered for changes in an object’s position 
vis-à-vis proximal “objects” surrounding it. He then presents “external place” as surfaces of 
proximal bundles of objects, which are necessarily more distant, given the sense of what is 
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proximal is closer to something approaching restfulness. Descartes uses an analogy of a man 
sitting on a moving ship to explain his point: 
[…] a man sitting on a ship that is leaving port thinks he is moving relative to the shore which he regards as 
fixed; but he doesn’t think of himself as moving relative to the ship, because his relations to its parts remain 
unchanged. We ordinarily think of motion as involving action, and of rest as the stopping of action, ·and by that 





Descartes’ plenum is presented as relational, built with similar concerns for “proximity” and 
“distality” already highlighted in this dissertation. In his emphasis on relations, Descartes is 
able to reject the notion that matter has indivisible (and proximal) end points as was 
suggested by many from the Corpuscularian School of his time (atomism). In a similar way, 
he is doing something much different than Newton, who believed space not to be a substance 
like matter was (or even necessarily filled with matter) but an entity in its own right, one he 
believed his calculus could detect. Devoid of matter in this way, metaphysics could thus do 
away with concerns for relations. In these ways, Newton takes up an opposing position to 
Descartes that will be important when considering Rousseau and Sade’s metaphysics. 
However, there are two positions in Descartes’ erudition that problematize the proximity-
distality scale he so incisively suggests. These are vortices and the notion of the non-extended 
soul. The distance Descartes pursued had a directional dimension, the plenum was 
astrophysical, and it had as its source those swirling vortices, whose centrifugal forces carry 
the whole of the universe along its circular belts. Just as it was with the man motionless on a 
moving ship yet moving relative the passing shoreline so too was it for the world, in 
Descartes words:  





The directionality and quality vortices had in being something somewhere depletes it of its 
quality of “negativity”, making them necessarily “positive” and consequently proximal as 
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even Alpha Centari is proximal to the astrophysicist who can describe it, explore it and locate 
it on a map. In a similar way, the non-extended soul too confronts a similar problem: it is 
immaterial yet it belongs to someone. Nothing could be more proximal and less relational 
than that. The plenum for Rousseau and Sade works very differently. It is neither somewhere 
nor something with this or that quality; it is absolute relationality. Although Descartes charts 
a useful course in his exploration of “negativity”, the manner of motion he describes is 
outside the purview of what will be seen as “negative” in this paper. The “plenum” of our 
concern has already been adumbrated in the curious manner Rousseau places Julie within 
Clarens estates and it is to this positioning we now return. 
The source of Claren’s upheaval in the first half of the book, Julie would take on an 
inverse role in the latter half as its radiating source of energy and health as if she were the 
queen of a beehive. When she is agitated the whole hive comes to tumult; when she is 
mollified it returns to order again. Fittingly, Vila called Julie the “queen bee of Clarens”.
141
 
Another way of considering the “plenum’s” “negative” orientation is to turn to another 
famous beehive, that one in D’Almbert’s Dream. Diderot took too astute notice of the 
vagaries of beehives and like Rousseau intuited a reactivity of deep-seated eroticism. 
However, Diderot set his gaze first upon individual worker bees and worked his way up to an 
organizing logic, i.e., the queen. This pattern of starting from the smallest entities and 
working up towards an aggregate of organizational coherence is still a highly fashionable 
approach in modern scientific discourse especially in theories of evolution, e.g., Darwin’s 
1859 On the Origin of Species or Dawkins’ 1976 The Selfish Gene. Here Diderot reflects on 
the simple rules of attraction and repulsion of rudimentary entities; and perceives therefrom 
an incremental logic and order: 
[…] he'll tell you that the second bee would pinch the one next to it, that in the entire cluster there would be as 
many sensations aroused as there are small animals, that everything will get aroused, shift itself, change position 
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and shape, that a noise will arise, small cries, and that someone who had never seen a group like that arrange 




Such an order of articulation confirms Israel’s manner of distinguishing Rousseau’s 
interpretation of “volonté générale” from another version, Diderot’s.
143
 He contends 
Rousseau had 
[…] a far more developed conception […] only […] realiz[able] in the context of civil society, under the State, 




As for Diderot it was the case that “General Will” emerged almost as an exceptional 
occurrence in a phenomenon otherwise general as Israel cites Diderot saying in his article in 
the Encyclopédie, “Droit naturel”: “the individual is always driven to seek only his own 
welfare so that inevitably “les volonté particulières sont suspectes”.
145
 Admittedly a radical 
claim, starting any metaphysical system from such “particularities” is ad initio an “object” 
beginning and ultimately leads to a mechanistic explanation; and, for this reason, Rousseau’s 
approach is unique and a “negative” answer to a tradition that has followed in the wake of 
Hobbes’ position. In her consideration of Julie, the “Queen bee”, Vila intimates with what 
Rousseau filled the “plenum” he developed. And since it was not a “vacuum”, it had to have 
some kind of content:  
Julie must stay strong and virtuous and healthy; if she were to falter, morally or physically, the network of 




Here Vila recognizes the importance of “virtue” in Rousseau’s monism. “Virtue” is what fills 
his “plenum”. 
 The monistic vision Rousseau develops for “virtue” comes by way of a line of 
argumentation more often than not mistaken as one of the first forays into anthropological/ 
sociological speculation. In his Discours sur l’origin de l’inégalité Rousseau talks a lot about 
origins, especially of language, of “civil society” but as just demonstrated origins for him do 
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not have that “bottom-up” meaning that tends towards “positive” beginnings (like Diderot’s 
beehives). Meaning comes to him rather in gradations receding towards deeper “negativity”. 
Take the following quotation regarding “virtue” for instance and see how it need not 
necessarily be read as an anthropological beginning but rather a decline into a deeper aspect 
of nature:  
It would seem at first glance that men in the state of nature, having no kind of moral relationships between them, 
or any known duties could be neither good nor evil, and that they could have neither vice nor virtue in the 
individual those characteristics which might be injurious to his own preservation and ‘virtue’ those which might 





Though Rousseau conceded Hobbes’ point that humankind had a claim to the things he 
needs, Rousseau scolded him for giving them over to passionate imaginings that aim for sole 
proprietorship of the universe.
148
 Rousseau wrote Discours in 1755 about seventeen years 
before his Dialogues, that book where he controversially presents himself as the glaze over 
the entire universe. Is such self-positioning on par with the self-absorption Hobbes expounds 
about as some have concluded? Antoine Lilti in his “The Writing of Paranoia: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and the Paradoxes of Celebrity” identifies such rash conclusions of the likes of 
Jacques-Henri Meister, who claimed Dialogues be the result of a “dark imagination, exalted 
to the point of delirium” or Johann-Gottfried Herder, who believed the work be the product of 
the machinations of one of Rousseau’s enemies, who wrote the book and used Rousseau’s 
moniker in order to discredit him.
149
 However, Lilti acknowledges Foucault as one of the few 
to recognize the uniqueness of this work:  
[Foucault] set it in the framework of the autobiographical works, between the Confessions and the Reveries. But 
above all, he tore the text away from the theme of madness, in stressing its coherence and hidden rigor. With 
this move, the text escaped from the paradigm of insanity to be integrated fully into the body of Rousseau’s 
work. As Foucault memorably put it: “the work, by definition, is non-madness.” Yet at the same time, by the 
very gesture of breaking the link between the text and its author, and claiming to do a purely semiotic reading, 
Foucault also broke with what is at the heart of the text: the affirmation of an existential suffering and the 
demand for its recognition. Foucault treated Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques entirely as a literary text, when 
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Foucault suggests the kind of continuity being drawn in this chapter concerning this trilogy of 
works. If any “necessity” exists for Rousseau (he hated that word) it is that for him to be able 
to articulate his monistic vision, the “object” could neither be something outside himself 
which was the fatal flaw of the mechanics of materialists from Descartes through to Newton 
and beyond; nor is the “object” something inside himself from that proximal position passion 
worked for Hobbes and Hume. Rousseau managed this conundrum in Dialogues in a similar 
manner to Montaigne, who in his essay, “Sur l’inéquité entre les hommes”, does away with 
“objects”, resonating with objectivity and subjectivity of that highly “negative” variety 
common in the late Renaissance: kingliness and serfdom:
151
  
[…] if you haggle over a horse, you strip off its trappings and examine it naked and base - or if he does wear an 
ornamental cover as used to be the case for horses offered to sale to royalty, it was only spread over the 
inessentials […] so that you should not waste time over its handsome coat or its broad crupper but mainly 




But Montaigne’s final message in this work - a work happening also to explore inequality - 
comes in the form of a parable that cascades down through history arriving at Rousseau’s feet 
as a piece of wisdom, whose moral message will be referenced at different stages of this 
dissertation. Montaigne told the story of how King Pyrrhus, who during a consultation with 
the shrewd advisor, Cyneas, saw no shortage of limits to his quest for empire: “master Italy”, 
“cross into Gaul and Spain”, “subjugate Africa”, to which Cyneas asked: “And in the end (?)”. 
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“The world and then I can rest, replied Pyrrhus.
153
 Cyneas then gives these penetrating words 
of advice:  
Then tell me, Sire, if that is what you want, what is keeping you from doing it at once? Why do you not place 





Rousseau took Cyneas’ advice when he wrote his Dialogues. The vanity Rousseau railed 
against in the human quest for knowledge; his forsaking of the literary coterie in Paris and all 
the pushing against “objects” of natural and human sciences, tastes and fashions all ended in 
a decision to embrace the “negativity” of his own imagination, which was the true source of 
what was intoxicating King Pyrrhus in the first place. But virtue was that which Rousseau 
determined to fill this space, his “plenum”; and appropriately it all began with the reflexivity 
of a very special relationship he maintained with a woman who “meant the world to him”: his 
“Mama”, Madame de Warnes. 
 Of all people to consult concerning Rousseau’s perspective on virtue, it is the arch-
seducer, Casanova, who elucidates best its inner workings. Not only does Peter Cryle, in 
“The Libertine Ethics of Casanova and his Contemporaries”, examine Casanova and his art of 
seduction but he also sketches the eighteenth-century evaluation of what constituted virtue 
and what did not. What is surprising is that virtue to be authentic required erotic pull, or in 
Cryle’s words, “a play of feminine resistance”, whose absence implied boorish prudery, 
earning the disparagements: “bégueules” or “devotes”.
155
 Cryle makes good use of 
Casanova’s own words to demonstrate this point, laying out as well “virtue” as a “negative” 
force to what is otherwise “prejudice; and thus “positive”: 
[t]he exercise of virtue cost nothing for a woman who is not in love; she might be aware of being ungrateful, but 
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If Casanova rejects prejudicial “objects” in constellations of dogmas and abstract moralities, 
his art of seduction, just as Grimm’s has already been shown to work, operates on its own 
“positive” terms, in Cryle’s words, “libertinage […] is quite simply a set of stylized 
moves”
157
 and it is here where Casanova-Rousseau comparisons end. The erotic pull of virtue 
in de Warnes and Rousseau’s relationship, documented in “Livre III: 1731-1732” of 
Confessions, had a salient metaphysical dimension only realizable when Rousseau’s oeuvre is 
taken in its totality; and it is this relationship, to which we now turn to get at the “plenum” 
being developed.  
 If eroticism for Casanova is the pull towards a consummation that is always left 
elusive, for Rousseau it is wholeness, filling the universe and having a temporal 
indefiniteness that engages in an interesting way with Spinoza’s notion of “striving”. 
“Negativity” for Spinoza, of course, ends at “God”, the “First Cause”, to whom a “freedom of 
the will” can never apply:  
[f]or the will […] requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and produce an effect […] although from a 
given will […] infinitely many things may follow, God still cannot be said […] to act from freedom of will, any 




So any comparison needs to qualify the very different metaphysics of Spinoza and his 
mechanical necessity and of Rousseau and his passionate eroticism. This being said, however, 
the usefulness of the comparison comes in how Casanova’s eroticism pales in both extent and 
implication compared with Rousseau’s when situated within Spinoza’s reflection on “definite” 
time: 
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For if [striving by which a thing strives to persevere in its being] involves a limited time, which determined the 
thing’s duration, then it would follow just from that very power by which the things exists that it could not exist 
after that limited time, but that it would have to be destroyed. But […] this is absurd. Therefore, the striving by 
which a thing exists involves no definite time. On the contrary, since […] it will always continue to exist by the 





Casanova’s eroticism fits Spinoza’s “definite”. Unlike how women for Casanova instilled 
only erratic infatuations, Madame de Warnes for Rousseau was the shadow cast over his 
entire oeuvre from her cameo as “Julie” in La nouvelle Héloïse to the hygienic prescription 
developed as his unique materialism, whose preliminary sketch is well understood despite its 
full explication never seeing the philosophical “light of day” in that never written Morale 
Sensitive, ou Le Matérialisme du sage. Just as Julie needed Wolmar to curb her extravagances, 
Rousseau saw Madame de Warnes needing hygienic prescriptions of her own to curb her 
foibles such as her spendthrift and impulsiveness to begin but never complete projects.
160
 But 
it was her poor judgment concerning her initiation of Rousseau into the art of sexual pleasure 
that most affected him:  
[n]o; I tasted the pleasure but I knew not what invincible sadness poisoned its charm. I felt as if I had committed 
incest […] as I clasped her rapturously in my arms I wet her bosom with my tears [… a]s for her, she was 




Rousseau’s lamenting judgment of Madame de Warnes’ careless indifference would really be 
an indictment of the Parisian coterie he abandoned in his retreat to the Hermitage; Madame 
de Warnes, a sycophant to this clique, had fallen under its pernicious sway: 
M. de Tavel, her first lover, was her master of philosophy, and the principles which he taught her were those he 
required in order to seduce her. Finding her attached to her husband and her duties, and always cold, intellectual, 
and unassailable through her senses, he attacked her by means of sophistries [… s]exual union, he argued, was 
an act most unimportant in itself; marital fidelity need merely be kept an appearance; its moral importance being 




                                                          
159
 Ibid, 75-76. 
160
 In his essay ‘Madame de Warnes’ Havelock Ellis confirms her volatile temperament that would lead her 
under false pretences from the security of her husband and ultimately bring her to poverty and obscurity in later 
life: ‘[…] her fondness for industrial enterprises, her extravagant generosity, the vanity that led her into 
exaggeration and falsehood, her independence and dislike of advice, her leaning to pietism, the ease with which 
she made acquaintance with people who flattered her […]’ (Havelock Ellis, ‘Madame de Warnes’, The Virginia 
Quarterly Review: A National Journal of Literature and Discussion, Summer 1933, section IV).  
161
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions, op. cit., 189-90. 
162
 Ibid, 190. 
65 
 
This was the culture of the salon. A social circle, where women played an important role, one, 
of which Rousseau disapproved. He admonished these women for dabbling in seduction, 
feigning morality - all of which made them likely targets for seducers like Casanova. 
However, Amelia Gere Mason in her study of salon culture - particularly her focus study on 
Madame Geoffrin’s salon - recognizes the importance of salon life - and the role of women - 
on the intellectual pulse of society. She argues these salons were the “cradle[s] of the new 
philosophy”.163 One of the iterative themes to punctuate this dissertation is the impact fashion 
had on popular science and how Rousseau and Sade could be popular but neither for the 
reasons they intended nor the reasons some claim.
164
 Mason sees in the doctrine of freedom 
and equality, espoused by philosophes like Montesquieu, d’Alembert and Voltaire, a 
“positive” bulwark of popular appeal, challenging long-held social norms and customs much 
more “negative” given their antecedent position. Rousseau defended institutions of domestic 
obligations. Madame de Warnes was caught up in this salon culture and Rousseau’s literary 
journey aimed to save her. In Émile, for example, Rousseau vehemently opposed the 
conception of feminine freedom and equality, promoted in the salon, admonishing wives and 
mothers to follow what is now understood as a more “negative” course of “nature”:  
[…] let mothers deign to nurse their children, morals will reform themselves, nature’s sentiments will be 




Perhaps the best example of the toxic mix of science and popular appeal Rousseau lamented 
comes through Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s flirtatious science lesson to a fair lady in 
Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes. Fontenelle was keenly conscious of his audience when 
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he set out to reduce the cosmos to “objects” whose “positivity” matched only that of what 
constituted his own world:  
[…] there are Men in the Moon, for do but observe how much the Face of Nature is chang’d between this and 
China; other Visages, Shapes, Manners […] Principles of Reason […] between us and the Moon the alteration 




And in a stroke, of which M. de Tavel would have certainly approved, he cajoles his attentive 
listener to switch allegiance to these delightful “objects” of the night and away from the 
“light of day”, whose uniformity is routine; translucence, ignorance. Fontenelle sets up the 
scene of this grand seduction this way: 
But since you talk of Romances, why do Lovers in their Songs and Elegies address themselves to the Night? 
‘Tis the Night Madam, says I, that crowns their Joy and therefore deserves their Thanks. But ‘tis the Night, says 
she, that hears their Complaints, and how comes it to pass, the Day is so little trusted with their Secrets? I 
confess, Madam, says I, the Night has somewhat more Melancholy Air than the Day; we fancy the Stars march 
more silently than the Sun, and our Thoughts wander with the more liberty, whilst we think all the World at rest 
but our selves: Besides, the Days is more uniform, we see nothing but the Sun, and the Light in the Firmament; 
whilst the Night shews us variety of Objects, and gives us ten Thousand Stars, which inspire us with as many 
pleasant Ideas. She reply’d, what you say is true, I love the Stars, there is somewhat charming in them, and I 
could almost be angry with the Sun for effacing’em. And I can’t, says I, pardon him, for keeping all those 




Recall Spinoza saying “infinitely many things may follow from a free will”; this certainly 
applies to these stargazers on this night; and the products of their imaginations are framed in 
what fancy comes of a Casanovian “pick-up line”. Rousseau uses his imagination in the 
manner Cyneas (through Montaigne) advises King Pyrrhus: “to conquer without conquering”, 
in neither direction nor definiteness; he fills out the extent of the “plenum”. Rousseau 
presents his relationship with his “Mama” as the closest thing to a (“positive”) description for 
such an obscure notion as the “negativity” filling this “plenum”. The alignment of seducer, 
conqueror and scientist in this discussion brings to question just how closely they are tied to 
similar goals and approaches. Casanova, King Pyrrhus and Fontenelle all demonstrate how 
negativities like desire and imagination need not necessarily belong to the “plenum”, the 
innovation of how Rousseau makes them both belong should be seen as his principle 
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intellectual contribution. There is here great implication for the History of Science for it too 
developed out of similar “positive” pushes as those ones exerted by King Pyrrhus and 
Fontenelle. (See Chapter 4.1 for a recasting of this theme in the focus on “adventurers and 
fortune-seekers”.) 
1.5 Incest and Child Abandonment 
 One of the goals of investing the time to develop Rousseau’s metaphysics is to show 
how it is that Sade arrives, picks up from where Rousseau leaves off in his conceptualisation; 
and then goes on to expand and modify it for his own literary purposes. Although presented 
in the guise of autobiographical anecdotes, e.g., Rousseau’s predilection for (passive) 
flagellation; his concern for incest; and habit of abandoning his children all in this list have 
much broader metaphysical significance and Sade had the perspicuity to recognize this, 
recruiting many of these same themes for his own ruminations. For example, flagellation 
would play an increasingly more complex role for Sade in both biography and prose. Passive 
and active flagellation are documented respectively in two criminal indictments against Sade, 
one involving Jeanne Testard, who Schaeffer narrates “[Sade] told […] to flog him with the 
iron-wire whip after having it heated red-hot in the fire”;
168
 and Rose Keller, who, according 
to the “rap sheet”, was whipped numerous times by Sade after which he “dripped hot wax on 
her wounds”.
169
 And in Les 120 Journées de Sodome, the subject of the next chapter, Sade 
orders passive and active flagellation at different points of gradation in the “positive-to-
negative” scale he adumbrates, positioning the latter on the more “negative” (or, in his words, 
more complex) end. The topic of incest was introduced in the previous section and in order to 
establish more precisely the types of parameters Sade would use in his writings it is worth 
adding some depth to the significance of incest for Rousseau. In addition, it is worth 
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introducing another important theme springing from Rousseau’s voluptuousness: his 
illegitimate children. This theme would be picked up by Sade in his reflections on infanticide.  
It was earlier claimed that, although Madam de Warens was the prototype of Julie in 
La nouvelle Héloïse, during Rousseau’s deflowering she played the role with the scriptedness 
of an inculcating courtier, not with the same passion that followed Julie through to her 
downfall. It was Rousseau’s passion that was really depicted in the character of Julie:  
[i]magine my ardent and lascivious temperament, my heated blood, my love-intoxicated heart, my vigour, my 
sound health, and my youth [… c]onsider that in this condition, though thirsting for the love of woman I had not 




It was Rousseau treating himself and Madame de Warnes in synonymy and simultaneity that 
constitutes the height of the “plenum”, and the width of his monistic vision:  
[h]er picture was always present in my heart and left the room for no one else. For me she was the only woman 




Any addition or subtraction had cosmological consequences either as “I only felt the full 
strength of my attachment to her when she was out of my sight” or  
I ceaselessly sought opportunities for private interviews, which I enjoyed with a passion that turned to fury 




and all passed with a kind of indefiniteness that can be said to de-materialize Spinoza’s 
notion of “striving”:  
[explaining how he felt in Madame de Warnes’ presence: i]f ever a waking man’s dream seemed like a 




And, for Rousseau, the preservation of his chastity was the guarantee for maintaining the 
cosmological order: 
[she left his] senses no time to be aroused by others, safeguarded me against her and all her sex […] I was chaste 




For Rousseau the tears that wet his “Mama’s” bosom during the incest scene were worthy to 
be shed by all caught up in the crestfallen narrative of human history: the timeless problem of 
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the “proximal” concern for reproduction, i.e., the inherent “positivity” in both its approach 
(seduction) and result (procreation). Rousseau brings the issue to the deepest point of crisis in 
that myth of human order, embedded deep in Western tradition: the tragedy in the Garden of 
Eden. Rousseau’s monistic vision really has not been adequately set in this drama unfolding 
as an incest story between two family members - or siblings - Adam and Eve. This drama will 
also be vital for reading Sade as writers like John Phillips have been keen to point out (See 
The Marquis de Sade: A Very Short Introduction). Rousseau’s words are elegiac and haunting 
on what was lost when sexuality entered the human narrative. He offers an alternative to the 
one ending in incest, shame, expulsion, and the curse of matrimony; and its presentation is 
infused with the expected high dose of “negativity” such that traditional “positive” roles and 
designations of human interactions begin to dissolve away: 
What might have been my undoing was in fact my salvation, at least for the time. Intoxicated with the pleasure 
of living beside her, and burning with desire to spend my life with her, I saw in her always, whether she were 
absent or present, a tender mother, a beloved sister, a delighted friend, and nothing more. I saw her always in 




In at least one aspect of his family-based metaphysics, however, Rousseau appears to fall into 
contradiction: he fathered five children and sent all of them to foundling hospitals to be raised 
by the state. He offers this notorious justification: 
I will be content with a general statement that in handing my children over for the State to educate, for lack of 
means to bring them up myself, by destining them to become workers and peasants instead of adventurers, and 









 Rousseau’s statement is only 
consistent when placed on the metaphysical scale of “negativity” and “positivity” being 




 Ibid, 322. (Emphasis added) 
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proposed in this paper. (The specific issue of “adventurers and fortune-hunters” will be the 
subject of analysis in Chapter 4.1: Metaphysical Explorers.) In Les Confessions, Rousseau 
seems of two minds about being a derelict father. In the narration of his time spent at the 
soirées of Madame la Selle, Rousseau admits being caught up in the customs of what Mason 
has already described as the principles of the Salon (p. 65). Rousseau describes dinner table 
chatter including such “ordinary topics” as “honourable people injured, husbands deceived, 
women seduced, secret accouchements”
179
 and claimed to have to burnish ones salacious wit 
and furtive coquetry in order to survive and thrive. This necessity has already been suggested 
in discussions on “articulations” in Grimm’s love display (p. 46) and that seductive science 
lesson, Fontenelle delivered when exhorting a young maiden to shift her alliance from the 
light of the sun to the darkness of the night sky (p. 66). Despite this, Rousseau claims to part 
company with his fellow salonnières on one significant point: he was by no means following 
their “morals”: “I […] gradually adopted, thank Heaven! not the morals, but the principles, 
which I found established”.
180
 Rousseau claims that he preserved his moral rectitude 
throughout his time in the Salon, morality being for him that aspect of himself, descending 
what can now be considered the fully formed “plenum”. With analogic “negativity” and 
“positive” available to untangle contradictions, Rousseau’s justification can now appear 
reasonable. And so can his justification for abandoning his children. His justification consists 
of rolling back what had come to be the nascent family model in his time, that one of the 
burgeoning middle class. In Discours sur l’origin de l’inégalité, Rousseau describes how it 
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was that the underpinnings of family relations began to reflect the proximal concerns of this 
ascendant group, i.e., its hunger for economic prosperity, industrial progress and social 
mobility. For Rousseau, children in metaphysical “distance” relate to parents much 
differently and he recruits what deceptively appears as anthropological claims
181
 to support 
his position: 
No individual was recognized as the father of several children until such time as they lived in families together 
and settled around him. The goods of the father, of which he is truly the master, are the ties which keep his 
children dependent on him, and he may choose to give them a share of his estate only to the extent that they 




Children of ancient tribes were born in steep “negative” decline to the whole of the 
community, that is, children did not belong to only one set of natural parents; the only due 
children owed parents was the respect for giving life. Nursing and raising the progeny of 
tribes were both privileges and obligations for all members. Later, in “La Profession de Foi 
du vicaire savoyard” (1762) (appended to Émile, ou De l’ éducation) Rousseau further 
dislodges children from “positive” captivity, this time from evangelical zeal. (In Chapter 3.1 
this “positivity" will be linked to the legacy of the Protestant Reformation.) He argues: 
[…] if there is only one true religion and every man is obliged to follow it under the threat of damnation, one’s 
life must be spend in studying them all, in going deeper into them, in comparing them, in roaming around the 




Rousseau goes on to present a global dystopia as a reductio ad absurdum where all the 
regimes of social life: “trades, the arts, the human sciences, and all the civil occupations”
184
 
fall into disarray while peregrine (“positive”) truth-seekers never stay in one place long 
enough for civil society to ever take hold. Rousseau then presents the argument that 
precipitated his exile, the condemnation of his Émile and its public burning in 1762: “if the 
son of a Christian does well in following his father’s religion without a profound and 
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impartial examination”, how about the son of a Turk (?).
185
 This pattern of rolling back 
objects from “positivity” to “negativity” was witnessed earlier in Chapters 1.2 and 1.3 when 
the evanescent object of scientific inquiry and the mechanism of object formation for 
Rousseau were subjects of exploration. This pattern will be seen applied again at different 
points in this dissertation as Sade deployed a similar strategy, the principle difference being, 
of course, a choice of strategic orientation: Rousseau aimed at virtue; Sade, vice. In order to 
transition towards the metaphysics, infusing Sade’s ɶuvre, it is worth presenting the point 
where Rousseau gave up on not only his audience but also his commitment to virtue. The 
point of terminus arrived as a reverie, and it is here where Sade continues on where Rousseau 
left off.  
1.5 Towards the Bastille: Epistemology of a Reverie 
During the “Cinqième Promenade” of his Rêveries, Rousseau described the kinds of 
activities that would have occupied one of these “solitary” days. Early morning he would be 
on his knees with his microscope, flipping through his reference book, Systema Naturae, 
peeking into the private lives of plants: the “long forked stamina of the Brunelle”, “the 
explosion of the fruit” of the balsam-apple and the box-trees’ buds, “the thousand little acts of 
fructification, all of which would overwhelm him with delight”.
186
 Midmorning he would go 
to the apple orchard but not before first scanning the sky, preparing in advance a “stock of 
amusements for the employment of the afternoon”
187
 indoors in case it rained. He would 
climb one of the trees and pick apples until some locals stopped by for lunch. After lunch he 
would duck these guests’ bothersome company, walk to the lake, jump in a boat and row 
himself out to the middle, lay supine, eyes towards the heavens, thinking this thought:  
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[why in] enjoying a thousand pleasing, though confused reveries, which, without any particular fixed object, 





As stated in the introduction of this chapter both the tone and audience of Rêveries departed 
radically from his previous works where he had been interested in developing his particular 
form of materialism based on obeisance to “objects” in deep “negativity” all orientated to 
promote virtue. His motivation had been an elegiac attempt to re-imagine the proper 
conditions of his time at the Chambery estates where he and Mama were once again together, 
guided by the wisdom of such characters as Émile’s instructor, Julie’s husband, Wolmar and 
Rousseau himself, the judge. And as this vision in this chapter has been presented having 
monistic reach, it perforce applies to all his readers in any time, place or under any 
circumstance. But now on St. Peter’s Island he was happy to leave the books, writing paper 
and ink-stand “well packed” and replace “stupid manuscripts and musty books with an 
apartment full of flowers and plants”.
189
 He had given up on his audience and his “plenum”; 
he was writing only for himself. Some insight concerning his attitude of decisive retreat from 
“objects” is given by Montaigne a century earlier in his essay “Comment l’ame discharge ses 
passions sur des objects fauls, quand les vrais loy defaillent” where he describes, using a 
Latin adage, the kind of step he himself is unwilling to take:  
[As winds, unless they come up against dense wood, lose their force and are distended into empty space;] it 
seems that the soul too, in the same way, loses itself in itself when shaken and disturbed unless it is given 




Notably Montaigne describes the space of the absence of objects as one that is in fact 
something; he borrows the Latin word for “distend” to describe an empty space that has 
something by way of “distension’s” synonyms: “swelling” or “inflating”. (Recall here 
Bordeu’s theoretical characterization.) It is not the case that Rousseau in writing for himself 
had finally discovered his “self” after a lifelong writing journey that took him towards 
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increasing “negativity” and further recession from proximity, which has been shown to form 
those “positive” marks that build towards ideas of “selves”. This would be a major retreat and 
is unlikely especially since “positive” “selves” are the very things Rousseau extirpates as 
judge and cosmological constant in Dialogues:  
[t]out cela prouve invinciblement que la haine dont J.J. est l’objet, n’est point la haine du vice & de la 




If anything Rousseau even beginning here to discount what constitutes “evil” or “good” is a 
drift away from what D’Holbach had pinned down as those digital (and rudimentarily 
“positive”) concerns: “inimicality to his welfare” or “congeniality to man’s happiness”. Now 
it appears that the question simply be a matter of positionality on a “negative-positive” scale. 
And reveries happen to be the furthest “negative” point where knowledge begins to resemble 
nature and take on something like “pure motion”. Enter Sade, who would pick up from where 
Rousseau left off and Rousseau even plays the soothsayer to this point when he states in 
Rêveries:  
[t]his kind of reverie may be enjoyed in every situation where we can obtain tranquility; and I have often 
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2.1 The Science of Cesspools  
Eighteenth-century arguments for monism tended always to presuppose origins in the 
cesspools of the natural world. The marshes in outlying areas of cities and town that stoked 
fears of miasmas during times of plague; an airtight bottle containing a fermented mass of 
organic detritus, the birthplace of Needham’s famous “animalculae”; preformation: “the 
existence of the germ in the female before fecundation [being] one of the most general laws 
of nature”
193
 as St-Martin cites Spallanzani; all these sites of slime and stink produced 
anxiety for all those gazers who saw what was only inhospitable to observation and ever 
inchoate to comprehension. Some sense of this anxiety comes through in Montaigne’s 
disorientation when wind has only a treeless expanse as passage - no object to grasp on to, 
only “distension” (p. 73); a shared feature of cesspools. But the cesspool now has a familiar 
topography. St-Martin has adumbrated it as the “context of a negative progression caused by 
specific forces” of what otherwise would be delineable by “positive” features. In this chapter 
Sade’s novel, Les 120 Journées de Sodome will be explored as a “cesspool” and the most 
“negative” of all his works - born really on the eve of the French Revolution and arriving to 
posterity under the strangest of circumstances. It is a book Sade believed till death was 
forever lost to the looting that took place in his prison cell when the Bastille was overrun by 
revolutionaries in 1789; disappearing on account of his wife, René, not being able to retrieve 
in time what belongings had remained behind, items including an extensive library and a 
modest selection of his own writings. This retrieval was of course necessary because of 
Sade’s transfer to Charenton a week earlier due to disruptive behavior causing commotion in 
a tense Bastille already on edge. He had been haranguing the growing rioters outside his 
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prison cell using that famous “piss megaphone”,
194
 stirring up, those who would listen to a 
higher revolutionary pitch with his colorful claims of prisoner abuse and other atrocities 
happening in the Bastille. But in the end someone did find the manuscript in its make-shift 
scroll form in its hiding place, managing to hand it over to the one, Marquis of Villeneuve-
Trans, who ensured its safekeeping as a family heirloom for over a century until finally in 
1900 the dermatologist and psychiatrist Iwan Bloch got his hands on it and began the 
tradition of engagement with the text as a scientific document. The “resurrected” Les 120 
Journées truly came accompanied with a “new body” as it would be considered a celebrated 
precursor to a nineteenth-century psychiatric tradition (emerging within the domain of 
sexology) that aimed to document qualitatively all psychosexual disorders imaginable so as to 
fill the pages of an encyclopedia of “positive” knowledge. Specifying this particular 
formation of Sade and offering its preliminary refutation is useful here to set the stage for 
working Les 120 Journées against scientific assertions in its own age, with which Sade would 
not have agreed especially those embodied in the figure, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, and his 
famous Discours Préliminaire de l’Encyclopédie de Diderot; and for this juxtaposition that 
familiar question of “objects” will again take center stage. 
Bloch’s work in sexology also emerged out of a scientific tradition that presupposed a 
unity amongst all natural and human sciences, one that could be corroborated through 
scientific progress. A poignant example of this belief came in the form of Herbert Spencer’s 
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thesis, in his book, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, where he argued how the 
homogeneity of life comprises conditions of unstable equilibrium wrought by evolution: 
competing earlier forms, simple, primitive, seeking to co-opt higher ones for some particular 
gain, narrow and automatic; these higher ones in turn inhibiting the more primitive ones in 
order to maintain some semblance of social fluidity and generality for individual gain of a 
more nuanced variant.
195
 Such a principle could apply equally to a natural science like 
neurology (cortical vs. reptilian regions of the brain) and a human one like political science 
(multicultural vs. atavistic states) and “positive” facts were sought to backfill all that 
remained in between. Among Bloch’s contemporaries in the field of sexology, Havelock Ellis 
and Richard von Krafft-Ebing pursued similar stratification and expansiveness. Especially for 
Ellis, in his chapter “Love and Pain” of Studies of the Psychology of Sex: Vol. 3 he, on the 
topic of “love bites”, drew a similar Spenserian scale beginning from an Arabian mare biting 
her mate during coitus, members of primate cultures in New Caledonia making bite marks on 
the neck and shoulders a sign of a “quadrupedal attitude”, biting in high literature (Ovid, 
Plutarch and Horace) as an expression of affection and finally the devouring feature of the 
Eucharist as a symbol of ideal love.
196
 And in the first chapter, “A System of Psychology of 
Sexual Life” in his Psychopathia Sexualis this expansiveness is not lost to Krafft-Ebing either, 
who explored possible links between topics as seemingly antipodal as biological reproduction 
and religion: 
Religion as well as sexual love is mystical and transcendental. In sexual love the real object of the instinct, i.e., 
propagation of the species is not always present to the mind during the act, and the impulse is much stronger 
than could be justified by the gratification that can possibly be derived from it. Religious love strives for the 
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The question of “objects” takes center stage for Krafft-Ebing as that which cannot be pinned 
down on either side of the extremes of this scale and even for Ellis his conclusions operate on 
conceptual clusters where an object like a “bite” can speciously travel unimpeded from the 
deepest “cesspool” of organic life to the highest nodal point of cultural evolution, say De 
Vinci’s “Last Supper”, housed in the refractory of Santa Maria Delle Grazie - but only as 
something “positive”. Designations like scientism, evolutionism and psychologism have been 
used - often in derogatory senses - to describe these constellations of “positive” knowledges 
that seek out both physical and conceptual “objects” to explain everything within the range of 
life, ranges staggered according to the strata just seen, low to high, the formal structure of 
disciplines such as ethnography and even to an extent psychoanalysis. 
Certainly it is no surprise that Sade shared a like monistic vision in his striving to 
develop a model to account for the whole gamut of human phenomena one he approximated 
using the poles: “Nature”, the limit of the objective world and “desire”, that of subjectivity. 
Sade, speaking through Duc de Blangis in the introduction of Les 120 Journées, is careful 
though to refer to subjectivities only as placeholders and advising self-discovery be only what 
lightens the darkened recesses: 
Many of the extravagances you are about to see illustrated will doubtless displace you, yes, I am well aware of it, 
but there are amongst them a few which will warm you to the point of costing you some fuck, and, reader, is all 
we ask of you; if we have not said everything, analyzed everything, tax us not with partiality, for you cannot 
expect us to have guessed what suits you the best […] choose and let lie the rest without declaiming against that 
rest simply because it does not have the power to please you. Consider that it will enchant someone else, and be 
a philosopher.
198 
Sade is here refusing to hold subjectivity to a common interpretation; the truth of “others” 
and their place in the world neither comes from “guesswork” nor is beholden to any 
“partiality”; it comes when the right combination of objects strikes the subject’s own 
imagination and the spritzing ejaculate marks the moment of attestation. In Sade setting up 
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his book as a menu or, in his words, a “banquet”: “six hundred different plates offer 
themselves to your appetite”
199
 he is barring himself from this moment of attestation as well 
as everyone else for that matter. It is the agitated reader alone, who knows. This is an entirely 
different “author-audience” relationship than that one traced in the literary evolution of 
Rousseau, the subject of thorough investigation in the previous chapter. Sade’s is an 
“engaged disengagement” Rousseau was never able to achieve in his incremental merger with 
the audience, culminating in his Dialogues and then abrupt breaking away in Rêveries. 
Actually the configuration of relations Sade presents in Les 120 Journées harkens back to that 
Heidegger-inspired expression: “eclipse”, reinterpreted in the introduction as a key element to 
reading Sade and the manner he deploys sensibilité. To review: coevality is avoided by 
modelling relations on both synonymy and simultaneity; “as if at an ecliptic point of 
alignment, all objects inorganic, organic and conceptual alike stand at some nodal point, any 
proximal shift leftwards or right constituting a cracking open of the floodgates to the 
necessity of having to confront all in contingency and infinitude” (p. 27). It is felt that 
modern analyses of Les 120 Journées have missed these kinds of nuanced readings, 
neglecting to properly situate Sade in the literary and scientific contexts of his time. All has 
not been for naught however. John Phillips in his chapter “In the Cathedral of Libertinage: 
Les 120 Journées de Sodome” appears satisfied to compare the work with nineteenth-century 
nosological approaches but then acknowledges alternative perspectives: 
And despite its undoubted similarity to the modern sexology manual, and its pretentions to the status of a 
scientific study, there are those who refuse to see it as a precursor to the work of Freud or Krafft-Ebing. Chantal 
Thomas rightly argues, for example, that, while Freud and Krafft-Ebing view any departure from normality as 
unhealthy, Sade actively advocates this. 
200
 
This advocacy that Phillips makes a point of mentioning is less a partisanship of “perversion 
for perversion’s sake” - an interpretation often pinned on Sade, the Romantic - and more an 
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erudite metaphysical reflection. Sade, like d’Holbach before him, is attempting to remove 
that partition science has always seemed to maintain in reducing its fact to what is either 
“congenial” or “inimical” to humankind. And the two do just this in order to approach a level 
of knowledge unadulterated by human fingerprints. As it will soon be shown these 
fingerprints were left all over science of the Enlightenment as well. In the next section Les 
120 Journées will be considered a scientific document amongst another whose legitimacy is 
far more easy to accept to modern sensibilities given the presence of features more partial to 
how science is practiced and discussed today. As it was with the second section of the 
previous chapter “Armelle St-Martin and the History of the Evanescent Object of Science” 
(Chapter 1.2), analysis will work backwards from the most “positive” object positions to the 
more “negative” one with those in Les 120 Journées rounding out the “negative” species on 
the spectrum. To arrive here the scientific legacy of L’Encyclopédie de Diderot is an 
illuminating starting point. 
2.2 The “General Systems of Human Knowledge” of Jean Le Rond d’Alembert and 
the Marquis de Sade 
 In the introduction of this dissertation, Warman reading Sade as a “sensationist 
materialist” was challenged for its insistence his project be about enlivening inert literary 
qualities through amplified “analogies” or “dramatizations” so as to lift “Frankenstein” up by 
the “words”, so to speak. She captured this aim with her use of the expression: “literality”. 
Though recognizing the unique status of Les 120 Journées Warman links Sade’s 
documentary project to that other one of his age: the L’Encyclopédie de Diderot:  
Having established the process of analysis and coherence […] Sade turns to a more general problem: how can 
fact and analysis become something more ambitious, that is, link up into a system. (This was not a problem Les 
Cent Vingt Journées had had to face, however systematic its approach and exposition: all it needed was ‘l’intérêt 
d’un récit’. In fact it did not attempt to account for libertinage as a system in the way that the later books did.) 
‘Ressemblances’ and ‘liaisons’ are the tools with which to construct something more general: we are back in the 
realm of analogy, and Sade is […] indebted to it as a method of generalization […] It is first structural (as the 
Encyclopédie article asserted) but is also used more widely and freely.
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The substance, to which Warman relates Sade’s ambition as a writer - Les 120 Journées being 
only an initial step in this direction - must be seen through this bestseller of the mid-
eighteenth century, captured best by D’Alembert in his famous Discours Préliminaire de 
l’Encyclopédie de Diderot. It is worth highlighting at the outset some points of contrast 
between the tenets of this encyclopedic project and key principles already established in this 
dissertation. In his “Translator’s Introduction” to the Discours Préliminaire Richard N. 
Schwab calls the work a fusion of the “rationalism of Descartes” and the “empiricism of the 
likes of Bacon and Locke”, all of whom work with materials hard-edged and “positive”: 
“absolute principles” ascertained through deduction for the former; “hard facts”, through 
inductive activities such as “experience, experimentation and sensation”, the latter.
202
 The 
manner these “materials” “link up into a system” - to use Warman’s words - is spelled out by 
d’Alembert himself who reflects on the phenomenon of a magnet and the general 
implications it suggests: 
Since knowledge and the necessary enlightenment concerning the physical cause of the properties of the magnet 
are lacking, it would doubtless be an investigation most worthy a philosopher to reduce, if possible, all these 
principles to a single one, while showing the liaison that they have with one another.
203
 
Schwab, citing Ernst Cassirer, further adds shape to this zenith-like “singularity” when he 
calls the search for the unity of all phenomena one of the central aims of the Enlightenment:  




These presentations really amount to “protrusions” of that “plenum” introduced in Chapter 
1.4 - or better - “scabbings” of it for even if the vitality of an organ is forced outside itself as 
in the case of say swelling it is still by its nature nourished at the source; a “scab” is a 
“protrusion” dead and sterile, the pinnacle of its structure being as lofty as its crusty end. 
And, furthermore, “swelling” has been discussed already as that principle manifestation of 
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“negative forces”, i.e. for Bordeu and his “erections” (p. 3) and Montaigne and his 
“distension of wind” (p. 73). D’Alembert even seems aware of the limitation of what he seeks 
after in this “singular fact” and the dangers of “death” and “sterility” it poses; he states:  
[…] some have tried to reduce even the art of curing to calculation, the human body, that most complicated 




Surely, he would have had in mind the likes of Herman Boerhaave or Archibald Pitcairne if 
read according to how T. Brown interpreted them in Rina Knoef’s paraphrase in her book 
Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738): Calvinist Chemist and Physician: 
In Pitcairne’s system, just as in Boerhaave’s early medicine, life is a result of the constant circulation of the 
blood caused by the motion of the heart and arteries. Moreover, all other function of the body depends upon the 
free flow of the blood and humours secreted from the blood through the vessels of the body. Pitcaime treated the 
blood like any other fluid, which meant that he adopted the general mechanical laws in order to transform the 
body into a hydraulic system. 
206
 
Knoef saw Boerhaave’s position much differently, however. She argued he departed from a 
Newtonian emphasis on forces of cause and effect; and this is captured in his concept: “thread 
of the warp”:  
[they] cannot be produced by any cause […] they are entwined and woven together, so as to form the foundation 
and support for each single body […] growing, moving […] and propagating itself by fruitful generation [like] 
the seeds of things.
207
  
This seeming reference to what was found earlier in those “cesspools” of nature (i.e., 
germination), imbued with all that “negative” force, is tempered by how Knoef then relates 
Boerhaave’s chemistry to his Calvinist faith and the belief matter in “woven” form is still 
passive and in need of propulsion and maintenance by divine “energy”; and from this an 
apparent new “scab” forms: “creation is like God’s royal tent in which man can behold 
God”.
208
 D’Alembert criticized those who introduced dei ex machina in this way, ones whose 
work with supranaturalism and constancy (eternity) meant only “death” and “sterility” if 
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taken into the literal ground of the natural world. D’Alembert criticized Leibniz and his 
theory of “pre-established harmony” for this very sort of introduction, a proposal seen 
retroactively synchronizing the two substances in question: the “body” and the “soul”, a 
systematic attempt d’Alembert called too optimistic and, what’s more, dangerous in having 
that advantage of being able to explain everything
209
 without recourse to the check of 
something like say “falsifiability”. D’Alembert looked to Francis Bacon for the proper 
outlook: 
Hostile to systems, [Bacon] conceived of philosophy as being only that part of our knowledge which should 
contribute to making us better and happier, thus apparently confining it with the limits of the science of useful 
things, and everywhere he recommended the study of nature.
210
 
One of the common themes emerging out of the previous two chapters is that “positive” 
knowledge has always been lionized for practicality; one such measure being its viscosity in 
allowing “facts” to affix together and form accumulating bodies of knowledge. This could 
include Le Mettrie praising Claude Joseph Geoffroy for discovering plant parts to add to a 
developing repertoire of botanical knowledge (p. 4). In his “egg” reflection, Montaigne put it 
this way: “unlikeness” for legislators, judges, philosophers and theologians is of great benefit 
(p. 44) for with it justifications and applications come anew, adding new layers to each one’s 
respective fields of knowledge. Foucault in L’Archéologie du savoir gives a modern appraisal 
of this tendency in mature form in disciplines of Western science, using his concept of 
“strategies”. “Strategies are open-ended and are always measured by their degree of 
“formative” potential: 
A discursive formation does not occupy therefore all the possible volume that is opened up to it of right by the 
systems of formation of its objects, its enunciations, and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete, owing to the 
system of formation of its strategic choices. Hence the fact that, taken up again, placed, and interpreted in a new 
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But on a more basic level, d’Alembert praises Bacon for removing the barrier between pure 
and mechanical sciences in his program to promote what Schwab called the “unity and 
interrelation of all truths, and the relationship of knowledge to society”.
212
 What is meant by 
this is that the slightest of modifications of use value became the beginning of discovery, for 
example, something as simple as M. d’Argenville’s sluice, mentioned in the encyclopaedic 
entry: “Gardening and Hydraulics”.
213
Even the smallest change, achieving better 
manipulation of the vagaries of water, is an extension of knowledge and perforce an 
augmentation of “usefulness” for humankind. This standard applies to all categories of 
knowledge where articulation happens only on the most recently grown branchlet from the 
trunk of the tree of knowledge. This could be the modification to “Masonry” in the subsection 
“Arts, Trades, Manufactures”; of “Uses of Nature” in the division: “Natural History”, order: 
“History”; or the one to “Hygiene proper” in the sub-sub-section “Hygiene” of “Medicine”; 
in the section: “Zoology” in the subdivision: “Particular Physics” of “Science of Nature”, 
order: “Philosophy”. The modification to “masonry” belongs to branch: “Memory” of 
d’Alembert’s “Detailed System” in Discours Préliminaire while the modification to “hygiene 
proper” belongs to branch: “Reason”.
214
 As for modifications in that third branch: 
“Imagination”, it is not a stretch to say Grimm’s incidental “love-sickness”, mentioned in 
Chapter 1.3, is a modification of the “Tragic”: subdivision “Dramatic” though Rousseau 
would certainly have a difficult time seeing it as belonging to the division: “Sacred” of the 
order: “Poetry”. As mentioned earlier, Smith left room for fashion in his conception of 
“division of labour”: “when employed [one] should soon find out easier and readier methods 
of performing [one’s] own particular work, whenever the nature of it admits of such 
improvement” (p. 49). It is these “positive” grounds: the formative (Geoffroy according to Le 
Mettrie; the “legislators” and “theologians”, Montaigne) and the practical (the unity of 
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sciences and arts, Bacon) that Sade refused to engage. And for this reason Hunt’s placement 
of Sade in the materialist tradition of pornography of the revolutionary period was rejected (p. 
10-11) as well as the comparison between Sade’s principle of seduction and that of Casanova 
and Fontenelle’s, as Cryle put it for them: “libertinage […] is quite simply a set of stylized 
moves” (p. 68). And to repeat, it follows from all these points that desire and imagination 
need not even belong to the “plenum” developed in Chapter 1.4. With the comparisons made 
between important principles in Discours Préliminaire and those of the preceding chapters it 
is time to begin comparing the architecture d’Alembert establishes for the Encyclopédie and 
that one Sade uses to structure his Les 120 Journées. Of principle concern in this comparison 
will be differing conceptions of “imagination” and “imitation”. 
 D’Alembert saw “imagination” and “imitation” belonging to opposite ends of the 
spectrum of human understanding: “[w]e take imagination in the more noble and precise 
sense, as the talent of creating by imitating”.
215
As earlier mentioned, improvements to 
“masonry”, “hygiene proper” and “tragedy” really belong to the three branches of “Diderot’s 
Detailed System of Human Knowledge”: “memory”, “reason” and “imagination”, whose 
sequence here also constitutes for d’Alembert his order of prerogative. These three pillars 
support the architecture of his “system of knowledge” and d’Alembert would draw out its full 
explication by examining each one of these pillars individually and in relation one with the 
other. In a clever polemical move against his opponents amongst the mainstream scholastic 
philosophers of his time, d’Alembert reserves a description of the transition from “memory” 
to “reason” as a historical account of European civilization from the Renaissance onward. 
D’Alembert first establishes “memory” as the puerile first step towards understanding, it 
relying on only what can be “imitated” from knowledge pre-possessed, in the case of his 
argumentation, the rediscovery of knowledge of the Greeks and Romans at the advent of the 
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Renaissance. He argues knowledge of European civilization initially came not from the 
“study of nature” but of “indiscriminately devouring” what the ancients had gathered as 
knowledge from their study of nature.
216
 He then set the stage to narrate how it was possible 
that knowledge of the classics could end up being so central to the knowledge of his society; 
one he claimed decidedly did not pay heed to nature at all. How was it that Aristotle could be 
relied upon so heavily even though his research project can not at all be said to be the same as 
the Scholastics, whose own project shared his namesake: Aristotelianism (?): 
These circumstances gave rise to that multitude of erudite men, immersed in the learned languages to the point 
of disdaining their own, who knew everything in the ancients except their grace and finesse […] They acted like 
great lords who do not resemble their forefathers in any real merit but who are excessively proud of their 
ancestry. Moreover, that vanity was not without some degree of plausibility. The realm of erudition and of facts 
is inexhaustible; the effortless acquisition made in it lead one to that one’s substance is continually growing, so 
to speak. On the contrary, the realm of reason and of discoveries is rather small. Through study in that realm, 





And for the transition from “reason” to “imagination” d’Alembert shifts away from a 
historical approach and moves towards a formal one where he argues that whereas “reason” is 
laborious as it often “exhausts itself in fruitless investigation [… is] limited to the ideas that 
lie before it, forced to check itself each instant”;
218
 objects in imagination are self-
generating,
219
 from raw materials, those “objects” formed from “memory” and “reason”. This 
ordering is a scrambled reversal of what has been presented in this dissertation as the 
spectrum of “negative”-to-“positive” knowledge. “Imagination” has been assigned the formal 
quality, “negativity”, belonging to the same category as “relations” and “desire”, and it has 
been said that it is the impetus through which “positive” objects - or better, increasingly more 
“positive” ones - form. D’Alembert seems even to allude to this point when he reflects on the 
idea of “partial” knowledge under the influence of his highly de-sexualized regime: 
“curiosity”:  
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[t]he mere fact that we have occasionally found concrete advantages in certain fragments of knowledge, when 
they were hitherto unsuspected, authorizes us to regard all investigation begun out of pure curiosity as being 




As for “memory” d’Alembert defines it as “imitation” of objects only pre-possessed, i.e., the 
classical knowledge in his historiographical account. The imitation of these objects he takes 
as inferior to the imitation of those in nature. The “imitation of Nature” was considered 
something very different in d’Alembert’s view as it depended on imagination and “putting 
together beings similar to those which are the objects of our direct ideas”, the realm of 
“reason”, which he argued was “highly recommended by the ancients”.
221
  
The sceptic, David Hume argues that “uniformities of nature” offer no sufficient 
standard, through which to confirm the validity of truth statements about the world: any truth 
claim has as its basis only past experiences and gathered patterns, which all end up as 
“begging the question” when used to ground truth statements. And this elusiveness of truth 
came without him even discussing knowledge in those “obscure” forms, in the human 
repertoire that apparently has no bearing on anything natural at all. In this regard his critique 
of the idea of the “immortality of the soul” finds a common position in d’Alembert’s earlier 
mentioned critique of Leibniz and his “pre-established harmony”. Accordingly, in the wake 
of this dual epistemological failure Hume presents, the term: “uniformity of objects” seems 
better suited to capture discussion of both forms of imitation: those based on “obscurities” 
and those ones of the nature world. “Imitation” is “tropism”: a “direct turning towards (all 
forms of) “objects”. This term was developed in the introduction as the basis for a mode of 
relations characteristic of that “anteriority” phase of human development, one believed 
central to the period of concern. These “objects” include those that Hume and especially 
d’Alembert would prefer to handle separately. It should be stated that the difference that may 
exist between these two variants of “objects” is that the more “negative” the object be; the 
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more residual influence from an earlier phase be present. The manner of object engagement 
in the “posteriority” phase, i.e., taxis as indirect engagement, (p. 30), seems to be a pattern 
ever present in those objects Hume and d’Alembert write off as “obscure”. Though the 
“posteriority-anteriority-interiority” complex has been presented as separate phases, it is in 
fact more of a cascading from earlier to later where what comes next in the order always 
contains features of what came before. And d’Alembert even alluded to this point (albeit 
unintentionally) when he discusses the role religion plays in his society as something not only 
confided to matters of faith but also the regulation of life processes, implying regimes of 
“nature”: “religion is intended uniquely to regulate our mode of life and our faith”.
222
 
However, his point is taken not as a general statement of fact but one of critical resistance as 
the phrase that follows is: “[the theologians] believe [religion] was to enlighten us also on the 
system of world”.
223
 In light of how Boerhaave’s Calvinist faith informed his science (Knoef) 
or Leibniz’ “pre-established harmony” worked to unite bodies and souls, more subtle 
attention needs to be paid to the nature of these earlier mentioned “protrusions” into the 
“plenum”: the “singular fact” of d’Alembert and Cassirer’s reflection does not have the same 
arc as say Boerhaave’s “tent” (p. 82), the latter is imbued with a much deeper “negativity” 
though all the above can be reducible to that now familiar model d’Holbach presents as what 
is either “congenial” or “inimical” to humankind. This deeper negativity has already been 
explored as the terminus of Montaigne’s reflection, recapitulated in the adage: “[n]ature [as 
the Christian deity] always gives us happier laws than those we give ourselves” (p. 42). In 
Les 120 Journées there is presented an order of human knowledge, starting first with 
“imagination”, followed by “memory” (from objects natural to more obscure), with 
absolutely no mention of “reason”. (One would have to wait until the 1795 La philosophie 
dans le boudoir, well after the initial stages of the French Revolution, to discover an “object” 
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in his oeuvre that resembles this “positive” type and this will be a principle topic in 
discussions in Chapter 5.1.) But what fills the “plenum” is anything but concern for what is 
either “congenial” or “inimical”. Sade, just as Rousseau did in the previous chapter, takes up 
a cosmological posture to make a very poignant monistic argument concerning how the 
imagination be the fons et arigo of all knowledge. Sade speaks through an exchange between 
two villains of Silling Château, who seem befuddled by the objects that pass through their 
purview and present the imagination as what travails them: 
“[Durcet:] […] I must declare my imagination has always outdistanced my faculties; I lack the means to do what 
I would do, I have conceived of a thousand time more and better than I have done, and I have ever had 
complaint against Nature who, while giving me the desire to outrage her, has always deprived me of the means. 
 
“[Curval:] There are […] but two or three crimes to perform in this world, and they, once done, there’s no more 
to be said; all the rest is inferior, you cease any longer to feel. Ah, how many times, by God, have I not longed 
to be able to assail the sun, snatch it out of the universe, make a general darkness, or use that star to burn the 
world! oh, that would be a crime, oh yes, and not a little misdemeanour such as are all the ones we perform who 




The “plenum” presented in this manner is an incremental increase in intensity of what 
Rousseau earlier introduced as its content: “virtue”. With Rousseau describing “virtue” as 
fundamentally erotic, it is now possible to see “vice” simply as its amplification. It is with 
“vice” that Sade fills the “plenum” of the world.  
 As already mentioned, the “imitation of nature” - or in d’Alembert’s words, “imitation 
of la belle Nature” - begins with clear and direct ideas only discoverable by “reason” that 
spring forth from “imagination” and then fully unfurl. D’Alembert uses the examples of 
Painting and Sculpture to sequence the following order of development. First it is reason:  
Painting and Sculpture ought to be placed at the head of that knowledge which consists of imitation, because it 





He then gives imitation its push, its sweeping quality: “warmth, the movement, and the life 
which is capable of giving, it seems rather to create than to portray […]
226
 - imagination. 
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With adjectives like “lively, vivid and pleasing”
227
 d’Alembert gives description to the 
sentiment of “imitation of la belle Nature”; they are sentiments actually not too different than 
the adjectives Sade discusses though the discrepancy in degree is quite pronounced: 
“inflamed”, “spasmodic” and “vexed”. The objects (of reason) d’Alembert considers 
important as starting points for “imagination” to do its work, Sade banishes from 
consideration and presents “imagination” rather as a malevolent force coming up from below 
as if bringing with it the heat of hellfire itself. This is how the Duc formulates it - in a state of 
himself feeling “warm as he fingers Zéphyr”:
228
 
The man who is addressing you at this very instant owed spasms to stealing, murdering, committing arson, and 
he is perfectly sure that it is not the object of libertine intentions, which fires us, but the idea of evil, and that 
consequently it is thanks only to evil and only in the name of evil one stiffens, not thanks to objects, and were 





The differences d’Alembert and Sade exhibit here are visible in the formal structures they use 
to organize their works. Speaking of the formal organization of the Encyclopédie in “Part III” 
of Discours Préliminaire d’Alembert speaks of the need to balance reader accessibility with 
that goal of unifying human knowledge, the latter being the stated innovation promised in 
Diderot’s Prospectus, that antecedent public relations document meant to both create a buzz 
of anticipation and gauge the viability of the project from the public response. The project’s 
editors agreed to compel all entries, arts and sciences alike, to an alphabetic arrangement 
regardless of pulls towards categories, those inchoate forms of disciplines. This was meant to 
ward off confusion of having not only multiple alphabetical orders for all the different 
categories of sciences or arts but also the doubling up of entries if a “number of words 
common to different sciences” or arts need be repeated.
230
 What came from this format was a 
need to cross-reference and herein lay the unifying principle the editors had the responsibility 
to accomplish:  
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[t]he only operation in our work as editors which presumes some intelligence consists in filling the voids which 
separate two sciences or two arts and in linking the chain when an article which appears to belong to several 




D’Alembert summed up this format as sciences and arts being treated in an order of words - 
not ideas - which he reduced to an “object” focus: if treated in the order of ideas,  
[…] the encyclopedic arrangement of the sciences and the arts would have gained little, and the encyclopedic 
arrangement of words, or rather objects through which sciences [and arts] come together and communicate with 




An alphabetic beginning guaranteed an object beginning, from which it was possible to 
overlay matrices of cross-references to push knowledge upwards towards increasing 
convergence. Schwab summarized this plan as “a vehicle for advertising the virtues of co-
operation among the disciplines and for the entire methodology of the Enlightenment”
 233
 and, 
although Schwab argued the plan ultimately failed to live up to its intended purposes, it did 
occasion the writers of the Encyclopédie opportunities to “jab” at sanctioned knowledge - and 
those institutions supporting it - not by a direct confrontation but a lateral one where hallow 
objects say of ecclesiastical importance are desacralized by association with secular ones.
234
 
For example, take d’Alembert’s Spinozan handling of God, not from special revelation but 
from material requirements beginning with matter, moving up through to ideas, seamlessly, 
and finally ending at an all-powerful intelligence, counting as a unification of knowledge 
outside the purview of church doctrine and authority.
235
 In Les 120 Journées Sade makes the 
same spirited critique of the establishment as d’Alembert does though the guiding structure is 
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far different. On “Day Six” of Madame Duclos’ narration, the first of four narrators covering 
the first thirty days of November and dealing with “150 Simple Passions”,
236
 Sade speaks of a  
[…] grave and learned professor of Scholasticism at the Sorbonne who, tired of wasting his time proving the 





Sade recounts the professor’s investment into such an erudite question this way: 
He would send prior notice of his intended arrival, and Aurore would feel like one dying of hunger. Curious to 
see that pious colloquy, I [Duclos] fly to the spy hole: my lovers greet one another, I observe a few preliminary 
caresses all directed upon the mouth, then most delicately our rhetor seats his companion in a chair, seats 
himself opposite her and, taking her hands, deposits his relics between them, sad old vestiges they were, in the 
most deplorable state. “Act,” he enjoins her, “act, my lovely one. Act; you know by what means I may be drawn 
from this languid condition, I beg you to adopt them with all dispatch for I feel myself pressed mightly to 
proceed.” With one hand she fondles the doctor’s flabby tool, with the other she draws his head to hers, glues 
her lips to his mouth and in no time at all she has, one after another, shot sixty great belches down his gullet. 
Impossible to represent the ecstasy of this servant of God; he was in the clouds, he inhaled, he swallowed 
everything that came his way, you’d have thought the very idea of losing the least puff of air would have 
distressed him, and whilst all this was going on, his hands roamed inquiringly over my colleague’s breasts and 
under her petticoat, but these fingerings were no more than episodic; the unique and capital object was that 
mouth overwhelming him with sighs and digestive rumblings. His prick finally enlarged by the voluptuous 
vibrations the ceremony causes to be born in him, he discharged into my companion’s hand, and ran off to 




This lengthy account of one of the 150 simple passions suffices to demonstrate the nature of 
what Sade is documenting in this manuscript, one often misleadingly linked with the 
Encyclopédie. In his preamble to the work Sade directly contradicts d’Alembert’s aim in 
Discours Préliminaire, i.e., a unification of knowledge from clearly delineated alphabetic 
objects. Sade presents rather the risk of his passions appearing too unified on first glance, 
compelling a need for differentiation:  
[…] study closely that passion which to your first consideration seems perfectly to resemble another, and you 





Next in line after this professor from Sorbonne was a gentleman, who preferred his brothel 
hireling to drink an emetic before his arrival so she could vomit in his mouth to initiate his 
orgasm. All the details that go into each vignette of passion are designed for divergence - not 
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convergence as is the case for d’Alembert - and Duclos gets a tongue lashing from her hosts 
whenever she fails on details of divergence:  
‘Duclos,’ the Président interrupted at this point, ‘we have, I believe, advised you that your narration must be 
decorated with the most numerous and searching details; this precise way and extent to which we may judge 
how the passion you describe relates to human manners and man’s character […] I have not the faintest notion 
of your second monk’s prick, nor any idea of its discharge, In addition did he frig your cunt, pray tell, and did he 




This perpetual divergence guarantees objects be only as good as the scenery where the 
imagination glides on past onto the next view until arriving at what constitutes the singular 
passion. Where it ends is in fact at the selection from the “banquet” that Duclos offers her 
listeners, who take and leave as they please. Sade is offering of course these same options to 
his readers. And as stated earlier, the “elliptic” limit, barricaded in the “imagination” of the 
beholder, is the guarantee that any search for unity be futile. And for the professor, the right 
brothel, the right girl with the precise taste in belches, the right foreplay, the right chair and 
position vis-à-vis the girl’s chair, the right quantity of belches… is the endless contingency 
bleeding into the next one on all sides: ad initio, the professor’s constitution; mood; age; 
quality of his prick; level of stress; formation of his ideas…; or in medias res, the pressure of 
how Aurore glues herself to his lips; the duration, timbre and magnitude of the belches and 
the sequence and variety of their occurrence, etc.. Sade is overly ambitious in how he 
promises to arrange his passions for the ease of the reader:  
But as some reader not much learned in these matters might perhaps confuse the designated passions with the 
adventure or simple event in the narrator’s life, each of these passions has been carefully distinguished by a 
marginal notation: a line, above which is the title that may be given the passion. This mark indicates the exact 
place where the account of the passion begins, and the end of the paragraph always indicates where it finishes.
241
   
 
It would seem that Klossowski in Sade Mon Prochain assumed Sade adequately achieved this 
stated aim, i.e., to build from simple to increasing complexity those passions as “specific 
fixed idea[s]”.
242
 Klossowski attributes these passions to that species: the “pervert”, whose 
“desire is sated only in the scrupulous taste for, and search, a detail, sated only in a gesture 
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that advances scrupulously to this detail” and notably he related this “fixed idea” to that 
“positive” object of psychopathology discussed earlier in reference to Bloch christening Les 
120 Journées; Klossowski called this “idea” a “mania”.
243
 But as Schwab pointed out the 
failings of the editors of the Encyclopédie to adequately fill in the gaps in knowledge with 
some unifying notation as d’Alembert promised, in all translations of Les 120 Journées since 
Maurice Heine’s inaugural one and Pauvert’s first for a wider audience, it would seem that 
Sade too did not live up to the promised notation laid out in the introduction:  
[t]his mark indicates the exact place where the account of the passion begins, and the end of the paragraph 




No such “marks” were ever found in Sade’s original text. Or he soon recognized on setting 
forth that such “positive” delineations of passions go against the formal argument he is 
making in how he arranges his work, a fortiori, his monistic argument. Cesspools so much of 
interest in the beginning of this chapter find new sources for monistic consideration in 
reflection on the tastes of these peculiar subjects like this professor of Scholasticism; but all 
of what happens at Silling Château presents this “negative” vision. It is to the goings-on in 
Silling Château that we now turn. 
2.3 The Almanac of Les 120 Journées and the “Metaphysics of Failure” 
 If Warman sets Les 120 Journées at the beginning of Sade’s literary journey to set 
fact and analysis on a “literal” course towards systematization, St-Martin, in her chapter 
“Inflation Romanesque: Maladies Inflammatoire Aiguës et Fièvres”, offers an organizational 
scheme much different, one in the form of a timeline based on the lifespan of an illness 
starting from the “chronic” pangs in its initial stages slowly crescendoing to that full-blown 
breakout with all its acuity. She situates Les 120 Journées at the chronic onset, while 
anticipating Justine to be the acute climax:  
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Compliments given earlier, St-Martin is insightful in proffering to the evolution of Sade’s 
oeuvre something of a “negative” arc, the “maladie inflammatoire” coming from a source that 
can only resemble one of those cesspools of previous discussions. Appropriately, she 
references Bordeu, that scientist of Sade’s generation, who offered up scientific reflections 
conscious of the need to include “negativity”. Here Bordeu depicts the “negative” form an 
illness like a fever takes from beginning to the final culmination:  
Si l’on examine bien l’action qu’ont les poches du tissu cellulaire, respectivement les unes sur les autres, il sera 
facile de concevoir cette chaîne de compressions morbides dont nous parlons, qui se font du dedans au dehors, 
et du péritoine et de la plèvre vers la tête, la surface du corps et ses extrémités; surtout si on se rappelle la 




But St-Martin restricts Sade too tightly to the science of his day in reducing his case to one 
fashionable idea of biology. This raises the spectre of what has been shown as dallying with 
“positive” objects of science exposing Sade to the criticism of contradiction, for example, his 
treatment of “épigenèse” in the previous chapter. It also obfuscates Sade’s wider project 
stated as showing that “objects” of science have a history. This is why that “complex” of 
“negative-to-positive” objects has been set up as an alternative “system” to organize both 
Sade’s ideas and how they unfold within the evolution of his oeuvre. This section will argue 
how it is that Les 120 Journées is a deeply “negative” work and, what’s more, one whose 
“negativity” matches that of the historical conditions of his time, sitting in the Bastille on the 
eve of the French Revolution. Although presented in narrow historical terms, the “negative” 
structure St-Martin engages: “maladie longue” is deployable in this dissertation for novel and 
far-reaching affect. In the following quotation, she reintroduces that problematic association 
with the Encyclopédie but then goes on to adumbrate a “negative” structure (taken of course 
as the life cycle of an illness) that will be workable for the argument being made in this 
section: 
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S’il fallait associer, d’un point de vue structural, Les Cent Vingt Journées à un type particulier de maladie, il 
faudrait se tourner vers la maladie chronique. Cette dernière est caractérisée, d’après l’Encyclopédie, par sa 
lenteur: “ainsi, on distingue des maladies longues, chroniques, dont le movement se fait lentement”. Les Cent 
Vingt Journées, qui jouent sur la repetition et la prévisibilité, coincident avec la marche de la maladie chronique. 
La régularité de la structure de l’Ecole du libertinage, qui donne invariablement lieu à des repetitions, à des 
retours, fait que cette œuvre se compare advantage à une evolution lente et cyclique, qui est la marque principale 
de la maladie chronique. Ainsi, dans Les Cent Vingt Journées, le rythme de la narration des historiennes 
(comme celui de la maladie chronique est peu rapide), car brisé systématique par la rigidité d’un programme 




Les 120 Journées reads more like the predecessor to the encyclopedia, that quaint literary 
relic of bygone times: the almanac. 
Almanacs have always come in forms with varying degrees of emphases depending 
on the nationalities and cultural interests of the target audience. In the introduction to her 
exploration of almanacs in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe in Populäre 
Kalenderim vorindustriellen Europa: Der “Hinkende Boten”/ “Messager boiteux” Susanne 
Greilich gives a breakdown of the basic structure of this then popular genre of reading 
material: 
Neben einem 24-seitigen Kalender, der neben den Wochen- auch die Namens- und Festtage auflistete und 
ableitend vom Stand der Sterne sowie der Erscheinung des Mondes Vorhersagen über das Wetter traf, enthielten 
die Almanache einen in den französischen Ausgaben ,Ephémérides’ genannten Teil, der Fruchtbarkeit der Erde, 




The content of almanacs was based on “common sense”, i.e., the otherwise fortuitousness of 
say a royal birth, the appointment of a new cardinal or an auspicious sign for a good crop 
yield all counted as knowledge that relied on either traditions or popular wisdom - and 
notably not on “facts” as would serve as knowledge in encyclopaedias. The defence of 
“common sense” would be taken up by philosophers like Thomas Reid, whom Arthur 
Schopenhauer would later praise for his:  
[W]iderleg[ung der] Lockesche Lehre, daß die Anschauung ein Produkt der Sinne sei, indem er gründlich und 
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Reid developed his idea of “sensus communis” as an antidote to Hume’s scepticism that had 
already rendered much of popular wisdom and age-old beliefs illegitimately grounded. But 
Hume also extended this line of attack to perceptions in the natural world, of whose 
derivative truth-claims he argued were only as strong as the “uniformities” strung together 
from experiences. Both these epistemological arcs have been shown earlier to possess a 
salient “negativity” of relations where subjects both face objects straight on (tropism) and 
follow circular paths toward others (taxis) the only difference being the degree of “negativity” 
and “positivity” of those object pursued: the former, “natural”, those ones for which 
d’Alembert saw the greatest possibility for scientificity (“imitation of nature”); the latter, 
“obscure” objects, derogatorily lumped into those categories of superstition or religious 
mindedness (the form of “imitation of nature”, to which d’Alembert objected). The almanac 
captures the “negativity” of relations of these “negative-to-positive” objects, something 
ultimately frozen out of encyclopaedic projects. As for the debate between Hume and Reid, it 
was a matter of respective prioritization of these objects, ones either more “positive” or 
“negative”. In their reflections on eighteenth-century philosophy in their psychology essay, 
“Reality Monitoring” Marcia K. Johnson and Carol L. Raye sum up nicely these two very 
different positions: 
Two general lines of thought have been that perception and imagination primarily differ in that precepts are 
stronger or more vivid [Hume] and the opposing idea that ‘sensation… and imagination, even where they have 





The manner almanacs trace “uniformities of nature”: the changing of the seasons, the lunar 
and ecliptic cycles, the periodicity of the rising and setting of the sun - those ones Hume so 
deftly deployed to the effect of injecting such a pall of confidence over the whole of the 
philosophical project - is far more transparent than those “uniformities” of “obscure” objects 
Reid would reserve for the “imagination”: signs of the zodiac, royal and ecclesiastic 
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“watching” and holidays. In Enquiry in to the Human Mind Reid speaks of the speed those 
objects of Hume’s concern: precepts pass from sight to what they actually are (the things 
signified) “leaving no footsteps in memory or imagination”.
251
 He uses the micro-cosmology 
of his own room to emphasize this point: 
[…] the visible appearance of things in my room varies almost every hour depending on whether the day is clear 
or cloudy, whether the sun is in the east or south or west, whether my eye is in one part of the room or in 





For him it was those with sufficient “passion and affection” to channel the magnitudes of 
what he called signs of the “language of nature”, those ones outside that daze of artificiality 
plaguing many of Reid’s contemporaries, Hume included. For Reid it was children, artists, 
the hoi pollio, the blind, who could reach beyond the pale of appearances and ascertain the 
“force and energy of language”;
253
 and concerning the last on this list Reid asked this 
penetrating question:  
[h]ow a sighted man detects so many things by means of the eye is as unintelligible to the blind as how a man 
can be inspired with knowledge by God is unintelligible to us. Should this lead the blind man to dismiss as 




The quality Sade investigates in Les 120 Journées is really the magnitude of these “negative” 
objects and the expanse of the “imagination” that gives access. The tone Sade takes is much 
more amplified than Reid’s but even much more so than that one presented in all tranquillity 
in the landscape architecture Rousseau establishes at Clarens estates in La nouvelle Héloïse, 
that estate run by that “insensitive” figure, Wolmar. Linking almanacs and Rousseau’s work 
here is not too far-fetched especially given the dual emphases on “folksy” common sense and 
the natural rhythms of agrarian lifestyles and digestion (e.g., the proper diet for Julie) to 
whose uniformity Wolmar calibrated his prescription of moral hygiene. If there is any 
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ambiguity here in this comparison, Sade makes it crystal clear. Les 120 Journées is an 
almanac. 
 If Sade had been that eminent editor of the Almanach Royal - that producer of royal 
commissioned editions since Laurent D’Houry’s first in 1684 - he would have been ten days 
late submitting his final draft in writing but at least he managed the right month. Sade began 
his final draft on the 22
nd
 of October, 1785, completing on the 28
th
 of November, twenty days 
later; and as is the common statement in the “Avis de L’éditor” at the beginning of each 
edition since D’Houry:  
[l]es personnes qui prennent part à cet Ouvrage, sont priées d’envoyer leur Instructions ou Observations avant 




This almanac connection has been one interpretative device, neglected amongst others that 
always want to frame Les 120 Journées as something of an encyclopaedic project (as 
juxtapositions with Krafft-Ebing and d’Alembert have shown); and, furthermore, one 
incomplete on account of the final three parts after Madame Duclos’ full narration of the 
“150 Simple Passions” being written only cursorily in list form, these three parts being of 
course the narration of Madame Champville, and the “150 Complex Passions”; Madame 
Martaine, the “150 Criminal Passions”; and, finally, Madame Desgrange, the “150 
Murderous Passions”. Neil Schaeffer gives one interpretation to the incompleteness to this 
work, one aesthetic, playing on the subjectivity of Sade, the author. Characterizing Duclos as 
a guide who reassures readers along the way with her comparative “narrative skill, some 
humor and often humanity”,
256
 Schaeffer describes with what readers have to contend in the 
second, third and fourth narrations when such a narrator is absent: 
 […] when the reader is left entirely on his own, he finds himself in what will progressively become a bare, 
unconsoling, nightmare landscape of horror [… n]o literary device could more powerfully suggest the dreadful 
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With an almanac as an organizing principle, Sade would need only write one part for the 
logic of the entire work to be established as much of what almanacs consist anyways are lists 
of details under lapidary headings. The final three parts appearing incomplete is thus a moot 
point. On closely comparing Les 120 Journées and the Almanach Royal, the “almanac” as an 
organizing principle does seem convincing especially in the portending descriptions of 
seasons and the painstaking effort to itemize in the manner of a logician all the different 
administrative functionaries of French society - both within seven years of the start of the 
French Revolution. It had been the tradition since D’Houry to embed ominousness in the four 
months overlapping those with which Sade outlined his work. November, the month marking 
this beginning of Les 120 Journées’ daily tabulations, is presented in Almanach Royal with 
an allegory referencing in Latin an arrival: “novem ab imbre”, the month marking the ninth 
calendric placement since the previous winter, along with the woeful adjunct by the Roman 
emperor Commode who wants to hold winter’s inevitable arrival: “L’Empereur Commode 
essaya vainement de changer son nom & celui de Decembre”.
258
 November, a cardinal 
successor of September: “le septieme après les neiges”,
259
 must then also have such a “snowy” 
reference, one even given special recognition on “The Fourteen Day” when Sade follows up 
on that absolute barricade in his initial geographic description of Silling Chateau.
260
 On the 
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fourteenth of November the residents awake to a portending event either auspicious or dire 
depending on the residents’ proclivities:  
It was discovered upon that day that the weather had lent its approval to our libertines; infamous enterprises, and 
had removed them to an even greater distance from the probability they would be spied upon by mortal eyes; an 
immense blanket of snow had fallen, it filled the surrounding vale, seeming to forbid even to wild beasts access 
to our scoundrel’s retreat; of all human beings, there was not one that existed who could dare hope to reach 
where they lay fast. Ah, it is not readily to be imagined how much voluptuousness, lust, fierce joy are flattered 
by those sureties, or what is meant when one is able to say to oneself: “I am alone here, I am at the world’s end, 
withheld from every gaze, here no one can reach me, there is not creature that can come nigh where I am; no 




As for the month rounding out not only the narrative of Les 120 Journées but also winter’s 
long stay: February, its allegorization in the Almanach Royal can be seen as an omen for the 
events that would take place under Madame Desgranges’ watchful eye in the final instalment 
of the “150 Passions”, for which she is responsible. This month, according to the Almanach 
Royal, originates from the Latin word: Februarius “qui signifé purifier & faire des expiations, 
ce qui se pratiquoit pendant douze jours”.
262
 The index of the murderous passions Desgranges 
speaks of comes by way of lists of “sacrificed” including wives, sultanas, bardashes, and 
fuckers along with all those young maidens and youths kidnapped in the antecedent to the 
story’s beginning. Sade tabulates this list as a “Final Assessment” including even those who 
would survive: 
Massacred prior to the 1
st
 of March, 
     In the course of the orgies ………. 10 
Massacred after the 1
st
 of March ……. 20 
Survived and came back ……………. 16 




Of course as the “Final Assessment” includes twenty more “sacrifices” in March, committed 
beyond the final day of February; none of them were mediated by that tradition involving 
formal narrations and the audience participating in ceremonies as if according to liturgical 
obeisance. The sense from March 1
st
 onwards is one of disposing of the bootie for the sake of 
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The allegory for February happens also to conjure up that cesspool of “negativity”, St-
Martin mentioned in the onset of this section, that one stated as the foundation of Sade’s 
monistic musing:  
Februare viennt aussi de Februus, ancient Dieu des morts, & pere de Pluton; peut-étre de-là febris, fiévre, 




Here February is not simply presented as a time of year, an arbitrary temporal marker on a 
calendar per se; but shown possessing its own vitalism, tended to even by personifications of 
the zodiac, i.e., the attendant “Taureau” and “Bélier”; and imbued with the quality of having 
its own “genesis” and duration. The first line of the “Époques pour l’Année 1782” suggest 
just where this beginning may have been: “[o]n compte depuis la création du Monde jusqu’au 
Déluge universal […] 1658 ans”.
266
 Here is another instance where “fever” need not be read 
so closely to science of Sade’s days as St-Martin intimates. In fact, on closer analysis, the 
science St-Martin speaks of is often far too tightly anchored to the “positivity” of individual 
bodies. Consider in the following citation how easy it is to slip into discussions of characters 
mutually defined by their “positive” roles: 
Les symptoms de la fièvre établissent des frontières nettes entre la victim et le bourreau. En effet, seul ce dernier 
éprouve constamment une elevation de sa temperature corporelle. La diversité du sympôme de la pyrexia, leur 
richesse métaphorique montrent que Sade s’est plu à traduire en images ce qui peut n’être qu’une banale 
manifestation pathologique […] il emploie les termes d’échauffement pour traduire la montée du plaisir chez le 
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libertin; ce terme donne naissance à des derives sémantique tel que flamme, chaleur, rougeur. Á ce niveau précis, 




But need not “la création” et “Déluge universal” be spoken of with terms like “fiévre” 
without finding “positive” conduits to house their meaning? Perhaps the answer implied here 
is an extension of the critique of those holding too tightly to a hermeneutic of sola scriptura: 
those who take the words of Holy Scriptures literally. Here now it is the literality of meaning 
that is being bypassed; and the “form” literality takes that becomes the new target: the 
dismantling of words imbued with “positivity” in sacred texts. The “Déluge” is the ultimate 
miasma without the event even being in the “form” of an event let alone having content in 
meaning like say something metaphoric. It is the “corruption” of the world that brought about 
the “inflation” of its waters without this string of nouns need being conduits for holding 
“positive” meaning in objects. This concern for “negativity” should figure central to the 
hermeneutics of all sacred texts actually.  
Such a line of approach also implicates those functionaries mentioned ad nauseum in 
both Les 120 Journées and the Almanach Royal, all of whom are given the mention and 
concern only the most micro-managing of bureaucrats could muster - in St-Martin’s 
aforementioned words: “[l]a diversité du sympôme de la pyrexia […] qui peut n’être qu’une 
banale manifestation pathologique”. But, of course, the “negative” backdrop from which all 
of them fall has already been given a thorough working-through in the development of the 
“plenum”; for the sake of convenience, these two quick reminders of its architecture suffice 
as summaries of what is denigrated in “positive” form: “Rousseau builds his “General Will” 
out of passion occupying the distal space Hume actually reserves for “comparisons”” (p. 55) 
and “Diderot took too astute notice of the vagaries of beehives and like Rousseau intuited a 
reactivity of deep-seated eroticism; however, Diderot set his gaze first upon individual 
worker bees and worked his way up to an organizing logic, i.e., the queen” (p. 58). With the 
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“positive anchor to individual bodies” removed from consideration it is possible to look anew 
on the profuse itemizations dedicated to all those high- and multi-level bureaucratic functions, 
around which the worlds of D’houry and Sade turn. Once the course for all (observable) 
cosmological occurrences are accounted for and measured for the year in question, the 
Almanach Royal descends only by degree to those ones making the comprehensive lists of the 
whole of the administrative organ of the French kingdom. Starting from the most deeply 
“negative”: “Naissances et Alliances Des Roi, et Principaux Princes et Princesses de l’Europe 
de France”, “Cardinaux qui composent le sacré Collège Cardinaux évéques” and “Le Clerge: 
Archevêque et évêchés, leur taxe en Cour de Rome en Revenu”, the lists quickly fall in 
descending order to that panoply of supporting functionaries adjuncted with the pertinent 
titles and addresses, whose painstaking individual mention is enough to give the impression it 
be strictly a bureaucratic exercise. Maison de Roi; Maison de Reine; Maréchaux de France; 
Lieutenons Généraux des Armées du Roi; Governement du Château Royale de la Bastille; 
Chambre de Comptes; Avocats du Parlement; Inspecteur de Police; Académie Royale des 
Science; Directeur des Fermes etc. are examples of some of the functionaries given special 
dedication in the Almanach Royal. The indispensability of Les 120 Journées is that Sade too 
is as particular in naming these functionaries and offering up their details. However, it is not 
in the manner of Diderot working up to an “organizing logic” in his observations of the 
goings-on of a beehive that such detailed lists in the Almanach Royal find their analogy. Sade 
is working from the same distance Rousseau has already been shown developing his 
metaphysical position that one imbued with “reactivity with a deep-seated eroticism”: the 
“plenum”. But again the “plenum” here is not filled with “virtue” as it is with Rousseau; but 
“vice”. In the following quotation from his introduction to Les 120 Journées, Sade 
crystallizes his departure from the contents of Rousseau’s “plenum” this way: 
For - and why not say so in passing - if crime lacks the kind of delicacy one finds in virtue, is not the former 
always more sublime, does it not unfailingly have the character of grandeur and sublimity which surpasses, and 
will always make it preferable to, the monotonous and lacklustre charms of virtue? Will you protest the greatest 
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usefulness of this or of that, is it for us to scan Nature’s laws, ours to determine whether, vice being just as 
necessary to Nature as is virtue, she perhaps does not implant in us, in equal quantity, the penchant for one or 




Sade takes the length of Les 120 Journées to itemize the same administrative organ D’houry 
and his successors did since the Almanac Royal’s maiden publication. Through the infamies 
of either of those four principle “heroes” of the work: a duke, a bishop, a président in the 
French court and a financier; or all those other characterizations, bedaubing the narrations of 
all four of the story-tellers, the functionaries are treated with the same devotion as an almanac 
but of course the “negativity” of what otherwise saturates its deceptively “positive” 
appearance is laid bare and the “monotony” betraying for “virtue” its inevitable slide towards 
“positivity” (i.e., d’Holbach’s “congenial-inimical formulation”) is undone by “Nature” and 
its bestowal of vice, but this bestowal does not come in “equal quantities”, as the above 
quotation points out. After all, in his reflection on why one would choose an “aged, ugly and 
even stinking crone” over a “fresh and pretty girl” Sade naturalizes the flaw and inherent 
“positivity” of virtue in considering how “a man on his promenade prefers the mountains arid 
and rugged terrain to monotonous pathways of the plains”.
269
 The following three examples 
suffice to illustrate Sade offering up almanac entries for three functionaries of the 
administrative organ Almanach Royal would too have described: 
My hero was an elderly ecclesiastic who served as chaplain to the king […] he was only approached if one 
where naked, but one’s front and breasts had to be thoroughly covered […] were he to catch the least glimpse of 




The first purchaser to arrive was an old treasurer of the Exchequer […] I gave him little Lucile, over whom he 
waxed very enthusiastic. His habitual mania, quite as filthy as disagreeable for his partner, consisted in shitting 
upon his Dulcinea’s face, of smearing his excrement over all her features, and then of kissing her in this state, 




And having given notice of the hour of the visit, and advised me of the ritual to be expected by that elderly post-
office commissioner whose name, I remember, was Monsieur de Grancourt […] Our man listened with the 
keenest attention to my harangue [about the Parliament delegating me to arrest and punish him], and 
immediately I had done that, he burst into and fell down on his knees before me, imploring me to deal leniently 
with him […] into the fire I had thrust the an iron scourge garnished with pointed steel tips […] start[ed] to beat 
him with it, gently at first, then with increasing severity, then with all my strength, and that heedless of where 
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To close out discussion on Les 120 Journées, that most singular of pre-revolutionary 
almanacs, something by way of “metaphysics of failure” at the very heart of the work needs 
considering; and it is to this conceptualization that we now turn with the aid of these three 
aforementioned strategically selected almanac entries. 
 Failure does not mean here some personal deficiency on the part of Sade, the writer; 
but one that will be shown to be reflected in the investments of all four heroes, who are 
metronomes of the work’s escalating tempo moving in “negative” recession. This failure also 
comes by way of the medium of the almanac itself. With the French Revolution, the 
Almanach Royal would fall into disrepute and be discontinued, replaced with a new version, 
the Almanach National. The editors of this almanac struggled to maintain the contradictory 
aims of encouraging continuity with what it had just replaced while attempting a 
cosmological renewal with the newly enshrined “citizen-in-arms” as the centre. Richard Taws’ 
in his essay “Material Futures: Reproducing Revolution in P.-L. Debucourt's Almanach 
National” offers the very different position of this new centre, one where “negativity” is 
replaced by something saliently “positive”. Taws’ focus on print - what its materiality was 
and how it mediated an entirely new public discourse - is another reminder that “desire” and 
“imagination” need not belong in the plenum (p. 85): 
Almanack national is a work that functions as a condensed mediation on the nature of materiality and 
representation in Revolutionary France, at a moment when debates about such subjects were becoming 
increasingly significant. It asks what kind of medium is appropriate to revolution, and at what stage in its 
development, thereby portraying the Revolution as embedded in historical process and projecting imaginatively 




In addition to these failures another is the fact that this work never saw the light of day in 
Sade’s time; this may help explain why Sade never made any attempt to write anew this 
clandestine manuscript. It is commonly said that Sade recaptured the spirit of Les 120 
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Journées in subsequent works like Justine and Juliette but given how this dissertation has 
emphasized the historical and intellectual conditions of his oeuvre, this claim is now 
problematic. Sade even suggests as much when he woefully stated:  
[…] —my manuscripts over whose loss I shed tears of blood! Other beds, tables, chests of drawers can be found, 




This point is missed by Lély, who carries on a belief disseminated earlier on by one of Sade’s 
first biographers, Maurice Heine:  
Losing his 120 Days […] Sade lost his main thread, and knew it. The remainder of his literary life was 
dominated by concern to remedy the consequences of that accident. So with painful perseverance and insistence 




The above selection of the functionaries for Sade’s almanac entries: the chaplain to the King, 
the treasurer of the Exchequer and the post-office commissioner offers variations of differing 
degrees of failure that will be discussed in the final part of this section. Understanding the 
nature of these failures will be useful in beginning to turn the corner in discussing “objects” 
in a new way and moving incrementally towards success. The French Revolution was a 
seminal period in the history of Western history, one where a new order of knowledge 
appeared, one of whose far-reaching explication Foucault dedicated the rump of his 
intellectual investment in Les Mots et les Choses. The transitory features of change are 
reflected in Sade’s evolving oeuvre. But before this can be demonstrated, the metaphysics of 
failure needs explaining and the features of this explanation ultimately explain why the 
almanac is now only considered a quaint repository of human knowledge. 
As it was for Charnes in Rousseau’s La nouvelle Héloïse, Silling Chateau was run by 
an “insensitive” manager - or rather four of them: Duc de Blangis, Bishop of X***, 
Présidente de Curval and Durcet. In developing his particular style of materialism Rousseau 
relied heavily on the character of Wolmar to rein in the unbounded “sensibilité” of Julie; it 
was common sense and bodily calibrations aimed at synchronization with natural processes 
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that allowed Julie first to settle and then be raised to the centre of life for the community. 
These qualities are all features of the epistemology of the almanac as per previous discussions. 
It was pointed out earlier that the organization of the terms of Rousseau’s argument contained 
a contradiction: “if Julie be the fons et origo of life in Clarnes, how does it follow that it is 
impassive objects, embodied by this “folksy” Wolmar” (p. 51) that are the actual bases? This 
contradiction was solved by not seeing the objects of concern as either “sensitive” or 
“insensitive” but rather lying along a slide rule of “negativity-positivity”, free from the 
burden imposed by logic that can only ever operate in “positivity”. But there is now available 
a more subtle conceptualization: a “posteriority-anteriority-interiority” complex: relations to 
objects are attenuated from indirect (taxis) to increasingly direct (tropism) and internalized 
(interiority). (“Interiority” will begin to be developed starting from Chapter 3.1.) The position, 
from which to interrelate objects of say Julie’s “sensibilité” and the “negative” objects 
Wolmar arranges for her, is the “plenum” - a location spurning proximity, the customary 
position for examining relations amongst objects (Hobbes, p. 54/ Hume, p. 55 / Diderot, p. 
58). Rousseau instead chooses a basis point more distal, encapsulated in his notion of 
“volonté générale” (p. 59). This, of course, has been all in addition to the other goal set by 
this dissertation: the purging of observations of that other “partial” variety, i.e., d’Holbach 
warning of judgments that fall to the side of either being “congenial” or “inimical” to 
humankind. Sade used “vice” to shellac Rousseau’s metaphysics on this point, presenting 
“virtue” as both a landscape of “positivity”: “prefer[ing] the mountains’ arid and rugged 
terrain to monotonous pathways of the plains” (p. 105), and the pinnacle of “congeniality” - 
what is morally good, or “hygienic”. But for Sade “vice” too need not necessarily be a choice 
of the inimical for the sake of what is inimical. Klossowski explores this problem in his 
notion of “apathy”:  
[… f]or the monster to progress beyond the level that has been reached, he has first to avoid falling back shy of 
it; he can do so only if he reiterates his act in absolute apathy [… here] Sade introduced a critique of the 
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The risk for transgression is that the push against objects, naturally finds complacency and 
torpor, settling on what in fact becomes “congenial” to the individual in question: for 
Klossowski “apathy” is needed to fend off this possibility and maintain forward 
momentum.
277
 The manner insensitivity has been developed in this dissertation sets it apart 
from Klossowski’s “apathy” in that the former has a “negativity” setting itself outside even 
being a choice of either what is “congenial” or “inimical”. (Apathy will be shown to reach its 
pinnacle of success in La philosophie dans le boudoir in Chapter 5.1.) In the following 
exchange between Curval and the Bishop the “negative” impetus of insensitivity is 
expressively revealed to reside in the same “plenum” Rousseau adumbrates in his 
metaphysics although Sade notably excludes there being the possibility of a (“digital”) choice, 
the choice of hygiene, that problematic outcome of what is otherwise Rousseau’s solid 
“negative” metaphysical space. “Hygiene” is ultimately “virtue” enacted: 
[Curval ruminates: … “]All that before affected one disagreeably, now encountering an otherwise prepared soul, 
is metamorphosed into pleasure, and from this moment onward, whatever recalls the new state one has adopted 
can henceforth only be voluptuous .” 
“But what a distance one must travel first have ventured along the road of vice to arrive at that point!” said the 
Bishop. 
“Yes, yes, ‘tis so,” Curval acknowledged; “but little by little one makes one’s way along, and the path one treads 
is strewn with flowers; one excess leads to another, the imagination, never sated, soon brings us to our 
destination, and as the traveler’s heart has only hardened as he has pursued his career, immediately he reaches 




The rest of this section will explore Les 120 Journées through these shared features 
developed as Rousseau’s metaphysics, drawing comparisons from Rousseau’s oeuvre, 
especially La nouvelle Héloïse and Les Confessions. The end of this comparison will be the 
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demonstration of an inherent failure on the part of the epistemology of the age, a failure seen 
through the experiments conducted by the four “heroes” of Silling Château. 
 Just as Rousseau achieved through Wolmar a scaling of objects, positive to negative, 
in his juxtaposition of the management at Charnes estate and the rigmarole he saw outside 
France, Sade does something similar in recruiting his four “insensitive” managers at Silling 
Château - the difference of course being a matter of magnitude. On the first rung of this scale 
are those “Simple Passions” of Duclos’ November narrations and they have already been well 
summarized in how Sade was concerned for the monotony of sexual preferences and the need 
for those ever important details to guarantee divergences in his (almanac) entries (p. 92-93). 
Sade (through Duclos) made mention of that Scholastic professor from Sorbonne, whose love 
of “belch tasting” was only as “positive” as the shimmering boundaries of all those detailed 
contingencies involved in the ritual of the particular passion and, as well, the blending taking 
place with the passion’s ever so subtle lateral slide to another on the arrival of the next 
brothel visitor, who brings something derivative: “vomit tasting”. As it is for the form of the 
book, Duclos’ entire narration is a progressive decline from objects less to increasingly more 
“negative”. Mentioned as one of those three functionaries to the administrative organ of 
France, the “chaplain to the king”, who would have been installed at the time of Sade’s 
internment at the Bastille, presents not only one adumbration of an early “object” (presented 
November 10) but also an early indication of the kinds of problems objects pose for the 
characters: the sight of female-only sexual parts makes this chaplain go limp. Next in line 
amongst those three functionaries was the “treasurer of the Exchequer”, whose coprophilic 
passion should be seen as an alternative version to Wolmar’s lessons on hygiene: this being 
his careful application of “remedial” substitutions of objects more “positive” for those of 
greater “negativity”, e.g., substituting a passionate kiss for one innocuous for Saint-Preux (p. 





 Reading coprophilia into these lessons, i.e., brown “cream” smeared over Lucile’s 
face and this “treasurer” “kissing” and licking it off, would seem ludicrous until one begins to 
consider the increasing care the four managers of Silling Château invest in the dietary rules of 
their seraglio. If Rousseau requires as a beverage for Julie: milk and sugar, tastes of the fair-
sex; a meal: vegetables from the country, fine greens from one’s own garden, fish from a lake, 
cheese from one’s own mountain and game caught by one’s domestics with absolutely no 
“articulation” to the taste, i.e., with no exotic spices whatsoever (as described by Vila),
280
 
Sade requires what is from the body, produced with just as much concern for ingredients and 
preparation procedures: 
That morning [of the nineteenth day], after having made some observations upon the shit the subjects were 
producing for lubricious purposes, the friends decided that the society ought to try something Duclos had spoken 
of in her narration: I am referring to the suppression of bread and soup from all the tables save Messieurs’. 
These articles were withdrawn, and replaced by twice the former quantity of fowl and game. They hoped to 
remark some improvement, and in less than a week an essential difference in the community’s excrement was 





If “milk and sugar […] are deemed symbols of innocence and sweetness [… and] their most 
becoming ornaments",
282
 Sade skewers such a notion. To a “straw man” concern raised by 
one of the members about the smelliness of breath that would follow from these dietary 
alterations, Curval retorts:  
[i]f it fall short of smelling of rot or the cadaver, well, be patient, the taste will develop, but that it have nothing 
but an odor of milk and honey or infancy,
283




                                                          
279
 ‘I made a most delicious repast with them. Where could you find such cream cakes as we have here? Imagine 
what they must be, made in a dairy where Julie presides, and eaten in her company. Franchon presented me with 
some cream, some seed-cake, and other little comfits. All was gone in an instant. Julie smiled at my appetite. “I 
find (said she, giving me another plate of cream), that your stomach does you credit every where, and that you 
make as good a figure among a club of females, as you do among the Valsaisans [identified earlier (NH, 
1.23.81) as heart drinkers].” “But I do not (answered I) make the repast with more impunity; the one may be 
attended with intoxication as well as the other; and reason may be as much distracted in a nursery as in a wine-
cellar.” She cast her eyes down without any reply, blushed, and began to cuddle her children. This was enough 
to sting me with remorse. This, my Lord, was the first indiscretion, and I hope it will be the last (Eloise, 2:256; 
NH, 4.10.452)’ (Anne C. Vila, op. cit., 216). (Full quotation) 
280
 Vila, op. cit., 212-213.  
281
 de Sade, 120 Days, 461. 
282
 Vila, op. cit., 212. 
283
 Notably Rousseau has also made mention of ‘cuddling children’ as one of Wolmar’s ‘negative’ prescription 
for Julie. 
284
 de Sade, 120 Days, 462. 
112 
 
This lengthy documentation of the panoply of coprophilic passions was once panned by Lély 
as reason to reject the claim Les 120 Journées is a masterpiece. Countering those who would 
offer up such accolades, Lély states:  
[…] one should point out that there is one persistent error which in many places reduced the didactic value of 
his work - namely, the monstrously exaggerated place which he gave to the coprolagneic aberration carried to 




Read through Rousseau, this “excess” seems not excessive at all. Next in order is that one 
belonging to the “post-office commissioner”, who has a passion for being whipped with 
scorched “iron scourge with tip metal tips” while adlibbing a judicial punishment for a crime 
he imagines having committed. This passion may not only be an allusion to that scandalous 
moment Rousseau only handled with the greatest of pusillanimity, his encounter with his 
whip-wielded nanny, Jacqueline, in Confessions; but also a harbinger to an important one in 
Martaine and Desgranges’ repertoire of (respective) “criminal” and “murderous” passions. 
Duclos uses this “commissioner’s” passion to round off the category of passive flagellation in 
her section and point the way for fire as “conflagration” to take on increasing significance at 
a time also when passive flagellation would also turn active, and thus “negative” (See page). 
The significance of Sade’s conflagrations is matched only by events and discourses, 
concerning the principle of fire, synchronous to Sade’s scientific investigations, a relevance 
that would actually grow in importance during the French Revolutionary period and well into 
the Napoleonic era (but more on this in Chapter 6). From the end of November onwards 
passions like passive flagellation and “heated” instruments would become increasingly more 
combinatory and spiral even deeper analogically towards greater depths of “negativity”. The 
culminating moment February 28
th
 was the erotophonophilic murder of the gravid Constance, 
by her husband, the Duc, and father, Durcet. This wife/ daughter relationship - along with the 
son/ nephew as it was a child of the masculine sex that Curval pulled out when he opened 
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 - constitutes another important “negative” passion beginning in earnest 
with the narrations of Madame Champville in December, those 150 complex ones. As has 
been the pattern thus far, passion here is again an extension of one already attributed to 
Rousseau: his incestual affair with his Mama, Madame de Warnes; and his child 
abandonment (See Chapter 1.5). On December 5
th
 Champville gives this anecdote of incest, 
revealing a gnarled picture of Edenic confusion of daughter/ son, brother/ sister, father/ 
husband but, more formally, a web of familial relations in deep “negativity”:  
[… h]e has four daughters, legitimate and wedded; he wishes to fuck all four: he makes all four of them 
conceive and bear children so as someday to have the pleasure of depucelating the children he has had by his 




In Madame Champville’s next narration Sade extends the “negativity” of passion towards 
even higher levels of “complexity”: blasphemy, officially inaugurated December 13
th
 with 
the finale of the day being:  
[… h]e has two girls shit upon a crucifix, he shits thereupon when they have finished, and he is frigged against 




Thus moving beyond family, towards relations of strictly “creator” and “created” - or, less 
anthropomorphically “cause” and “effect”, Sade is adumbrating the deeper implications and 
doing so not handling them with the typical proximity common of Cartesian or Newtonian 
mechanics; rather the point of investigation is from that now familiar “distance” and in 
deeper “negativity”, i.e.,  in the “plenum”. In sum, all the passions developed in November 
and December would accelerate to a feverish pitch all the way through January and February 
where criminality and murder would be the respective heightened magnitudes. Having placed 
Les 120 Journées in a tradition of “negativity” - considering first the Almanach Royal an 
important antecedent; and now Rousseau’s La nouvelle Héloïse; and drawing out from Sade’s 
work that analogic shape making possible discussion of objects in incremental declines 
towards degrees of “negativity” what now needs to be done is to establish why all this ends 
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up in failure. To do this these “negative” objects that have so far been given only qualitative 
descriptions need themselves to be treated negatively, something done with great pomp and 
affect in Les 120 Journées. In other words, what need be done to these objects to get at why 
what follows from them is a “metaphysics of failure” is to naturalize them in accordance with 
how Sade managed them in his narrative. The “how” of objects is needed to complement the 
“what”, which has just been given. 
 One of the advantages of calling Les 120 Journées an almanac is that by this very 
appellation the “objects” already discussed with their varying degrees of “negativity” all fall 
automatically under the sway of the uniformities of nature. Had Hume a repertoire of “objects” 
consisting of more than just “positive” ones, the “negativities” almanacs capture may not 
have seemed so vulgar to his tastes or obscure to his intellectual purview as all would admit 
to the same centrifugal influence of this uniformity. His assertion of scepticism was basically 
that this influence of uniformity, ignored by many amongst his contemporaries, threatened 
the very core of arguments built in reason. In the section to his Inquiry, titled “The visible 
appearance of objects” Reid is quick to surrender at least one aspect of the human mind to 
those uniformities Hume so deftly put to such damaging effect though Reid would still label 
Hume’s whole effort “a puppet […] constructed by an over-bold apprentice of nature in 
mimicry of nature’s own work.”
 289
 This aspect is imagination, cited in full from that 
fragment mentioned earlier in footnote #242: 
[…] I have to talk about things that are never made the object of reflection, although at almost every moment 
they are presented to the mind. Nature intended them only as signs, and throughout our lives that is all we use 
them for. The mind has acquired an ingrained habit of inattention to visible objects; no sooner do they appear 
than - quick as lightning - the thing signified takes over and occupies all our attention. Although we are 
conscious of the appearances when they pass through the mind, their passage is so fast and so familiar that it is 
absolutely unnoticed: and they leave no footsteps of themselves in the memory or in the imagination.
290 
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Reid’s emphasis here on tropistic object engagement: “the thing signified tak[ing] over and 
occup[ying] all our attention” follows an established pattern in scientific attempts to explain 
the natural world and humankind’s placement therein. Reid criticized Hume for “mimicking 
nature’s own work” but at several points already in this dissertation mimicry - or “imitation 
of nature” - has been seen a necessary task for scientific inquiry. And by now it is obvious 
this feature of imitation is lost neither on almanacs nor Sade in Les 120 Journées. For tropism 
and its direct dealings with “positive” objects to be what they are, there is the need to reshape 
those objects whose constitutions of indirectness necessitate some modification before 
engagement.  Objects in “memory” and “imagination” can be said to belong to this category. 
In Discours Préliminaire d’Alembert has already been shown relegating “memory” to those 
“puerile first steps towards understanding”, designating it the sole domain of his opponents 
amongst the Scholastics, who had yet to discover that all-important missing element in their 
erudition: “the need for “memory” to be transformed into “reason” (p. 85-86). For 
“imagination” he, like Reid, subordinates it to “things signified” but argues that proper 
“imitation of nature” “depend[s] on imagination putting together beings similar to those 
which are the objects of our direct ideas, the realm of reason” (p. 98), which was something, 
he argued, artists (in the right-hand branch of his “Detailed System of Human Knowledge”) 
had the facility of achieving. Hume, in his phenomenological exploration of human nature in 
his Treatise, too speaks of “memory” and “imagination” in “positive” terms. For “memories” 
he qualified them as “lively”
291
 such that when failures to make necessary associations occur 
they give off incriminating indications:  
[…] memory preserves the original form in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart 




For “imagination” he argues that it be anything but “lively” - rather “faint and languid”, mere 
inefficiencies in the system of cognition: “ideas are copy’d from our impressions, and that 
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there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable”.
293
 From this reason he 
concludes “winged horses”, “fiery dragons” and “monstrous giants” springing forth from the 
imagination are as harmless as “paper tigers”.
294
 Unlike d’Alembert, Hume denied “reason” 
any relevance, in essence, subordinating it to the same natural realm where Les 120 Journées 
and the Almanach Royale have been shown to operate. Positioning himself here yet being 
unwilling to engage its “negative” landscape, Hume really had no other choice but to choose 
scepticism. And what he did add to this “landscape” ended up being only “positive” objects 
anyways in the guise of “negativity” as Reid himself points out:  
[…] according to Hume’s system, the whole mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief, and all the 
actions and passions of the mind are explained by three laws of association together with a few original feelings. 




In this dissertation, any discussion of “negativity” has been predicated on the need for a 
“plenum”, that “immaterial” space where both proximity and objects (in “positive” form) are 
extirpated. To have a “negative space” be one part “sense”, another part “imagination”, 
mixed with a little bit of “memory” and then add “belief” and “passion” for good measure, as 
Hume would make it, is the exact recipe a common sense philosopher like Reid would reject 
and did so this way: 
The more we know of other parts of nature, the more we like and approve them. The little that I know of the 
planetary system, the earth that we inhabit, minerals, vegetables and animals, my own body, and the laws that 





The four “heroes” of Silling Château fill this same “plenum” - not with the “virtue” Rousseau 
spoke of - but “vice”; and reading their placement in Les 120 Journées, a “negative” space, 
requires one to undergo a similar investigation Sartre would make more than a century later 
but from an entirely different species of “negativity”, a post-Hegelian kind: “how can [these 
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four “heroes”] be related to nothingness so that through it Nothingness comes to things?”
297
 
(The difference in Sartre’s “negative” exploration will be described in full in Chapter 5.1.) Le 
Brun makes as good of an attempt as anyone in placing these four central characters of Les 
120 Journées within the backdrop of this “negative space”. Her description comes in the form 
of a revelry of her own. She stands in the front of the “birds of prey” cages at the Bronx Zoo, 
“groped and tickled by ideas, by shimmering sensations and glimmerings of memories”
298
: 
I watched the crowd pass by, passing with that strangeness which is natural to a crowd whose subtle texture is as 
yet unknown: over here, the curve of someone’s thigh, the corner of a smile, a straying curl, over there, some 
pretty eyelashes, a glimpse of neck, an arching wrist – these things seemed unintelligible. I felt at the center of a 
curious void, from which arose the aviary – or rather, its sovereign inhabitants, the sudden, absolute masters of 




Like all scientific attempts in the era of him writing Les 120 Journées, Sade too presents his 
version of “imitating nature”. 
 
Before the four “heroes” of Silling Château set off on their lubricious adventure, one 
of the first orders of business was to lay out certain ground rules in the form of “Statutes”. 
Appearing in the book’s introduction, these statutes look to be at first sight simply a set of 
unanimously agreed-upon rules and regulations implemented to maximize the enjoyment of 
the sojourners while limiting all the complications that may arise managing an environment, 
which, by its very nature, must be unorderly. Statute #1 establishes the uniformity that would 
govern the entirety of all Les 120 Journées. It also grounds the notion of a “metaphysics of 
failure”; something this section of this chapter has promised to reveal: 
The company shall rise every day at ten o’clock in the morning, at which time the four fuckers who have not 
been on duty during the night shall come to pay the friends a visit and shall each bring a little boy; they shall 
perform as bidden by the friends’ likings and desires, but during the preliminaries the little boys shall serve only 
as tempting prospects, for it has been decided and planned that the eight maidenheads of the little girls’ cunts 
shall remain intact until the month of December, and their asses shall likewise remain in bond, as shall the asses 
of the eight little boys, until the month of January, at which times the respective seals shall be broken, and this 
in order to allow voluptuousness to become irritated by the augmentation of the desire incessantly inflamed and 
never satisfied, a state which must necessarily lead to that certain lascivious fury the friends shall strive to 
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If Reid claims objects “pass through the mind with such speed and familiarity the imagination 
remains unaffected”,
301
 Sade portrays the process much differently. Sade intended the statutes 
not to be fortuitous laws, designed to serve the whims of the four “heroes”, but rather to be 
regulations aligned with cosmological events. These events would then be inflected in 
performances as if marking those in any cycle of an almanac, i.e., festivals with the same flair 
for custom and pageantry. In the 1782 Almanach Royal the calendric cycle followed this 
“Festes Mobile”: 
La Septuagésime le 27 Jan
 
  L’Ascension   le 9 Mai             L’Avant      le 1 Dec 
Les Cendres        le 13 Feb                             La Pentecôte   le 19 Mai 
Pâsques               le 31 Mar   La Trinité        le 26 Mai 




If the religious calendar here traces those important events and works in the life of Christ - all 
anticipating the “stations of the cross” - Silling Château follows what can be called “stations 
of depucelation”. In a subsection in “The Third Day” of Les 120 Journées, entitled “Schedule 
of Works to be Accomplished During The Remainder of the Party” the four “heroes” outline 
a calendar of their own, which was to pass through four “liturgical” stages: marriage 
ceremonies of all sets of children “whose age forbids them from conjoining the female 
counterparts, staggered in January with the additional custom of handing the child over to one 
of the four Fuckers; the sodomistic depucelation of the male counterparts, staggered in 
January (after the ceremonies of each one’s respective spouse in the same month). This final 
ceremony had the additional feature that the event would be inaugurated by the arranged 
marriages of the little boys to their matches amongst the four “heroes”, the adults taking the 
roles of wives. Here is the schedule for just one of these child pairings: Michette and Giton: 
On the 7
th
 of November […] Messieurs shall proceed in the morning to the marriage of Michette and Giton [… 
they] shall be separated on the marriage night, for to closet them together would be as futile as this ridiculous 






 [of December], Curval shall deflower Michette.
304
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 [of January], the Duc shall embugger Michette […] deflowered fore by Curval, and whose ass will 






 [of January], the Duc shall embugger Giton […] As the objects are progressively depucelated, they 
shall take the place of the wives upon the couches at storytelling time, and, at nighttime, they shall lie with the 
Messieurs, alternately, and at Messieurs’ choice, together with the last four fairies Messieurs will take to 
themselves as wives during the final month [(the replacement comes as necessity as February is the month of 




The general proceedings in these four stages would of course be repeated by all four of the 
child couples. The difference between the calendar in the Almanach Royal and Les 120 
Journées is really only a matter of implicitness versus explicitness. In the then Catholic 
tradition, holidays, ceremonies and liturgical proceedings all drew on parallel alignments 
between cosmology, theological belief-claims and extant human actions. For example, the 
wedding ceremony would not have been seen as the fortuitous pairing of husband and wife 
but rather a metaphysical event, the “holy” union between God (through Christ, the groom) 
and humankind (the bride), captured in the concept of ekklēsia and played out with the 
necessity of natural uniformity: puberty -  
[t]herefore man shall leave his father and mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall become one [… 




Just as it would be the case for religious vows, breaking the statutes at Silling Château 
warranted penalties. Perhaps in an effort to draw the parallel with “religion”, this “negative 
space” that Sade’s metaphysics also approaches, he issues Statute #26, relevant to all those 
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imprisoned - but not to any of the four “heroes” themselves as their “negative” position 
behind “religious acts” makes blasphemy their default speech:  





But the four “heroes” were in fact bound to all the statutes all the same; and herein lies the 
“failure”, in which Sade is investing metaphysical concern. As Statute #30 enjoins:  
[a]ny friend who fails to comply with any one of these articles, or who may take it into his head to act in 
accordance with a single glimmer of common sense or moderation and above all to spend a single day without 




The inherent contradiction of this injunction, i.e., to be immoderate while obeying the 
restrictions of the law, turns up at several moments in the story where heated lust impels 
some from amongst the compact of “friends” to forsake the rules, forego the financial penalty 
and satiate the lust. No fines end up being paid though this is not to say there were no close 
calls. In one episode on “The First Day” when Curval is particularly overheated from the 
combination of Duclos’ narration and the “objects” of lust in his midst he speaks almost as if 
Sade were revealing cheekily the innards of the program he had just set out to portray:  
“Président, be frank,” said Durcet: “on the verge of running amuck yourself, I believe that at the present moment 
you prefer to prepare yourself to feel how one enjoys than to discuss how one becomes disgusted.: 
“Why, not at all, not a bit of it,” said Curval, “I am as cool as ice… To be sure, yes,” he continued, kissing 
Adonis’ lips, “this child is charming… but he’s not to be fucked; I know of nothing worse than your damnable 
regulations… one must reduce oneself to things… to things…. Go on. Duclos, go on, continue, for I have the 




The lust of the four “heroes” would be kept in check but increase in ferocity all the way until 
the final day: the 20
th
 of March when the final account of the “heroes’” accomplishments 
read: “[w]hereof thirty were immolated and sixteen returned to Paris”. And for all the ferocity 
mounting until this climax - a climax surprisingly anticlimactic and modest, positioned on the 
page sandwiched between two tables banally recapitulating the before and after inventory of 
the inhabitants of Silling Château. Although the 20
th
 of March would have had of course no 
specific value for Foucault, much of his scientific inquiry bears striking resemblance to the 
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argument being promoted in this dissertation that “objects” of science have a particular 
formative history. He too sensed the importance of “object” moving amidst the Classical 
period through to the Modern; and one doing so according to a trajectory that resembled a 
transition from “negativity” to increasingly “positivity”. Just consider this historiographical 
line he draws in Les Mots et les Choses: he presents Don Quixote as playing with that dull 
object: “similitude”, which, in the course of his adventure, ends up becoming much sharper: 
“representation”, and his madness emerges from this discrepancy.
311
 At the advent of the 
Modern age these sharper objects of the Classical age follow this transformation:  
Sade’s characters correspond to him at the other end of the Classical age, at the moment of its decline [… i]t is 
no longer the ironic triumph of representation over resemblance, it is the obscure and repeated violence of desire 




All these shifts have a clear shape, one from dull to increasing sharpness but Foucault 
equivocates when he imbues this sharper edge of the historiographical line with “violence of 
desire”. Everything that has been gathering up until this point - on the eve of the French 
Revolution when a new metaphysical reality is about to be breeched - asserts the “violence of 
desire” recedes backwards into the “plenum”, growing in intensity with every slide into 
greater “negativity”. In his Surveiller et punir Foucault would even suggest as much when, in 
preparing the way for his lifelong investigation into the modern penal system, he strategically 
narrates with as much painstaking attention to detail - as Madame Desgranges in her February 
narration did - the “amende honable” of Damiens, that gruesome execution for his part in a 
failed attempt on the life of Louis XIV. How can one account for the discrepancy of 
“violence” apparently being both on the kingly end of the spectrum and the modern one as 
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well? Violence on the Modern edge will be the focus in the chapters to come and its 
explication will come with new “objects” and types of orientations toward these “objects”. 
These “objects” will be characterized by their extreme sharpness; and the mode of interacting 
with these “objects” falls to that final phase of the “posteriority-anteriority” complex, that 
theoretical model backstopping all discussions up until this point. This final phase is one of 
“interiority”, completing the triumvirate: “posterioirty-anteriority-interiority” complex. The 
“obscure and repeated violence of desire” has been properly accounted for in this chapter, 
dedicated to Les 120 Journées. The “negative” landscape of the almanac - and Sade’s own 
version of it - constitutes the “obscurity” Hume adumbrates but refuses to explore in his 
skeptical stupor; that “repetition” (“uniformity of nature”) d’Alembert attempts to “imitate” 
but could only do so using frozen “positivities”. It is Les 120 Journée where the “violence of 
desire” reached its highest pitch but discovered its most abyssal failure: just as Curval above 
lamented: “I know nothing worse than your damnable regulations… one just reduces oneself 
to things… to things”, desire reaches its limit at nature and can go no further. However, the 
Storming of the Bastille would mark an important sea-change. And the natural and human 
sciences would never be the same thereafter. It is no ebullient exaggeration when Schaeffer 
boldly suggested: “For Les Cent Vingt Journée de Sodome is one of the most radical, one of 
the most important novels ever written”.
313
 Posterity is most fortunate to even have 
bequeathed such a work in amongst the tumult of that pivotal event. 
 In the next chapter, Sade will be presented as an important purveyor of knowledge of 
the changing historical conditions moulding what would become the transformed object of 
scientific inquiry in the modern age. In the first section, “interiority”, that third element of the 
tripartite concept: “posteriority-anteriority”, will be introduced as the epistemological ground 
for the formation of “positive” knowledge in the modern scientific sense of the word. In the 
                                                          
313
 Neil Schaeffer, op. cit., 343. (Emphasis added) 
123 
 
section that follows, Sade’s contribution will be linked to the reflections of other esteemed 
thinkers of the time, Joseph Preistley and Jeremy Benthem, whose approaches share 
surprising similiarities to those of Sade’s. Pneumatology will be introduced as a rubric with 
sufficient breadth to capture the changing form of both knowledge and knower. The success 
of such a conceptualization will be shown to depend on having a “plenum” with scales of 
“negativity” and “positivity” firmly in place.   
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       Chapter 3 
 Revolution 
3.1 The Biography of Sade and the French Revolution 
In the introduction Foucault selecting Sade to be the principle transitional figure 
between the Classical and the Modern Ages was said to be a suggestive assertion. However, 
one problem was introduced in the abstract to this paper that would undermine the substance 
of this claim. Another problem will be presented in addition to this one. The first problem 
concerned Foucault’s theoretical starting point matching in principle that of d’Alembert’s and 
his eponymously named “Principle”. D’Alembert sought to avoid having to address 
“causation” in investigating “objects of science”, doing so by limiting his line of enquiry 
strictly to physical objects, specifically to their “inertia, equilibrium and composition of 
motion”
314
 - to use Terrall’s words.  In other words, he aimed his attention at “effects”, 
articulable with quantitative measurements with no need for speculation:  
This reduction made mechanics “rather a science of effects than of causes” […] By breaking the motion 
resulting from a collision into one component of initial motion and another of motion destroyed or lost in the 
collision d’Alembert sidestepped the question of what caused the change in motion at the instant of impact. The 
component of motion destroyed is a precise quantity that can meaningfully appear in a descriptive equation 
regardless of how it came to be lost or where it went.
315
 
Foucault also deployed a strategy of “effects”, or, in his words, “transformations”, 
“causations” like: “role of instruments, techniques, institution… seem[ing] to [him] as more 
magical than effective” (see Abstract). For the second problem, Foucault was praised for how 
he saw the shaping of “objects of science” as they evolved from the Classical to the Modern 
age. He adumbrated how the dullness, characteristic of Renaissance “objects”, or 
“similitudes”, sharpened incrementally towards the “representations” deployed by scientists 
in the Classical age with Sade rounding out the Modern age. It was with him that the 
“violence of desire” had the sharpness to breach the limits of “representations” and take on 
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the penetrateness characteristic of Modern science (p. 8). But the source of this “violence” 
was said to be not clearly established especially when the historical narrativization in Les 
Mots et les Choses meets the historical analysis of the origin of the Modern penal system in 
Surveiller et Punir; from this apposition, the axes of violence appear reversed with Sade on 
the more Modern end; and Damiens on the rack on the other. The ambiguity probably rests on 
the condition of that same “positivity”, behind which Foucault, the philosopher of “effects” 
barricaded himself. The flatness violence inevitably becomes when given exclusively 
“positive” treatment comes through when Foucault reflects on what happened to Damiens 
during his fateful “amende honable”. Foucault reiterated Kantorowitz’s point that punishment 
of a criminal’s body was linked in “symmetrical inversion” to that of the King’s, the King’s 
body being physical yet also the immaterial and timeless representation of the kingdom: 
enduring icon, legal foundation, liturgical center and Christological embodiment.
316
 Apposing 
terms designating “negativity”: “immaterial”, “liturgical” and “icon” with ones latently 
“positive”: “legal foundation” and “representation” has the effect of making all by default 
equally “positive” if the species of these objects are not given their proper distinguishing 
qualifications. “Representations” and their inundation by the “violence of desire” also end up 
as overall “positive” despite “desire” being given a prominent position. This absence of depth 
in handling “desire” also falls upon Auguste Comte, who traces his own epistemological 
timeline from the religious to the metaphysical through to the positive mindset of the Modern 
age in his Cours de Philosophie Positive. His notion of “desire” ends up being of the same 
“positive” form as what Foucault presents but unlike Foucault’s purportedly “negative” 
qualification Comte is perfectly content to match “positive” form with “positive” 
qualification: 
Human reason is now so mature that we are able to undertake laborious scientific researches without having in 
view any extraneous goal capable of strongly exciting the imagination, such as that which the astrologers or 
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alchemists proposed to themselves. Our intellectual activity is sufficiently excited by the mere hope of 
discovering the laws of phenomena, by the simple desire of verifying or disproving a theory.
317
 
Foucault’s attempt to conjure up a “negative” dimension to his study of “objects of scientific 
inquiry” has been lauded in this dissertation especially in how he positions Sade in his overall 
argument. But he musters a result fundamentally no different than Comte, who in 1830 
articulates incisively the apparent washing away of these “negative” processes, i.e., 
imagination from the “History of Science”. Foucault’s handling of Sade is skeletal and he did 
not to enough to engage more deeply in the oeuvre of Sade to fortify more solidly his 
argument in Les Mots et les Chose.  Before returning to this oeuvre and its position within the 
“History of Science”, it is worth drawing out some significant anecdotes from Sade’s own 
biography to ground the position, which will occupy the theoretical dimensions in the second 
section of this chapter. 
 On close analysis, much of the content of Sade’s first letter to his faithful lawyer, 
Gaufridy - delivered shortly after the abrogation of the lettres de cachet that had held him in 
prison for fifteen years at the behest of his intractable mother-in-law, Madame de Montreuil - 
confirms Rousseau’s earlier contention that in states of reverie in the “Bastille, or a dungeon, 
where no object struck [one’s] sight” (p. 64) something of an enriching state of contemplation 
be possible where much insight could be gained. In this early May 1790 letter Sade expressed 
how productive he had been in prison, exclaiming, “[d]o you realize, my dear lawyer, that I 
had fifteen volumes ready for the press (?),”
318
 and continuing on to berate his wife for not 
removing these works in time of the ransacking of the Bastille, after whose aftermath less 
than a quarter of them would remain. More interestingly in this letter, though, is the self-
description of his own psychological state upon confronting the “objects” of a new French 
society that awaited him outside: 
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[…] sight and lungs ruined, and through lack of exercise I have become so corpulent that I can scarcely move, 
sense are all deadened, I have lost all sense of taste, I care for naught, the world I was so mad about seems an 
utter bore to me… a wretched bore!... There are moments when I have the mind to become a Trappist, and I will 
not promise not to vanish one of these days without anybody’s knowing where I have disappeared to. I was 
never such a misanthrope as I am since I have returned to human society and if I seem strange when I present 
myself to people they can be sure they produce the impression on me.
319
 
Coming from a moral scientist like himself, these words are not simply indulgent complains 
and one remembers Rousseau’s state of mind while writing his Rêveries and how in the 
overall evolution of his anthology it too constituted an abrupt metaphysical transformation. 
This state of mind vis-à-vis “objects” of the world would soon find new transformations as 
Sade, the turn coat, would adapt quite well to his new environment and actually rose to a 
prominent position as an “active citizen” in the capacity of a “man of letters” in the highly 
influential, militant wing of the new National Assembly, the Section des Piques. Part 
functionary; part propagandist Sade took up a minor role, albeit one of surprising relevance in 
the emerging new French republic. For example, he was responsible for drawing up policy 
directives for the General Assembly of Hospitals, having the responsible for several wards in 
Paris; even recommending (and implementing): 
[…] that in future every wretched patient of the hospital was given a separate bed and people were n,o longer 
made to sleep two or three in a bed.
320
 
Sade’s position in this new society would be precarious despite the accolades he earned for 
his revolutionary prose and diligent work carrying out his various postings, one rising even as 
high as a stint as magistrate for the Piques Ward. His colorful background - along with events 
really outside his control - placed him in direct line to the guillotine, however; and had it not 
been for some assistance from higher-ups and sheer luck, he would have certainly met this 
fate. But Sade’s manner of engaging the “objects” of his world - in a manner, which it has 
already been suggested he did with considerable facility - constitutes a novel metaphysical 
approach characteristic of this new revolutionary age and an approach that saw Sade through 
to both the successes and failures of his intensive involvement with the high-stakes 
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revolutionary politics of the time. Partly out of both ambition and the sheer precariousness of 
his position as an indulgent ex-aristocrat with a checkered past, Sade with great perspicuity 
structures in the following epistolic passage this new engagement as an oscillation between 
something appearing as “motivationally authentic” yet “demandingly inauthentic”, ones, 
whose constitutive forms would take on increasing “positive” qualities: 
[…] the daily necessity of working first for one party, then another, results in a mobility of opinions which 
affects my inmost mode of thought. And if I really do probe into it, it proves to be for no party at all, but a 
compound of them all. I am an anti-Jacobin and hate them to death; I worship the King, but I loathe the old 
abuses; I love very many articles of the constitution, but others revolt me […] There you have my profession of 
faith. Now what am I? Aristocrat or democrat? Tell, please, my dear lawyer, for I myself have no idea at all.
321
 
And herein lies that manner of “object” engagement promised earlier, termed: “interiority” 
that one said emerging much later alongside the “posteriority” and “anteriority” of prior 
focuses. As an important digression, it is worth introducing “interiority” by establishing what 
this “mobility of opinion” actually was not - despite how Sade would characterize it. The 
reference in this passage to “crisis of faith” needs careful treatment given what has been said 
up until this point concerning those comparative values of “negativity” and “positivity”. The 
new source of motivation particular to the French Revolution and fear for that new instrument 
of punishment that would enforce this motivation’s “object” are the very concern for 
“authenticity” and “inauthenticity” shown spinning Sade in apparent perplexing circularity. It 
is worth staging Sade’s “crisis of faith” in the context of a longer history of faith to 
demonstrate to what extent Sade incisively perceived that a new stage had been reached. 
Though the American and French Revolutions shared many of the same “positive” 
mantras, e.g., the rule of law over arbitrary edicts of kings; equal citizenry over feudal 
subjecthood, the landscape cannot be said to be at all similar. In Visionary Republic: 
Millennial Themes of American Thought, 1756-1800, Ruth H. Bloch describes how American 
witnesses initially gloated from afar over the accomplishments of the French revolutionaries. 
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They would have believed their counterparts held a common millennialist vision where triumph 
over one of the “four Beasts of the Book of Revelation”,322 would bring promises of the same 
God-inspired gifts of equality, freedom and democracy, shared with America, the primogeniture. 
Bloch conveys the sense of shock once the French Revolution verged toward something much 
more materialistic:  
The threat posed by French Deism and Atheism now seemed to counter-balance, indeed outweigh French anti-
Catholicism. Few remained sanguine about the possibility of the Protestant France… in addition, although in 
1793-94 many Protestant leaders had been able to excuse the Terror and even the French civil religion, they had 
done so in the faith that the republic would soon find a proper Protestant and Libertarian, religious and political 
bearing. Shortly after the outbreak of the European war, however, Federalist propaganda escalated its attack 
against French infidelity.
323
   
 
But the ranges in anti-Catholicism expressed in both revolutions reveal two similar yet 
distinct motivational orientations where the status of the “objects” of focus is the point of 
divergence. The beginning for the American orientation is conversion, an orientation with 
deep ties to the legacy of the Reformation. Conversion, amidst any two systems of belief, is 
imbued with deep “negativity” and seem to follow these trends: a) it seems never a haphazard 
act with subtle alterations in subjectivity but rather one with profound reverberations, 
burrowing deep into human “negative” behavior, i.e., imagination, desire and passion; yet b) 
the landscape between the old and the new professions of faith still comprises “objects” 
whose “negative” qualities make for easy accommodation of what previously existed. 
Conversion is not about changing and then contending with myriads of contradictions that 
come in the aftermath but rather it is radical accommodation. (Again contradictions only 
occur when dealing with “positive” objects.) The Protestant Reformation, though maintaining 
much of the same “negative” landscape as its Catholic competitor, did move incrementally 
towards “positivity”, its theological adage: “justified by faith alone” marking a sharp turn 
away from appeal to an apparatus based strictly on “relations”, e.g., the Holy See and the 
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Holy Seal. The American Revolution, along with the rhetoric of freedom and equality that 
was thereafter enshrined into law, can be said to follow naturally from the Reformation. 
Reflecting on Harold J. Berman’s Law and Revolution Volume 2, The Impact of the 
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, Michael D. Gordon considers how 
Berman took Luther and Calvin’s respective reformations in German and England to be of 
like: 





Berman contends that any separation between “negative” theism and “positive” secularism be 
but one of scale:  
[…] the acquisition by secular governments of powers once held by ecclesiastical courts was less the 




One of the outgrowths of Protestantism is that novelty that would set the pattern for a new 
manner of “object” engagement - not one as “objects” “out there” as “tropistic”, i.e., those 
already seen developing out of the transition from “posteriority” to “anteriority”, but rather 
“objects” of what pursues these “tropistic” “objects”.
326
 Still remaining, however, here in the 
“negative” backdrop of a millennialist faith that held the “Kingdom of Heaven” to be a model 
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 It should be noted that this description is purposefully streaming past intermediate stages of the development 
of these ‘objects that pursue’. For example, Benedict Anderson in his book Imagined Communities elaborated 
on several historical instances where the notion of ‘absolute relations’ falls into different partitions such as was 
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ecclesiastic language, Latin and ill-disposed towards the printing press from the beginning. Francois I in 1535 
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new slide towards increased ‘positivity’ within Christendom itself when he said ‘[…] the fall of Latin 
exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually 
fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized’ (Ibid, 13). 
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for the American Revolution, this manner of “object” engagement would eventually reach 
Sade in a different revolution with very different “objects”. His lamentation about the 
“mobility of opinions” and confusion over the profession of his own faith in the high-stakes 
game of revolutionary political activism testify to this new form of “object”, one much more 
“positive”. What comes from this is something metaphysically new where there is a dual 
“objectness” of that, which is pursued and that, which is doing the pursuing - coming together 
into an overall “positivity”. (This newness comes on account of how widespread this object 
orientation became during the Revolution, its smale scale version being of course on display 
in interactions in the Salon as Rousseau’s story of Grimm (p. 46) and his differentiation of 
“morals” and “principles” have shown (p. 70).) This is the beginning of a notion where unity 
exists in both natural (“objects” outside) and human (“objectness” of what is inside) 
phenomena. This is something of concern to Comte over a decade later when he states:  
[t]he formation of social physics at last completes the system of natural science” once theology and metaphysics 




In his letter to Gaufridy, Sade is introducing “authenticity” not as the motivational orientation 
towards “objects” themselves but as the source of the “motivation”, the new starting point of 
this engagement, which would be firmly embedded en masse once French “citizenry” was 
inscribed into law and given a period of time to take full effect. This is, in a nutshell, the 
nature of “interiority”. And once again to add “inauthenticity” to the pairing, the other half 
Sade raises in his statement of mixed loyalties, it is worth examining what demanding force 
lurked behind and haunted Sade throughout the Revolution. It turns out that this force was 
novel as well; and had just as “positive” an impetus as that one seen here in “authenticity”.  
 In his analysis of the evolution of criminality from those “greater gangs of 
malefactors” of the Middle Ages, notorious for their flagrant acts of physical violence; to 
those “smaller groups” emerging in the eighteenth century, who preferred less risky “anti-
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 plunder, Foucault in Surveiller et Punir gives a telling confirmation of the 
relationship just developed as the dual ascent of “objects” into “positivity” and that 
“negativity” that develops alongside it: the punishing force. It is here where “authentic” 
motivation and “inauthentic” demand fall invariably towards that metaphysical turn towards 
“interiority”: 
A general movement shifted criminality from the attack of bodies to the more or less direct seizure of goods; 
and from a ‘mass criminality’ to a ‘marginal criminality’, partly the preserve of professionals. It was as if there 
had been a gradual lowering of level – ‘a defusion of the tensions that dominate human relations … a better 
control of violent impulses – and as if the illegal practises had themselves slackened their hold on the body and 
turned to other targets. Crime became less violent long before punishment became less severe.
329
 
The pursued “targets” Foucault speaks of are those “objects” of increasing “positivity”, 
whose deployment increasingly takes on “tropistic” complexity, in other words, the increased 
necessity for survival being dependent on technical or professional skill rather than sheer 
violence. The incline from criminal hordes to smaller compacts is a form of this narrowing. 
(This comes of course atop those sources of motivation already seen narrowing, i.e., Luther’s 
souls, “justified by faith” and those geopolitical and technological revolutions Anderson 
explores in footnote #326: the diplomatic one, during the Age of Discovery and that cultural 
one with the invention of the printing press.) Having been attributed a “negative” 
qualification, this “inauthentic force” - now the focus of interest - has as well an incline into 
“positivity”. This is traceable to the evolution of laws; and Foucault, once again, is 
indispensable in providing insight. Firstly, Foucault starts with legal punishment under 
monarchical rule and presents it with every quality of “negativity”, noting in particular its 
contradictory and violent nature:  
                                                          
328
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, op. cit., 75. * ‘[…] the internal organization 
of delinquency altered; the greater gangs of malefactors (looters working in small, armed units, groups of 
smugglers firing on the agent of the tax authorities, disbanded soldiers or deserters who roamed the countryside 
together) tended to break up’ tracked down more efficiently and forced to work in smaller groups […] in order 
to pass undetected, they contented themselves with more furtive operations, with a more modest  deployment  of 
forces and less risk of bloodshed: “The physical  destruction of institutional dislocation  of large groups… left  
the field free  for an anti-property form of delinquency  practised  by individuals or very small groups of robbers  





[… i]t was because [the King] had brought the law into conflict with too many summary acts of justice […] or 
with administrative measures, that he paralyzed normal justice, rendered it sometimes lenient and inconsistent, 
but sometimes over-hasty and severe.
330
  
Foucault then anticipates the “positivity” of what laws would eventually become, spelling out 
what would be realized as the dream of the reform movement of the eighteenth century:  
[… t]he ‘super-power’ of the monarch [was…] too concentrated at certain privileged points […] too divided 
between opposing authorities[; it should be] distributed in homogeneous circuits capable of operating 
everywhere […’ continuous[ly] …] down to the finest grain of the social body.
 331
 
Much of what Foucault does in Surveiller et Punir is present how “homogeneous circuits” 
were constructed, using modes of “discipline” that were aimed at laws in one-to-one 
correspondences (rationalization): “let the punishment fit the crime”.
332
 It is here where 
“authentic motivation” met its match: “inauthentic demand”. And that one instrument of 
punishment that would have preoccupied Sade in life - but not in prose - was the guillotine. 
Foucault described this instrument as the ultimate “positive principle”, a rational executioner 
par excellence: 
 [d]eath was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous event […] contact between the law […] and the body of the 
criminal […] reduced to a split second.
333
  
And although its design had in mind a form of punishment more “humane” than previous 
methods; more “digital” in “innocence” and “guilt” being tied in direct correspondence to 
other absolute categories like “legal” and “illegal” and “life” and “[instantaneous] death” - all 
with little to no intermediary ground - Sade saw in it something far more pernicious. Part of 
the reason for this attitude comes from the fact Sade was an old-styled moral scientist in a 
world turning its back on “sensibilité” as an approach to explore the natural and human 
worlds, doing so in favour of a scientificity that would not have been Sade’s forte. The other 
part comes due to a reason much more personal; and it is to this reason that we now turn. 
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 For a deeper reading into how discipline and ‘fair’ punishment were pursued ‘positively’, see Foucault’s 
chapter ‘Docile Bodies’. 
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In the introduction of this dissertation, two very different experiments, conducted at 
the foot of the guillotine, helped reveal the aims for two scientific orientations often mistaken 
as the same. Although both Cabanis and Sade set their erudite minds at the location of death, 
their methods followed two very different trajectories: for Cabanis, it was material facts 
garnered from reason; for Sade, imagination. These two distinct categories of scientific 
inquiry could follow the classifications: sensitivity and sensibilité, respectively. In 
experiments at the guillotine, Staum tells of how Cabanis reduced pain’s origination to 
nervous sympathies, i.e., consciousness of pain to fully functional brain and spinal cord.
334
 
Non-pain isolated to corpses; death assigned as the terminus, marking all human “positive” 
possibilities would have both been acceptable specificities in nineteenth-century “sensitivity”. 
Sade underwent his experimentations with test subjects, trial after trial, bringing the issue of 
pain and death to the very same location as Cabanis but never settling on anything conclusive 
that could be qualified in “positive” terms. Consider these two examples: the suturing of the 
vagina of Madame de Mistival to prolong pain long enough to realize a syphilitic death, as 
narrated in La philosophie de le boudoir: 
Madame de Mistival, opening her eyes –Oh heavens! Why do you recall me from the grave’s darkness? Why do 
you plunge me again into life’s horrors?/ Dolmance, whipping her steadily - Indeed, mother dear, it is because 




Or, in L’Histoire de Juliette, Saint-Fond’s alchemical recipe for eternal pain after death:  
[…] have him sign a pact, writ in his heart’s blood, whereby he contracts his soul to the devil [...] insert this 
paper in his asshole and to tamp it home with one’s prick [... h]is agonies […] shall be everlasting.
336
  
One element this hypothetical meeting between Cabanis and Sade at the foot of the guillotine 
failed to disclose at the time is that Sade, though familiar with the guillotine in life, was 
diffident to conduct such experiments with it in writing. Sade’s lily-livered response to the 
guillotine is an issue taken up by David McCallam in “‘La Machine’: Sade, The Guillotine 
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and Eroticism”. To summarize his position, the guillotine conjured up far greater horrors for 
Sade than those he imagined in his own novels, those one that  
[…] provide any exquisite agony for the libertine to savour […] slowed to multiple, partial blows […] elid[ing] 




McCallum argues that Sade’s antipathy for the guillotine is consistently held throughout his 
entire oeuvre and, although McCallam does introduce that all too common anachronism 
whenever decapitation enters into any orbit of sexual meaning: the Freudian notion of “threat 
of castration”; he does correctly position the guillotine squarely at the center where science 
and society intersect under a common historical alignment. At issue here is another telling 
statement of that transition of the “object of science” from its “negative” origin to its new 
“positive” reality: 
[…] the guillotine is on the whole rejected by the Sadean imagination. It inverts the dynamics between the 
libertine torturer and his machines: the revolutionary “bourreau” […] can no longer serve as a model for Sade’s 
experiments in pain; pull a cord and holding up a mechanically severed head, he is reduced to the status of a 
state functionary. The erstwhile torturer is now in the service of the machine he operates, he is just as 
instrumentalized by the guillotine as is its victims.
338
 
Sade’s non-response to the guillotine in writing should be seen just as much a polemical 
statement of opposition to scientific trends of his day as it was a statement of something 
much more personal. In one of those curious historical turns during the Revolution when 
“prisoner” Sade was moved to the comparatively tranquil prison, Picpus hospital - due in part 
to a medical condition; and the clandestine financial stewardship of a wealthy female friend 
(Constance Quesnet) - the guillotine happened to be transferred from its regular location at 
the Place de la Concorde to the Place du Trône-renversé. The reason Lély gives for this 
transfer is that the original location “could no longer bear the stench of the blood” and the 
new location was fitted with a new modification: “[a] lead-lined vat was placed under the 
knife to catch” the blood and drain it off to a charnel-house.
339
 This new site happened to be a 
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few hundred yards away from Sade’s prison window; and he testified that he had been privy 
to the massacres carried out in all seriality, exclaiming to Gaufridy:  
[… my] imprisonment by the people, with the guillotine under my eyes […] hurt me a hundred times more than 
all the bastilles in the world.
340
  
More than just an individual concerned about whether or not he lived or died, Sade’s personal 
plea here has the richness of a “moral scientist”. Framing Sade as a preserver of “sensibilité” 
in a very different age of science adds a greater depth to how he engaged the guillotine. This 
instrument was the placeholder for that period of violent paroxysms before “positivity” had 
the sufficient “sharpness” to cut past the nape of the neck and sink deeper into the recesses of 
the social body. Foucault called this depth, the “soul” and went about with great finesse, 
laying out all the machinery that would constitute this new kind of incision, his explication of 
the Panopticon being his most famous. But he misses the smooth causal chain that saw the 
guillotine as an intermediary stage. (Foucault, of course, would have rejected such a causal 
prescription.) Sade writing his letters to Gaufridy in the midst of the Revolution is offering a 
first-hand - and highly personal - account of what is afoot in the “metaphysics” evolving 
around him. Sade revealing this new manner of “object engagement” is a needed complement 
to what Foucault has already opened up in his exploration of the prehistory of natural and 
social science in modernity. And the guillotine figures important, taking centre stage at least 
in Sade’s mind by its salient de-emphasis in his oeuvre and emphatic predominance in his 
biography as that pre-panoptic exemplar of that “inauthentic” demanding force.  
 In concluding consulting details from Sade’s biography to help develop the 
emergence of that new manner of object engagement: “interiority”, it is worth pressing 
forward a little further to show another way the convergence of positive “objects” just 
developed anticipates that non-lethal “inauthentic demand” Foucault would make his chief 





intellectual contribution: the formative structure of all discourses in the human and natural 
sciences. One of the surprising heights Sade managed to reach as a “Citizen” of the 
Revolution was the opportunity he had to both write and deliver the eulogy for the then 
recently assassinated supreme heroes of the French Revolution: Jean-Paul Marat and Louis-
Michel Le Pelletier. The document was titled “Speech to the Shades of Marat and Le Pelletier” 
and Lély does not spare the document any critical diplomacy when he acerbically declared:  
[…] not lacking native eloquence, not that […] the familiar grandeur of his prose was missing but in the gush of 
revolutionary commonplaces such words as virtue, happiness, patriotism and liberty are frivolously used, to 
express falsehood and ignorance”.
341
  
The guillotine still not yet out of Sade’s peripheral vision one may ask: was it the case that 
Sade was under duress when writing his famous denigration of Marat’s assassin, Charlotte 
Corday, that one, against whom Sade’s discourse rises to a “negative” pitch. Probably not. 
But much force underlies the theatrics that were on display, those ones Lély insinuates are 
“inauthentic”:  
Oh, timid, gentle fair sex, how could it be that your delicate hands could take up that dagger? Ah, but the 
eagerness you all show, coming to cast your flowers on the tomb of that true friend of the people, has made us 
oblivious of the fact that the hand that struck, sprang from among you. Like those mixed creatures which belong 
to neither sex, vomit of hell of universal ill omen, the barbaric murder of Marat belongs to nobody. Let a funeral 
veil hide her memory for ever, let nobody every more depict her, as has been done hitherto, under the seductive 
sign of loveliness. Too credulous by far, you artists, destroy, deface, smash the features of that monster, or show 
it to us solely amid the demons of Tartary…. 
342
 
Sade had spent much of the revolutionary period hawking his latest plays to the big Parisian 
theatres, doing so to quite meagre success; and one remembers back to Rousseau, who too 
narrates his struggle to win an audience for his operas from among the urbane classes of Paris 
until the success of his The Soothsayer, that opera mentioned in Chapter 1.3 of this 
dissertation. Could there be anything then different in both Rousseau and Sade’s ambition to 
please? The difference revealed by Sade’s damnation of Corday is a case of “life imitating art” 
and this may have just as well been on Rousseau’s mind when he cynically doffed the 
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“lovesickness” of Grimm, that “unauthentic” sycophant. The difference the French 
Revolution brought was that the “positive” articulation Grimm exemplified as one example 
amongst the whole of the Parisian coterie, from which Rousseau would eventually flee, 
became the norm for all citizenry, christened by the Revolution. All the hoi polloi joined the 
theatre troupe. Theatre actors have “positive” roles, impelled to act according to “positive” 
features of what the particular theatre piece actually is: lines, props, a backdrop and all of this 
need not have a guillotine to enforce “inauthentic demands”. As the story of Grimm 
demonstrates, further articulation of “positive” roles comes with serendipitous possibilities 
and from these possibilities the overall “positivity” already described: “objects pursed” 
(anteriority) and “objects doing the pursuing” (interiority) find a new theatrical model for a 
the new society, one engendered by the French Revolution. The “positivity” of this new 
“citizenry” would have been enshrined into law: either as legislation or the new tacit norms 
displaying revolutionary fervour, all the “positive” propositions to the structure of this grand 
theatre. And add to this, the “negative” resonances, with which Sade inflects his 
characterization of Corday (“vomit of hell of universal ill omen”), that person who did not 
play according to her prescribed “role” as both subservient woman (“timid, gentle fair sex”) 
and obedient revolutionary (“you artists, destroy, deface, smash the features of that monster”). 
Enter the sociologist Erving Goffman and his 1959 development of the concept of 
“performances” in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and theatre becomes a fitting 
heuristic for all “positive” objects, inauthentic but necessary for some social instrumentality:  
[…] the performer may not be taken in at all by his own routine. This possibility is understandable, since no one 
is in quite as good an observational position to see through the act as the person who puts it on. Couple with this, 
the performer may be moved to guide the conviction of this audience only as a means to other ends, having no 
ultimate concern in the conception that they have of him or of the situation.
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Biographers, who compare Sade’s novels with his theatrical writings, are quick to point out 
the superiority of the former:  
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[…] the dramatic works, being most public, suffer most from conventionality and form what appears to be 
Sade’s inherent timidity when faced with the dramatic form.
344
  
How can this be a criticism for one, who wants to play a role in the grand narrative of his 
day? Maurice Lever offers an answer to this question and brings the focus, once again, to the 
model of theatrics, developed here as that non-lethal form of inauthentic demand. He 
compares the mask that enabled luminaries like Diderot and Voltaire in literature to 
dissimulate behind contradictory positions: materialism in Rêve d’Alembert and 
sentimentality in Père de famille for Diderot; corrosive sarcasm in Candide and teary pathos 
in Zaïre, Voltaire,
345
 to that one impossible to wear in theatre:  
[i]n a novel, an essay, or a philosophical tale one can bite and scratch, but on the stage one plays the 
sanctimonious hypocrite: one pulls in one’s ideas as a cat pulls in its claws.
346
  
The state of the society, being presented here as theatre means necessarily that this 
impossibility to dissimulate would also apply to the actors populating the stage within that 
backdrop: the French Revolution. Sade is an underappreciated philosopher of the transition 
between the Enlightenment and the Modern Age, whose very biography (captured in his 
many epistolary correspondences) attests to the new manner of object engagement just 
described: “interiority”. Adumbrating the object and object engagement needs the perspicuity 
of a moral philosopher to get at it. Sade has the unique biographical attribute of having been 
an active writer before the Revolution, throughout its duration but also in the aftermath and 
well into the Napoleonic period and beyond. Now it is clear that he saw something 
concerning the “object of scientific inquiry” at its different phases, confirming what Foucault 
presented with much brevity (focusing only on the correspondence between the works Justine 
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and Juliette). Consider how the date July 14
th
, 1789 seems to be an approximate partition for 
many amongst the older order of moral scientists of Sade’s generation. Sade would die at a 
ripe old age on the second of December, 1814 and would have been that one witness of the 
full maturation of the “object” of scientific inquiry.  
3.2 Priestley and Bentham: Towards a Metaphysics of Success 
When Auguste Comte sat down to write his reflection on the history of the “object of 
scientific inquiry” in his 1830 Cours de Philosophie Positive much of the dust had long 
settled on both the tumultuous periods of the 1790 Revolution and Napoleonic era but trouble 
was brewing yet again with the onset of the 1830 Revolution close at hand; and Comte made 
that perennial call to reflect on how “positive” science could again play the role of saviour in 
correcting societal ills. The principal figures in this section, Joseph Priestley and Jeremy 
Bentham, were contemporaries of Sade on the other side of the English Channel and they 
shared the same optimism Comte would express yet the two Englishmen had nothing of the 
same justification as Comte. As a matter of fact, the “negative” trajectory of the two men 
placed them in a similar orbit as Sade and taken together actually constitutes an important 
phase in the history of the “object” of scientific inquiry. By 1830, optimism was given a 
strictly “positive” prescription, anything falling short being “inimical” to the health of 
society; and Comte’s assertion liaises nicely with what has been discussed as the simultaneity 
of “posteriority”, “anteriority” and “interiority” just developed as the basis for theatrics 
during the French Revolution - all three phases on display in, for example, Sade’s eulogy for 
Marat and Pelletier. In the section of Cours, “The Nature and Importance of the Positive 
Philosophy” Comte entreats his reader to decide on what he calls one “common social 
doctrine” to remedy once and for all the “great political and social crisis” at the heart of what 
he called a continued state of anarchy and revolution.
347
 He attributes the remaining seeds of 
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dissension amongst men to a refusal to choose the correct option out of three choices that he 
makes the centrepiece of his history of the “object” of scientific inquiry. Comte argues that it 
is these three working in tandem that is the root of all social upheaval but it was the last 
choice, the “positive” one, where he believed hope for social stability lie: 
[…] the actual of men’s minds is at bottom due to the simultaneous employment of three radically different 
incompatible philosophies - the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. It is quite clear that, if any one of 
these three philosophies really obtained a complete and universal preponderance, a fixed social order would 
result, whereas the existing evil consists above all in the absence of any true organization […] positive 
philosophy is alone destined to prevail in the ordinary course of things. It alone has been making constant 
progress from many centuries.
348
 
Priestley and Bentham’s contributions to the debate will offer a needful complement to the 
“metaphysics of failure” introduced in the previous chapter. At issue in this section will be 
the modest success of Priestley’s scientific program and Bentham’s expansion of it in his 
development of utilitarianism. Their shared project will be shown to be something of an 
intermediate position between the “negativity”, developed in Sade’s Les 120 Journées and 
what will be shown later as the triumph of “positivity” in his La philosophie dans le boudoir 
(Chapter 5). 
 What possibly could Comte and Sade have in common? On first glance not much but 
there is room to see in both their scientific commentaries an implicit joint criticism of 
d’Alembert and Bacon for their approaches to classify human knowledge. Starting with 
Comte, he presents what he believes to be the correct method of classification, limited only to 
“facts” shared across disciplines, “facts” “positive”, attained by “direct observation” (so far 
d’Alembert and Bacon would agree) but presented with the aim to elucidate through 
comparisons the depth of the “objects” of concern with recourse only to “homogenous” 
affinity within fields and not added inflections from individuals in these fields, e.g., their a 
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 Comte establishes what can really be called a “negativity” test, which 
happens to share features with that one Sade introduced in his presentation of “banquets”: 
“choose and let lie the rest without declaiming against that rest simply because it does not 
have the power to please you [… c]onsider that it will enchant someone else, and be a 
philosopher” (p. 78-79). Sade is really presenting here the subjectivity of the knower as 
“explanandum”; the “explanan”, what can only vanish behind that point of the “eclipse”, to 
use the Heideggerian conception, introduced at the beginning of this dissertation. It would 
seem Comte also admonishes d’Alembert and Bacon for not recognizing this “point of 
eclipse” when they speciously laid out what constitutes the “general” knower: 
We are at the present time thoroughly convinced that all the encyclopedic scales – such as those of Bacon and 
d’Alembert – which are based upon any distinction between the different faculties of the human mind [i.e., 
memory, reason and imagination], are for that reason alone radically defective. That is true even when this 
distinction is not, as is often the case, more subtle than real; for in each of its spheres of activity our 
understanding makes simultaneous use of all its principal faculties.
350
 
Of course Comte did not have to surmount this “defect” as speculating on the constitution of 
the knower was for him off-limits, a realm of “metaphysics” or, in his words, “psychology”, a 
discipline if it happened to be aimed at oneself amounted to this absurdity: “a thinking 
individual cannot cut himself in two”.
351
 (He could have also added the perennial problem of 
“interpretation” if aimed at “others”.) However, Sade did aim directly at this limit but did so 
in pure “negativity” with those modalities at his disposal: passion, sexuality, relations and 
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in contemplating the operations that will be taking place in a mind supposed to be blank! Our descendants will 
no doubt see such pretensions ridiculed on the stage some day.’ (Full quotation) 
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imagination. This dissertation has presented each one on this list as exactly the same and in so 
doing avoiding the inherent “positivity” coming from their separate treatment in regular noun 
usage. One of the unique features of Priestley and Bentham is that while avoiding the 
reductionist trap d’Alembert never overcame they settle in an interesting way somewhere 
between Sade and Comte. 
 Priestley’s monistic vision of the natural and human sciences began in one of those 
now familiar cesspools. John G. McEvoy in “Joseph Priestley, ‘Aerial Philosopher’: 
Metaphysics and Methodology in Priestley’s Chemical Thought, From 1762-1781” sets up 
the plot here in the most unassuming of prose: 
[…] his chemical career began when he took up residence next to a brewery on his move to Leeds in 1767 […] 
his experiments on air were made ‘in consequence of inhabiting a house adjoining a public brewery where I at 




How many scientific discoveries would Priestley make from these experiments in this brewer 
adjoining his home? The answer to this question depends on what and what does not 
constitute “discovery”. This section will endeavour to begin to set up a comprehensive 
definition but for the time being let the answer to this question be this: Priestley made only 
one discovery though it would seem by historical accounts that he made numerous. What’s 
more, were Priestley to break up this one discovery into any plurality, it would fall into these 
two categories: one, “fixed air”; and two, the moral basis for “social reform”! If Le Mettrie 
denigrated Needham earlier for “daring to conclude from observations made on a single 
species (animalculae) that the same phenomena must be found in another” (p. 4), Priestley 
and Bentham were also scientists, who would have come to a like conclusion as Needham. In 
“States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy”, Simon Schaffer really captures this 
strange concoction of natural and social sciences in the criticism delivered by Edmund Burke, 
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who would be a chief opponent of these two men’s self-styled social reform movement - 
coined by Priestley as “rational dissent” in 1769 - and would be so all the way up to their 
open advocacy of radical mobilization for something similar to the French Revolution 
happening on English soil. Using that now familiar concept, the principle subject of Chapter 
One, Burke claimed Priestley and Bentham wrote their works in fits of “pneumatic 
reve[(l)]ries”.
353
 At the height of the French Revolution, he condensed both men’s unabashed 
“rational dissent” and the tools of their scientific trade as pneumatic chemists into this unified 
attack:  
The natural philosophy of the reformers provided fruitful targets for wit: in a famous figure, Burke compared 
‘the spirit of liberty in action’ to ‘the wild gas, the fixed air’: ‘but we ought to suspend our judgment until the 
first effervescence is a little subsided, till the liquor is cleared and until we see something deeper than the 
agitation of a troubled and frothy surface.
354
 
As suggested earlier, the “moral science” of Priestley and Bentham share interesting 
correlations with that one presented in Les 120 Journées - only without the total “failure” of 
what the book’s conclusion would end up being. Priestley and Bentham in their respective 
scientific approaches will be shown presenting a partially successful metaphysics, 
anticipating that fully successful one to be introduced later on in this dissertation: Lavoisier’s 
combustion. Before this can be fully explicated, the intermediate phase, to which these 
“rational dissenters” belong, needs to be foregrounded against what Les 120 Journées has 
already shown to be an abysmal moral collapse, but a collapse that is illuminating. 
Comte argues that astronomy was the science best suited to occasion discoveries of 
the first positive theories, attributing success to how steady observation and experimentation 
could yield payback once a pattern, or “law”, of a phenomenon was uncovered. This payback 
constituted for Comte a new form of excitation, replacing that old variant: imagination, 
whose application would have made this same purposive “stargazing” into that “chimerical” 
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 It is no surprise then that astronomy was that one science to progress 
first and establish “general principles” as the goal for all sciences to emulate. Comte calls 
Newton’s law of gravity the crowning jewel; here he uses this luminous discovery to set the 
respective emphasis and de-emphasis for what constitutes a good “positive” explanation: 
“normal relations of succession and similarity” - and not “real causes”:
356
   
On the one hand, this admirable theory shows us all the immense variety of astronomical facts as only a single 
fact looked at from different points of view, that fact being the constant tendency of all molecules towards each 
other in direct proportion to their masses and inversely as the squares of their distances. On the other hand, this 
general fact is shown to be the simple extension of an extremely familiar and therefore, well-known 
phenomenon - the weight of that body at the earth’s surface. As to determining what attraction and weight are in 
themselves, or what their causes are - these are questions which we regard as insoluble and outside the domain 
of the positive philosophy.
357
 
However, in the previous chapter, the only important feature that would mark astronomy and 
astrology as distinct was the quality of the “objects” in focus, ones guided by uniformities 
(and concomitant perceptional conjunctions in viewers, to use Hume’s words):
358
 “these 
epistemological arcs have been earlier shown to possess a salient “negativity” of relations 
where subjects both face objects straight on (tropism) and follow circular paths toward others 
(taxis) the only difference being the degree of “negativity” and “positivity” of those objects 
pursued” (p. 97). Comte sees chemistry following suit in its rejection of its predecessor, 
alchemy, debates about “intimate nature[s]” of a chemical phenomenon like heat: is it 
“material substance” or “vibration of universal ether” (?) were replaced by acquisitions of 
“positive” facts through the work of scientists like Fourier, facts being what Comte called the 
“inexhaustible food for the highest form of activity”.
359
 Uniformities and these perceptional 
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conjunctions are of course far less salient in these sciences of “cesspools” compared with 
their cosmological counterparts: “all these sites of slime and stink produced anxiety for all 
those gazers who saw what was only ever inhospitable to observation and inchoate to 
comprehension” (p. 75);
360
 however, Priestley’s “negative” scientific approach would turn out 
to be well suited to pneumatic chemistry. This is so despite Comte rejecting outright his 
approach though apparently in one respect Priestley did do something Comte would have 
enthusiastically embraced: gather “inexhaustible food” for his positive philosophy or, in other 
words, accumulate “facts”. The metaphysics of Priestley had a “negative” scientificity similar 
to that one introduced in Les 120 Journées; and before that in the “plenum” developed out of 
the oeuvre of Rousseau. McEvoy places Priestley in the exact same location as these two 
although, on this occasion, something quite different emerges from Priestley’s exertion and at 
first glance it is deceptively un-erotic: 
The infinity, inexhaustibility, and “necessary connection of all things in the system of nature”, guarantees that 
every new discovery will reveal new domains of ignorance. Incompleteness is an inevitable characteristic of all 
works in natural philosophy and “paradoxical as it may seem, this will ever be the case in the progress of natural 
science, as long as the works of God are like himself, infinite and inexhaustible. Any system will forever be 
challenged by the proliferation of new facts.
361
 
Priestley here posits a space of “immateriality”, defined of course in this dissertation as a 
“negative” space of all those now familiar modalities of strict relations (passion, sexuality 
and imagination); and his placement therein has a metaphysical quality Comte would come to 
reject as that “extraneous goal capable of exciting the imagination” (footnote #346). This 
“space of immateriality” has already been shown to be filled with virtue (Rousseau), vice 
(Sade) and now it is spirituality of that particular monistic quality Priestley (through 
McEvoy) spoke of as imbued matter as “‘powers of attraction and repulsion’, […] not 
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‘imparted to matter’, but ‘necessary to its being’.
362
 In this space McEvoy speaks of Priestley 
seeking out “facts” not as “positivities” of Comte’s treatment: “direct observations [of…] 
comparison […] with no added inflections from […] individuals […] for example, a priori 
conclusions” (p. 142) but rather as “analogies”, citing Priestley:  
[…] knowledge is a speck of light in the vast darkness of ignorance then “‘greater the circle of light’ [facts 
illuminate], the ‘greater the boundary of darkness’ [facts to be revealed].
363
  
Accordingly, Priestley inserts himself directly as the holder of this “light” rather than 
deferring to anything outside as would be the case if depending on “hypotheses based on 
facts”.
364
 McEvoy gave to Priestley a “heuristic” underlining to discovery where “negative” 
attributes of the researcher are paramount, in a word: “interiority” had not yet fully 
coagulated within Priestley:  
[... his] sense of analogy […] is clearly directed to providing a guide to the workings of the imagination in the 




Priestley’s partial metaphysical success comes by way of discovery being a veritable 
penetration of nature, i.e., he discovered soda water; and nothing better confirms the 
generality of this success more than his notion of epistemological egalitarianism and 
accidental discovery, two parts McEvoy insightfully bundles into one general principle, 
occluding such cases as discoveries emerging from the particular “genius”:  
[d]iscoveries in natural philosophy depend on the ability to take infinite pains in gathering facts; they can 
therefore be achieved by anybody.
366
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This is of course important as one of the metaphysical qualities assigned the “plenum” has 
been distality rather than proximity (see how Rousseau’s “General Will” inverts Hume’s 
“sympathy” for a remainder p. 55). What remains next to do is directly compare the partial 
successes and utter failures of the two “plena” in question, that one, developing out of 
Priestley’s scientific method (epistemological egalitarianism/ accidental discovery) and later 
reaching a new development in Bentham’s utilitarianism; the other, seen situated at the heart 
of Silling Château in Les 120 Journées. 
In recent times it could be said to have Sade “met” Bentham in Necati Polat’s “Three 
Contemporaries: The International, Bentham and de Sade”. Polat made out of Sade’s “pain-
pleasure” equilibrium a calculus that they argue satisfies Bentham’s principle of 
utilitarianism:  
[much like nerves in sensitivity] feelings of pleasure and pain can be calculated with mathematical precision by 




In addition, Polat suggested Sade’s belief in the “moral relativity” of local tastes challenge 
“phantoms [and] disgusting fictions”
368
 of top-down authority and offer a model for how 
economic and social needs evolve in the marketplace, notably, very much like how Jacobs 
and Hunt saw pornography doing the same for sexual desire. Now that the metaphysical 
argument this dissertation has set out to explain has reached some level of maturation it is 
worth reflecting on Polat’s juxtaposition of Sade and Bentham to identity just where his 
argument goes adrift; and offer an alternative way of seeing how these two men were in fact 
of similar minds as Polat asserts. The problem plaguing Polat’s treatment comprises the very 
same mixed terms Foucault applied in seeing Damiens’ gruesome fate through the framework 
of the “body of the King’” as Kantorowitz introduced earlier: “[o]pposing terms designating 
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“negativity”: “[o]pposing terms designating “negativity”: “immaterial”, “liturgical” and 
“icon” with ones “positive”: “legal foundation” and “representation” has the effect of making 
all by default equally “positive” if the species of these objects are not given their proper 
distinguishing qualifications” (p. 125). Polat does something similar in failing for instance to 
present a nuanced reading of “mimesis” in his effort to make Bentham and Sade cohorts of 
the then new conception of political theory: “internationalism”: 
The mimetic thus signifies the formal, the contingent, the copy, the reproduction, the simulated, the 
representational, the fantastic, the fictional, the artificial, the common, and so on. The “force of custom” 





Mimesis has already been presented in this dissertation in two different manners, one 
emphasizing its “negative” origins: “imitation of nature”, as demonstrated by Sade in his 
almanac, Les 120 Journées, presented in contrast to d’Alembert’s “positive” rendition in 
Discours Préliminaire. The other is the new “performativity” Sade displayed as an “actor” on 
the “stage” of the French Revolution but, more importantly now, is the increase in 
“positivity” introduced by Bentham when stricter performance requirements are demanded of 
the social body, the panopticon, being his representative example. The mimetic orbit for both 
Sade and Bentham occupy too disparate of positions on the “negativity”-“positivity” scale for 
equivalence to be declared. In addition, as it was with Foucault, Polat cannot properly 
distinguish “negative” from “positive” “objects” the consequence being making the whole of 
the list a series of “positivities”. Unlike “the formal”, “the copy”, “the representational” etc., 
the “fantastic” and “fictional” belong to the “negative” domain of imagination as does the 
“common” as Reid asserted in his reflection on what was required to see past the artificiality 
of “things signified”: “[f]or Reid it was children, artists, the hoi pollio, the blind, who could 
reach [by means of imagination] beyond the pale of appearances and ascertain the ‘force and 
energy of language” (p. 98). And what is the consequence of such a lack of differentiation? 
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Polat claiming Sade shared with Bentham a like hostility to the “negative” space of the “local” 
in favour of the moulding “positive” forces of the emerging marketplace seems entirely 
unconvincing as these two locations belong to different orbits. Hunt has already asserted a 
similar point, situating Sade in the French Revolution the prototype for the transmogrification 
of desire wrought by the new marketplace. Rather than “positivity” to discourse, Sade adds 
“negativity” by way of a critique, or better, engagement with the conditions of the world in 
his writing. This point also has the effect of specifying the role Foucault bestows upon Sade 
as the bridge between the Classical and the Modern ages: the “violence of desire” he brings 
“batter[ing] at the limits of representations” is in no way the “productive” act as Polat and 
Hunt would have it but rather a descriptive one especially when taking the entirety of his 
evolving oeuvre into consideration. This distinction makes all the difference and is ultimately 
how Bentham and Sade are illuminating in their mutual engagement.  
In his description of the transition from the exclusively chemical concern for the 
vagaries of air in “fixed” or meteorological form (pneumatics) to that more general, monistic 
principle whereby air enters the realm of  the human “soul” (pneumatology), Schaffer offers 
this convenient summation of the totality of Priestley and Bentham’s projects:  
[t]he axiom of utility, the analogy between natural improvement and moral reformation, and the aim of the 





If Priestley described the “immaterial” space of the “plenum” as epistemological 
egalitarianism/ accidental discovery, Bentham offered his version in “utility”, laid out in 1780 
Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Though the pneumatological 
elements in this document appear unapparent at first glance, his initial introduction of utility 
comes by way of a contrast with a “tyrannical” form where legislation operates according to 
“sentiments of antipathy and sympathy”. More than just respective emotions of hatred or 
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magnanimity, these sentiments are the most ancient of meteorological indicators, believed to 
have imbued objects in both the natural and human worlds:  
[t]he principle of sympathy and antipathy is most apt to err on the side of severity [… i]t is for applying 




Foucault took note of these “twins” in his preamble to Don Quixote’s journey away from 
“similitude” and towards “representation” of the Classical Age: “sympathy” as the 
“excite[ment of] things of the world to movement […] draw[ing] even the most distance of 
them together”;
372
 and “antipathy”, what “encloses every species within its impenetrable 
difference and its propensity to continue being what it is”.
373
 These “similitudes” cannot be 
described as too dissimilar from what has been shown filling the “plenum” as pure relations. 
However, the problem with application by the ancients is the necessary “coevality” that 
comes when manipulating what lies inside, in other words, the inevitable failure of 
interpretation to capture “simultaneity” before the “eclipse.” Reflecting on the terrestrial 
origins of “pestilences” in Jon Arrizabalaga’s chapter “Facing the Black Death: perceptions 
and reactions of university medical practitioners”, Agramont could be said to be acting 
simply on “interpretation” when intimating that to heal a sick patient what is required is to 
administer an enema:  
Agramont also defended the telluric origin of some 'pestilences', appearance of which was related to the 
terrestrial 'exhalations of fumes' that provoked earthquakes. These fumes caused a substantial air change through 
the same process as those from putrid waters [… t]he latter attributed the origin of some pestilences to 




Bentham refusing as a starting point such a meteorology of “corruption” is in keeping with a 
longstanding political line of the “rational dissenters” where the target of general social 
reform was aimed at just this point, as Schaffer cites Priestley’s opposition to the university 
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system of his time: all “resemble pools of stagnant water secured by dams and mounds, and 
offensive to the neighbourhood”.
375
 With the alternative utility comes a subtle shift in priority 
whereby the same “plenum” of what it replaces (“similitudes”) is held in check with the only 
difference being an optimism, which can be reduced to neither the shallowness of an 
individual “positive” outlook (proximity) nor the digitality d’Holbach presents in his adage: 
whatever is “congenial to man’s happiness”. Not shallow: just as it was necessary for the 
architecture of the “plenum” since Rousseau filled out its expanse with his “Social Contract”, 
optimism reaches its most distal bound when Bentham stretched it out in his own way: “the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number”. Not digital: in working according to the analogic 
principle of pain and pleasure: “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure”,
376
 utility is in the right state to fit the “immateriality” 
of the “plenum”. Bentham described it this way as he seamlessly overlays utility atop the 
“negativity” of “similitude”: 
The only right ground of action, that can possibly subsist, is, after all, the consideration of utility which, if it is a 
right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other. Other principles in abundance, 
that is, other motives, may be the reason why such and such an act has been done: that is, the reason or cause of 
its being done; but it is this alone that can be the reason why it might or ought to have been done. Antipathy or 
resentment requires always to be regulated, to prevent its doing mischief: to be regulated by what? Always by 




As already stated in pneumatological terms, utility is both “natural improvement” and “moral 
reformation”, originating from neither a priori understanding nor external impetus but from 
their two respective opposites: “accidental discovery” and “epistemological egalitarianism” 
as described by Priestley. The overall result is that discovery here fits what has already been 
called partial success: it legitimately penetrates nature though without the accompanying 
penetration of knowledge. This explains how Priestley (or anyone else) can make discoveries 
without the need for accompanying knowledge; or why Bentham’s metaphysics of utility 
provides a sufficiency for all matter - organic and inorganic alike - to act even without 
                                                          
375
 Simon Schaffer, op. cit., 261. 
376





recourse to external knowledge. In the case of Les 120 Journées, success comes as a reversal 
of these terms: knowledge is penetrated while nature remained intact all the way up to the 
departure date from Silling Château. The final result ends up as a chute of total investment 
and sheer futility, though the insatiable lust of all four “heroes” does reveal something 
indispensable to an understanding of the nature of knowledge. It is “visceral verbality”.
378
 In 
the interplay between Bentham’s Introduction and Sade’s Les 120 Journées, “knowing” can 
now safely be placed amongst those other modalities seen filling up the “plenum”. In closing 
out this section, it is worth contrasting the epistemological spaces Bentham and Sade 
establish in their works, spaces that have particular architectural layouts.  
Bentham’s panopticon would seem to be a highly complementary architectural space 
for what Sade had in mind for the activities in Silling Château. On so many occasions the 
“four heroes” were forced to resort to the “tyranny” Bentham described as “resentment 
requiring always to regulate, to prevent its doing mischief”; infractions such as unsanctioned 
visits to the chamber pot, over cleanliness in toilet hygiene and instances of backroom 
dealing were all rife to occur in the cavernous, enclaved design of Silling Château. It is worth 
describing some of its more important architectural features. Firstly, there is the semicircular 
amphitheatre with a stage for all of the four storytellers’ recitals, around whose curved walls 
were situated four individualized niches for the four spectating “heroes” (and their respective 
entourages), all of which had rear doors leading to personalized closets, fully furnished “for 
every kind of impurity” on occasion infamies were “preferred not to [be] execute[d] before 
everyone”.
379
 Then there is the chambers, forming one wing off the amphitheatre, designed 
for maximum seclusion, soundproof and dim all of the day, meant for “private interviews”, 
“secluded contests” and for all manners of “secret delights”.
380
 Finally, there is that feature 
architectural space, the dungeon, its entrance a three-hundred stepped spiral staircase beneath 
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the altar stone of a Christian temple, fortified by a triple door of iron, sealing off all the 
“cruelest arts” contained within. Sade sums up this latter space this way: 
And there below, what tranquillity! To what degree might not the villain be reassured who brought his victim 
there! What had he to fear? He was out of France, in a safe province, in the depths of an uninhabitable forest, 
within this forest in a redoubt which, owing to the measures he had taken, only the birds of the air could 
approach, and he was in the depth of the earth’s entrails. Woe, a hundred times woe to the unlucky creature who 
in the midst of such abandonment were to find himself at the mercy of a villain lawless and without religion, 
whom crime amused, and whose only interest lay in his passions, who heeded naught, had nothing to obey but 




More than just rooms in a building these niches, chambers and this dungeon are all 
“negative” spaces, whose metaphysical content is being offered up for comparison against 
what Bentham and Priestley have raised as an alternative to the pneumatology of 
“corruption”. Whether Foucault realized it or not, his exposition of the historical development 
of medical and penal hygiene up until the implementation of the Panopticon is so rich in 
metaphysical allusion his opening case study of how one set of magistrates in one late 
seventeenth-century French town go about tackling an outbreak of the plague could be a 
double entendre for the pneumatological differences in Sade and Bentham’s architectural 
design when this handling of the plague is contrasted with that older treatment of leprosy. On 
one side, Foucault raises the spectre of the “leper”, whose treatment involved confinement 
and exclusion: “of exile-enclosure he was left to his doom in the mass among which it was 
useless to differentiate”;
382
 on the other, he narrated one town’s quarantine of the afflicted and 
saw in its hygienic program a harbinger of Bentham’s panopticon: “those sick of the plague 
were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were 
the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself”.”
383
 St-
Martin raised earlier linkages between Sade’s usage of “corruption” in his works and the 
assumptions of Italian medicine she argued greatly influenced him so it is in no way 
inappropriate to consider the architectural space of Silling Château to be well suited to 
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“negative” notions such as miasma and corruption, the kind to which Priestley and Bentham 
sought an alternative. At issue now, however, is what these two “negative” conceptions of 
“plenum” space say about an epistemology of discovery. To set up this contrast, it is worth 
recounting one story from Les 120 Journées where one “object of discovery” exemplifies 
maximum investment, whose result can only be called futile. 
 Curval in a heated rage “seized her by the hair, overwhelm[ed] her with invectives [… 
and] dragged her to his chamber […] t[ying] her to his bedpost” so that he would not have to 
wake up in a “lubric furor”, and again go looking for his “object” of desire, who was in 
flight.
384
 The search party had eventually found Adelaide, sitting on Sophie’s bed and Sade 
describes the discovery this way: 
Those two charming girls, united by their similar tender natures, their piety, virtuous sentiment, candor, and 
absolutely identical amenity, had been seized by the most beautiful affection for each other and they were 
exchanging comforting words, consoling one other for the dreadful fate that had been reserved for them. No one 
had perceived their commerce until then, but what followed proved that this was not the first time they had got 
together, and it was discovered as well that the elder of the two was cultivating the other’s finer sentiments, and 
had especially pleaded with her not to stray from her religion and her duties towards God, Who would one day 




Many aspects of this anecdote of discovery by the four “heroes” in one of these enclaved 
spaces in Silling Château mark departure points from where Priestley and Bentham would set 
out to develop their respective pneumatologies. The same “similitudes” are present, the 
“identical amenity” (sympathies) of these two young girls; tyrannical “regulation”, the tying 
of Adelaide to the bedpost of Curval’s bed (antipathy); and less obvious, the atmospheric 
pressure pervading the whole of Les 120 Journées as that chute towards incremental depths 
of “negativity”, cosmology, the organizing logic; and religion, the phases of descent all the 
way down in this particular discovery of two charming girls in prayer to paroxysm of 
(Curval’s) blasphemous rage. The unanimous conclusion is that regulations are inadequate:  
[t]his fact accounted for the imperfect administration of the household, and arrangements were made whereby, 
in future, there would always be at least one duenna in the girls’ quarters and another in the boys.
386
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If Newton’s most spectacular discoveries followed as Curval’s the same drag of cosmology 
and phases of descent to religion
387
 then Priestley and Bentham, aerial scientists, could be 
said to be occupying a place outside and for them this was the starting point for their fresh 
pneumatological approach: “[u]niformities and these perceptional conjunctions are of course 
far less salient in these sciences of “cesspools” compared with their cosmological 
counterparts” (p. 146). Bentham (through Schaffer) sums it up this way:  
He drew an important contrast between the law of terror, spirits and fictions, and the law of utility, bodies and 
material interests. The former “drags men to its purpose in chains, from which… the captives break loose in 
crowds,” while the latter “transcendental legislation, leads men by silken threads round their affections and 




Cosmology is the former: the “drag” of what can only be the act of being impelled 
(physically and epistemologically) by “objects” in their orbits (“uniformities of nature”); the 
“terror, spirits and fictions,” the “negative” origins of religion, of the same order of 
magnitude as these “objects” it shadows as heavenly bodies. Comte described cosmology as 
the earliest of positive sciences but it is in fact that one imbued with the greatest “negativity” 
for reasons Bentham here suggests. He would go on to elucidate the vertiginous or, better, 
centrifugal effect on epistemology of a “negative” order when “captives break[] lose in 
crowds”, a scene not too dissimilar from the four “heroes” discovering in the earlier morning 
of November 13
th
 Adelaide and Sophie praying in a chamber. Bentham’s pneumatology is 
rather the “optimistic” remaking of the plenum whose aim he describes in Introduction as: 
“[the community’s] pleasures and […] security [being] the end and the sole end which the 
legislator ought to have in view”.
389
 Knowledge unites all men by “silken threads” tailor-
made to wants and needs - not prepossessed as if in an a priori vacuum of what has been 
shown as ‘drag’ and “descent” but fashioned by the legislator filling out the entire expanse of 
the plenum with men equal and improved:  
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[…] the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be 




The ‘silken threads’ are alternatives to ‘iron chains” of what can now be the tyranny of 
cosmology and religion, something Bentham conjoins by his use of “antipathy”. Schaffer 
then ties this contrast with the epistemological spaces set up here as the point of divergence in 
exploring the architecture of Silling and utility:  
The Panopticon, which substituted the illuminated space for inspection for the dark confinement of the dungeon, 
relied on the power of these “silken threads” [metaphysics of optimism] over subjects’ minds and the knowledge 




If the discovery of partial success for Priestley was soda water; for Bentham it was this 
crafting of the subject’s mind, which should be said to mark a significant moment in the 
history of “interiority.” The failure for both was that discovery happened without 
accompanying understanding: soda water was created without understanding the role of 
oxidization; subjectivities were created in the panopticon but knowledge remained tightly 
bound to new orders of objects and thus cannot be said to be knowledge sui generis (for 
reasons Hume would give). After all, a panopticon is a surrogate cosmos; and it would take 
new events for knowledge to be wholly freed and no longer bound by requirements of 
(natural and social) uniformities. This all anticipates the direction that will lead to 
understanding a “metaphysics of success” towards the end of this dissertation.  
 Before arriving at this point, it is worth considering another important dimension of 
“discovery”, one indexed in both Chapters 1 and 2. Reflecting on Rousseau’s metaphysics of 
child abandonment, the moral contrast was made between the career paths of his children, 
who had been destined to be “adventurers and fortune-hunters” before being sent off to be 
“workers and peasants”. Expediting on the high seas is a significant modality of discovery, 
one that cannot be overlooked in the period of focus. The scope in knowledge elicited from 
such epistemological expansion demands a new perspective be crafted for consideration in 
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this paper, a perspective top-down when encounters with new cultural centers require 
accommodation of new systems of knowledge. As a matter of fact, Sade included such a 
perspective in his ɶuvre, one complementing the bottom-up line of focus in his Les 120 
Journées. This perspective was fully developed in Chapter 2.2. But in his travelogue: Aline et 
Valcour, ou Le roman philosophique Sade attempts to navigate knowledge from the top-
down. To begin this chapter, however, the extent of Sade’s metaphysical plunge into 
“negativity” will be gaged by considering those other metaphysical explorers of the age: 
Diderot and Blake, who set sail with a similar “negative” compass of navigation but never 
reached the same limits that Sade did. Everything developed up until this point: the 
“plenum”, “pneumatology” and the “negative-positive” scale will be shown to apply both 




















 Aline et Valcourt 
4.1  Metaphysical Voyagers  
 Captain Cook had long been the ideal companion for would-be adventurers, seeking 
fame and fortune on the high seas in expeditions to the New World. If it had always been 
discoveries of new lucrative commercial markets or new lands awaiting stamps of national 
possession that stimulated excitement, such possibilities by the late eighteenth century had 
substantially diminished as that geopolitical game had long since reached saturation. What 
remained left to do to maintain the mystique of adventure was to romanticize in story the 
perilous task of preserving what colonies one still possessed or set about harassing competitor 
nations in that murky game of piracy that always oscillated between the threshold of being a 
legitimate tactic of economic competitiveness and a subaltern lifestyle attracting the most 
shady of characters from the dregs of society. John Gabriel Stedmen’s travelogue Narrative 
of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam: in Guiana from the year 
1772 to 1777 and Daniel Defoe’s The Life, Adventures and Piracies of the Famous Captain 
Singleton capture these two themes in the literature of the period, respectively. But another 
type of adventurer is oft overlooked, an adventurer, who was as enamored with the feats of 
Cook as these other opportunistic materialists’ exploits. Schaffer accounts how in 1771 
Bentham had solicited Cook personally to plan a joint voyage to the South Seas; and it was 
only due to political intervention on the part of Bentham’s enemy, Sir William Blackstone, 
that the plan was scrubbed.
392
 One character who did manage to board one of Cook’s ships 
was Sade, through his character Sainville, who, in Aline et Valcour, was in search of his 
kidnapped beloved: 
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Dès qu’il eut su l’objet de mon voyage, dès qu’il eu vu le portrait de Léonore, il m’assura qu’une femme 
absolument semblable à la miniature que je lui faisais voir, était à bour de a Découverte, second navire anglais, 
accompagnant Cook, et commandé par le captaine Clarke, qui venait de mouiller récemment au Cap.
393
 
This section will focus on just who these metaphysical voyagers were and how they presented 
a perspective of colonial expeditions much different than that one often the focus of attention 
for modern scholars, whose emphasis on the “material” exploitation in colonial policies 
obscures a much broader discourse. These metaphysical voyages have an enduring history in 
the literature of the period with pre-Revolutionary examples like Diderot’s Supplément au 
voyage de Bougainville; and the cycle of poetry by William Blake including French 
Revolution, America and Visions of the Daughters of Albion, all of which were born out of 
new sentiment, emerging from the tumult of the French Revolution. It is from such a 
sampling of reflections on European discovery that Aline et Valcour finds its most natural fit 
for theoretical investigation. Discovery again is more than just about who discovered what 
where and for what purpose. It only takes Bentham reminding readers in the opening to his 
preface to Fragments on Government that discovery had relevance in pneumatology: 
The age we live in is a busy age; in which knowledge is rapidly advancing towards perfection. In the natural 
Motives of world, in particular, every thing teems with discovery and the present with improvement. The most 
distant and recondite regions of the earth traversed and explored the all-vivifying and subtle element of the air so 
recently analyzed and made known to us, are striking evidences, were all others wanting, of this pleasing 
truth.
394 
He goes on to describe in the next paragraph discovery as a cognate of improvement
395
 and, 
with awareness of the previous section still fresh in mind, improvement also has very 
particular metaphysical meaning beyond the materialism that often fills in for both its motive 
and description. This unsung dimension is often overlooked in Sade as well especially in his 
reflections on the French Revolution in Aline et Valcourt. Discourses on geographical 
discovery will share many of the same parallels as those one, discussed already in the context 
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of scientific discoveries; so throughout this section efforts will be made to treat both 
indistinguishably. 
 In critical literature on the history of European discovery plant science has played a 
surprising role in framing what constitutes the machinery of improvement. One contributor to 
the critique of the field of eighteen-century horticulture is Jill H. Casid, who, in Sowing 
Landscape: Landscape and Colonization, persuasively argues that colonial gardening was 
central to the success of the European colonization project. John M. MacKenzie in his review 
of her work sums up her assertion this way:  
[e]mpire was everywhere written upon landscapes [… i]ts relationships of class, race, and power were reflected 
in its gardens and in its productive spaces, creating ‘psychogeographies’ […].
396
  
Improvement here has already had its preamble in the “materialist” approaches of those 
groups of adventurers, whose sole purpose for discovery was either national prestige, 
economic gain or the moral defence to continue both these pursuits. Desire (in the 
marketplace) and ideology have both been discussed at different points in this dissertation; 
and they have all been given “positive” bases so synonymy with “materialism” should not be 
surprising. Critical emphasis on “material” improvement has often obscured that other 
“negative” type just as important in the history of European discovery, that one that was the 
focus of study for that one luminary of the Lunar Society of Birmingham, Priestley; and his 
affiliate Bentham, based out of London. Differentiating between these two types is a 
necessary step going forward as vegetation happens to play a significant role in their 
“negative” conceptualization of discovery as well. In support of Priestley and Bentham, 
another luminary from the Lunar Society will be called upon, one, who would have engaged 
with many of the same themes: Erasmus Darwin. 
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 La Mettrie offered a portrait of plant life well suited to the tastes of a cosmopolitan 
audience in tuned with trendy discourses on science: 
The earth is not only the plants’ nurse; it is also in a way their dressmaker. It is not satisfied with suckling them, 
but also clothes them. With the same juices that nourish them, it can spin garment to cover them. Such is the 
corolla I have mentioned, which is decorated with the most beautiful colours. The corolla of man, and above all 




One can imagine here a bon vivant, accompanied by his lady, venturing into a commercial 
district for a dress fitting in preparation for an evening’s soiree. The gentlemen must be well 
attired but not to the same extent as (“above all”) his companion, who by the stroke of 
midnight once the gaiety of the evening’s activities have wound down will end up “without 
cover” beside him in bed - as the custom goes. In her chapter “The Private Lives of Plants” 
Londa Schiebinger traces the transition from how these “corolla” were originally “wedding 
gowns”
398
 for chaste brides in Linnaeus’ characterization to something much more debonair, 
worthy to be worn to one of La Mettrie’s soirees and discarded by night’s end. Schiebinger 
situates the science of “plant sexuality [first] in Linnaeus’ system t[aking] place almost 
exclusively within the bonds of marriage”
399
 and then sees it shift to audiences of high 
society where fluency in science was a mark of germaneness. This audience would have been, 
at the least, tolerant of underhanded violations of Christian virtue in discussions of science; 
and, at the most, delighted by the kind of pornographic display, rife in La Mettrie’s lectures 
on botany:  
[…] plants pulsating with heat with like passion to animals male plants shaking like a man copulating, their 
semen/ grains of dust covering fervidly stamens of the [female] flower.
400
  
If Hunt was shown presenting Sade earlier as the productive force behind that 
transmogrification of desire in the marketplace once the family compact had collapsed with 
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the fall of the King’s family during the French Revolution, Schiebinger presents Erasmus 
Darwin as something of a similar figure but from the side of plant “desire”: 
Darwin’s plants, unlike Linnaeus’s, did not limit sexual relations to the bonds of matrimony. Rather, they freely 
expressed every imaginable from of heterosexual union. The fair Collinsonia, sighting the sweet concern, 
satisfied the love of two brothers by turns. The Meadia (an ordinary cowslip) bowed with “wanton air” rolled 
her dark eyes, and waved her golden hair as she gratified each of her five beaux, Three youthful swains 
succumbed to the riper years of the Gloriosa. For Darwin, sex was not just the mechanism for improving and 
diversifying the stock of living organisms, it was also the purest source of happiness – “the cordial drop in the 
otherwise vapid cup of life”.
401
 
The use of Darwin as the representative of what Schiebinger calls an “economy of nature” is 
interesting, though problematic, as what is not explicitly stated in her presentation was the 
close company he shared with Priestley and Bentham. Her linking Darwin and his poetry to 
an economics of fashion far outweighs any consideration of the metaphysics that would have 
been more in line with the company he kept; and her singling out “happiness” in these 
licentious plant displays over what she calls “mechanism for improving and diversifying the 
stock of living organisms” raises an artificial distinction as the “free love” model had a 
sufficient “positivity” to be considered a basis of the economic order. One need only be 
reminded of how Smith left room for fashion in the workings of “division of labour” (p. 49) 
or how desire was always open to further “positive articulation” as Rousseau demonstrated in 
his account of Grimm’s rise to fame. Schiebinger describes the economy this way:  
[s]ex was no longer seen as a sin or vice, but as part of the economy of nature - a natural impulse that should 
find free expression. Free love was not only discussed among elites, it was practiced.
402
  
Though always open to vagaries of interpretation and use in the marketplace of ideas, 
Darwin’s poetry in proximity to Priestley and Bentham would have had a far different 
reading. In “Economy of Vegetation”, the first part of Erasmus’ poem, The Botanical Garden, 
flowers are very much not lusty members of coteries of high society but the “negative” 
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archetype for all orders of life coming up from chaos and then blooming in all manners of 
technological and social improvements. Even a steam-powered water pump, or, in his words, 
a “Giant-Power”, digging for minerals in industry, can be an underground vine:  
[That] forms earth’s remotest caves/ Lifts with strong arm her dark reluctant waves; / Each cavern’d rock, and 
hidden den explores, / Drags her dark Coals, and digs her shining ores.
403
  
Using accompanying philosophical notes to various poetic expressions, Darwin confirms 
below that lexica of pneumatology including such “negative” terms as heat and germination, 
expressed as deep-seated sexuality, all of which are now familiar features of cesspools:  
I. “NYMPHS OF PRIMEVAL FIRE!
404
 YOUR vestal train/ Hung with gold-tresses o’er the vast inane,/ 
Pierced with your silver shafts the throne of Night,/ And charm’d young Nature’s opening eyes with light;/ 
When LOVE DIVINE,
405
 with brooding wings unfurl’d […] Call’d from the rude abyss the living world./ “—




To be fair to Schiebinger, she does propose an alternative tradition to reading the more 
titillating parts in Darwin’s poetry. She does cite Laqueur and that older Galenic “one sex” 
model (that one mentioned on p. 41 of this dissertation); however, she see the new science of 
sex as materialist, more interested in weights and measure of sexual difference.
407
 Perhaps 
this was apt for someone like La Mettrie but not Darwin and the company he kept. 
Receptions to colonization in the New World actually bore a similar mark of “positivity” seen 
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underpinning the popularization of science, and success hinged on another conception of 
plant life. 
 Casid argued that aesthetic choices in “dressing” European colonization had a far 
greater effect on its durability than any policy, economic, political or otherwise. She develops 
her position from a gardening principle as ancient as it is pervasive in the perceptual ordering 
of objects in the history of Western culture. She summed up this principle as that 
pentateuchal prohibition against intermixing species of plants and animals, which she 
introduces in her reflection on James Grainger’s, The Sugar-Cane, a poem that broached the 
issue: 
The ghostly trace of miscegenation and imperial guilt are there. The appeal to “so God ordains” is likely an 
effort to keep at bay the theologically based criticism of hybridization encapsulated in the two laws from 




She focuses on printmaking and its ability to reify the logic of colonization, and the race 
relations that naturally fell under its sway.
409
 Reproducibility is one such formal feature that 
iterates the persuasive illusion amongst consumers that plantations’ operations depend on 
systems of colonial ordering and arrangement - not coercive slave labour, which actually was 
the case.
410
 Artificial and ubiquitous, this illusion allowed consumers to feast their eyes on 
the “business-as-usual” workings of the empire and even erupt with the same moral outrage 
and pity when the system showed signs of breakage, for example, during a slave revolt. 
Marcus Wood in “John Gabriel Stedman, William Blake, Francesco Bartolozzi and 
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empathetic pornography in the Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted 
Negroes of Surinam”, argues that this emotional response was a matter of economics, just as 
Smith had done in his conception of “economy of sympathy” in Theory of Moral 
Sentiment.
411
 Wood repeats Smith’s example of another human sentiment able to be 
“positively articulated”: the degree of one’s moral fitness even before the spectacle of horrific 
violence.
412
 In “Vegetable Pornography: The “Moral” (Scientific) Debate surrounding 
Francesco Bartolozzi’s ‘Stipple Gardens’ and William Blake’s ‘Vegetable Earth’ in John 
Gabriel Stedman’s Surinam Travelogue”, Joseph Blessin presents another “logic” of 
printmaking where chiaroscurist engraving styles like stipple, mezzotint and aquatint actually 
reproduce prohibitions on miscegenation. In the soft interplay between whites and blacks on 
metal plates or prints a double-leveled prestidigitation is achieved, on the first level, with 
paint pigments; the second, skin pigments. As was the case for colored points that work 
against each other to create the illusion of harmony on metal sheets:  
[…] slaves [and their families] in […] field[s] partitioned from […] slave-own[ing] famil[ies…] worked at ease 
[…] with sign of neither backbreaking toil nor inevitable familial estrangement.
 413  
The colonial garden of Casid’s reflection promises both illusions of perennial abundance 
(reproducibility) and a well-balanced composition of variety (chiaroscuro). She offers this 
florid description:  
[…] glowing red… scarlet cordiums, the verdant bowers of the Jessamine and Grenadilla vines, the tufted 
plumes of lilac, the silver white and silky leaves of that portalandia… and prodigious variety of minor fruits and 
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The colonial garden presented here bears the hallmark of that same “dressmaker” spinning 
the logic of plant anatomy mentioned in the earlier discussion of popular science and fashion; 
and now as before the same “positive” scaffolding applies. Plantation landscape was a well-
maintained garden where flowers present their colors singularly, grouped preferably 
according to respective species. If seen from a distance an arrangement like this would be 
guaranteed vividness and clarity in the viewer’s overall impression, falling otherwise into 
obscurity if colors are mixed amongst different species. At a closer proximity colors of 
varying species may be set side by side in more suggestive ways but, overall, the good 
gardener must balance all ranges between these two perspectival extremes, seducing viewers 
only so much as colors are singularly discernible. All the flowers, being perennial, needed 
periodic maintenance: the pulling of weeds and sharpening of transitions when blurring 
between flower species occurred. These gardening principles had scalar application: from the 
chiaroscuro used to promote images to European consumers all the way up to the 
architectural and discursive segregation of races, necessary for the operation of the whole of 
the colonial project. These principles show up for Hume, the “horticulturalist”, as well. 
Hume gives his own formulation of “gardens”, which too depends on elements 
constitutively “positive”: 
[…] my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’s points, dispos’d in a certain manner. If the eye is 
sensible of any thing further, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing 
farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points, 
and of the manner of their appearance.
415 
At play in Hume’s garden are one-to-one relations between impressions and ideas. And if 
eyes seek this “any thing further” and demand “it be pointed out” what is beyond vivid and 
clear impressions or ideas,  the realm entered is one of obscurity, whose points of entry Hume 
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famously seals off with his lock of skepticism. It is in the uniformity of these impressions and 
ideas in cultural forms where “perennial” states take hold, giving to the dimension of time its 
own “positive” quality. But Darwin would see something troubling within the interstices of 
these “colour’d points” and identify perenniality as the ease of gliding over and seeing 
uniformity in tradition:  
When Avarice, shrouded in Religion’s robe,/ Sail’d to the West, and slaughter’s half the globe;/ While 




And what quickly follows in behind these “dressmakers” of the “robes” of priests and popes 
are colonial gardeners, who uphold the marketplace with their own prestidigitation of color, 
which hide something much more ominous: 
Hear, oh BRITANNIA! potent Queen of isles,/ On whom fair Art, and meek Religion smiles,/ Now AFRIC’S 
coasts thy craftier sons invade/ With murder, rapine, theft,-- and call it Trade!/ -- The SLAVE, in chains, on 
supplicating knee,/ Spreads his wide arms, and lifts his eyes to Thee;/ With hunger pale, with wounds and toil 




The previous section demonstrated that for Priestley and Bentham interstices were also places 
of fester (p. 157), giving off this same “choaking” air Darwin saw suffocating this slave in 
chains. For members of the Lunar Society, the gardening techniques used could be the 
difference between who, amongst individuals and societies, had healthy pneumatological 
states and who did not; and in exploring botanical discourses in both science and economics 
the formal choices deciding states seems to break down into what is either “positive” or 
“negative”. “Positivity” has been shown to have an artificiality inviting what Priestley called 
“pools of stagnant water”, the breeding ground for all sorts of pathogens individual and social 
while “negativity” has been presented as a germ of life stretching monistically from the 
smallest of plant seeds all the way up to blossoming human improvement. At all stages there 
is discovery and hidden behind each of the plant’s folds serendipities await a blessed 
humanity. Voyages to the New World were caught up in this same optimism but, as has been 
shown, concern for weather was more than just about wind in ships’ sails or safe passage 
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around treacherous coastlines; it was fundamentally concerned about the meteorology of the 
human heart. These voyages had some famous antecedents and would-be successors when 
Sade (through Sainville) set sail from Italy with a 15-crew felucca and headed towards the 
coast of North Africa. Two in particular are noteworthy to mention at the outset as they both 
establish particular “negative” parameters not shared with voyages, guided by the 
“materialist” ambitions seen earlier. The captains are Denis Diderot and William Blake.  
Exploring the region known today as Oceania in the South Seas, Diderot, through the 
alphabetic characters A and B, gives his justification for how it was even possible from the 
comfort of his own armchair in France to accompany Admiral Bougainville, giving old 
meaning to the idiom “armchair general”, or, better, “armchair admiral”: 
[…] si le vaisseau n'est qu'une maison flottante, et si vous considérez le navigateur qui traverse des espaces 
immenses, resserré et immobile dans une enceinte assez étroite, vous le verrez faisant le tour du globe sur une 




In his memoire, Le voyage autour du monde, Bougainville presents himself as that 
“materialist” discoverer
419
 founding colonies like Malouine (modern day Falkland Islands) 
for the glory of the French empire - ensuring to adorn the new settlement with that “stamp of 
possession”
420
 - and doing something Dena Goodman would take particular note of in “The 
Structure of Political Argument in Diderot’s Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville”: 
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Bougainville gathered “facts”. Facts have already been given special attention in the 
introduction of this dissertation with Riskin “establish[ing] “sensibilité” as a salient 
“renunciation of [the] understanding” that comes from [them] (p. 19). Bougainville had 
accumulated many “facts” during his voyage including cartographical ones like his correction 
of the location of Brazil from a noted interpolation of movement of fish stocks and patterns of 
currents
421
 but, more important for this section, ethnographical observations gathered from 
his encounter with indigenous peoples such as those in Tahiti. In the following passage he 
connects the serene condition of the inhabitants with the state of the climate: 
[…] what better proofs can we desire of the salubrity of the air, and the good regimen which the inhabitants 
observe, than the health and strength of these same islanders, who inhabit huts exposed to all the winds, and 
hardly cover the earth which serves them as a bed with a few leaves; the happy old age to which they attain 
without feeling any of its inconveniences; the acuteness of all their senses; and lastly, the singular beauty of 




Dena Goodman identifies the manoeuvre Diderot makes on his “maison flottante”, wresting a 
place beside Bougainville in the Admiral’s quarters: he subordinated facts gathered from a 
real voyage to an exotic land to the ability to extract from these ‘facts’ proper conclusions.
423
 
The deployment of Diderot’s imagination is in keeping with the “negative” parameters of that 
science unique of the period. It is worth extracting some key features firstly from Supplément 
in anticipation of discussions of Aline et Valcour later.  
 In the introduction to Supplément Diderot wrote like the eighteenth-century version of 
a travel agent when situating Bougainville in a climate of such contrast from his homeland 
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the comparison could only mean for the onlooker that one was witnessing something truly 
exotic. Diderot describes in curious detail a thick island fog with such “suffisamment chargée 
d'humidité” it hangs not in the atmosphere but just above the earth (“retombe sur la terre”) 
creating a quality in the air of such low density that even a chemist would take notice.
424
 This 
is much different than the air particularly thick in Bougainville’s France, a thickness with that 
now familiar “positive” quality, the “choaking air” Darwin described, or the air, which 
Scheibinger identified with genteel “free love” overlain with the same “weights and measures 
of materialist science” (p. 163) seen here: 
Bougainville a le goût des amusements de la société. Il aime les femmes, les spectacles, les repas délicats. Il se 
prête au tourbillon du monde d'aussi bonne grâce qu'aux inconstances de l'élément sur lequel il a été ballotté. Il 
est aimable et gai. C'est un véritable Français, lesté d'un bord d'un Traité de calcul différentiel et intégral, et de 




Many of the motifs of “free love” already outlined resemble those same ones Hunt sees as not 
only the points of attack against key characters and typologies of the ancient regime in the 
run-up to the French Revolution, i.e., the “corruption of morals” of a venereal, impotent, 
degenerate privileged class
426
 -  but also the accretions formed from the democratization of 
desire, fostered by pamphleteers hawking the latest in pornographic propaganda to the 
Parisian hoi polloi, transforming political “activism” into something not “simply 
displacement or substitution for ‘real”’ politics”.
427
 In Supplément Diderot applies “free love” 
to far different ends. This is particularly evident in his reflections on libertinage, incest and 
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polygamy. In one of the exchanges on the topic of comparative mores between the French 
and the Tahitians a chaplain (L’aumonier) asks his Tahitian guide, Orou, whether or not 
libertinage existed amongst his tribe. Orou offers a “negative” framing of the answer, 
circumventing any positive prescription implied in the question; and embedded in the 
subsequent moral outrage the prejudicial chaplain displays upon hearing Orou’s answer. Orou 
splits libertinage into two forms. The first comes as the necessity for a man, whose wife is 
with child, to continue propagating his most esteemed attributes for the good of both his 
unborn child and the tribe’s progeny: 
Notre enfant n'a honte que d'un mauvais choix. Tu dois concevoir quel prix nous attachons à la santé, à la beauté, 
à la force, à l'industrie, au courage ; tu dois concevoir comment, sans que nous nous en mêlions, les prérogatives 




The second form comes in those instances, punishable by tribal code, when natural 
impediments to propagation are flagrantly brushed aside as in cases of desire expressed in 
and for the sterile, the deformed, the aged and those afflicted with the “maladie périodique” 
(menstruation).
429
 In both these forms of libertinage it is generation - if not fermentation - that 
is privileged over prejudice as moral prescriptions; and Diderot verifies here St-Martin’s 
earlier suggestion that libertinage be a surrogate for the principle of nature:  





Diderot privileges, however, generation over fermentation in adding the second form to the 
ledger of “châtiment”, that is, those leaving their home without a “voile noir” to deceptively 
seduce those of healthy constitution were subject to “l'exil au nord de l'île ou l'esclavage.431 This 
measure evinces the limit to how far Diderot was willing to extend libertinage, a limit Sade would 
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surpass when subordinating generation to its connate: fermentation. On the topic of incest Diderot 
again applies the “generation rule” for special cases amongst the Otaïti: when premature 
death takes either a father leaving behind a wife and healthy sons; or a mother, a husband and 
healthy daughters;
432
 a son’s preference for older women;
433
 or when a father with an ugly 
daughter wants to give her needed practice in the art of love-making to enhance her value to a 
potential suitor: “Si son père l'aime, il s'occupe à lui préparer sa dot en enfants”.
434
 For incest 
between brothers and sisters when the possibility of generation between siblings is impossible 
biologically (the “voile gris”), Orou explains how any blame would fall on the parents for 
lack of supervision but adds that the community sees in precocious sibling love the future 
health of the tribe: 
Des femmes à qui le temps de la grossesse paraît long ; des femmes et des filles peu scrupuleuses à garder leur 
voile gris; mais dans le fait nous n'attachons pas une grande importance à toutes ces fautes, et tu ne saurais 
croire combien l'idée de richesse particulière ou publique unie dans nos têtes à l'idée de population épure nos 




To all these well-reasoned arguments where generation is of utmost importance the chaplain 
sees only vice, which “[…] menace la constitution politique”.
436
 He sees jealousy as a natural 
law, the most basic source of all social upheaval:  
La passion de deux hommes pour une même femme, ou le goût de deux femmes ou de deux filles pour un même 




In A and B eavesdropping on this very peculiar cross-cultural exchange on the topic of “free 
love” two divergent positions become clear: the French one, which is highly developed yet 
given over to artifice; and the Otaïti, indigenous and still governed by natural law. Goodman 
sees Diderot recommending France seek wisdom from both these cultural emissaries. Diderot 
condemns France for how jealousy and artifice produce such formations as “private property, 
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creation of false moralities, of laws, of customs, of philosophy, of religious institutions”
438
 
and puts all in the crosshairs for political reform; however, he does so with this caveat that 
would lessen his swing towards Orou’s side:  





Free love is presented here in a much different manner than Schiebinger and Hunt’s “positive” 
focus. Diderot shows here how a voyage to the New World could be spurred by much more 
than “material” gain; there was a boon of metaphysical insight awaiting discovery. 
 David V. Erdman in Blake: Prophet against Empire reflects on what could have been 
a successful release had Blake only managed better the timing and marketing of his 1791 
poem French Revolution. In Erdman’s eyes, the deficiencies of handling this poem set Blake 
adrift in that trademark “involuted symbolism and obscure manner” of his later works.
440
 
However, having such deficiencies raises the possibility of immunity to pervasive influences 
of the marketplace whose “positive articulations” have already been shown to co-opt 
messaging otherwise meant for different purposes. Schiebinger has already demonstrated this 
in the case of how Erasmus Darwin’s science was received by his public (p. 152). Now if 
Diderot makes it his aim to fight back (so to speak) with “proper conclusions” to what 
Bougainville, a savvy populariser of discovery, reveals as “facts,” is there any substance to 
Erdman’s regretful tone in Blake’s work largely going unnoticed in his day? Perhaps he 
would have wanted his message to be unadulterated? Evidence shows that Blake like Darwin 
would have made popular engagement a priority but not for popularity’s sake. In “Scientific 
Amusements: Literary Representations of the Birmingham Lunar Society” Pam Perkins sees 
Blake himself encouraging scientists to engage their publics with their respective crafts even 
if the results were not always what they expected. Referring to a scene in Blake’s satirical 
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poem, Island in the Moon, Perkin did not read scientists as jeopardizing public health in a 
mishap like the one the character, Inflammable Gass makes, mishandling an air pump, 
breaking a flask containing the plague and causing the on-lookers of the spectacle to flee for 
their lives; but rather he reads it as augmenting public health by making science socially 
transparent.
441
 Inflammable Gass stands alone amongst other solipsistic characters like 
Pythagorean who “endeavour[s] to incorporate [his] soul with [his] bod[y]”;
442
 Obtuse Angle, 
who “underst[an]d[s] better when he shut his eyes”;
443
 and The Antiquarian, who defends that 
populariser of science, Voltaire, as “immersed in matter, & seems to have understood very 
little but what he saw before his eyes, like the Animal upon the Pythagoreans laps always 
playing with its own tail”.
444
 Aptly, possessing the same religious zeal and evangelical 
outreach as Priestley, Inflammable Gass defends Mrs Sigtagatist’s justification for attending 
church against detractors in the group (like the character Nannicantipot); he even intervenes 
on her behalf in the midst of a hostile exchange: 
You [Nannicantipot] would [knock down the minister Mr Huffcap and run away] You Ignorant jade I wish I 
could see you hit any of the ministers, you deserve to have yours ears boxed you do. – I’m [Nanicantipot] sure 
this is not religion answers the […] others – Then Mr Inflammable Gass ran & shovd his head into the fire & set 




This dual concern for public interest and criticism of “popularisers” of science like Voltaire 
are hallmark tactics of the Dissenting Rationalists, whose pneumatological mission was 
presented earlier under the aegis of Priestley and Bentham. The question of Blake’s proximity 
to these contemporaries and their scientific coterie, which includes, of course, Darwin, 
remains somewhat of an open question even today. Whatever the historical link may be 
Blake’s poetry is undoubtedly infused with the same pneumatological focus, which is part 
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outreach in the manner of Darwin; part criticism, actually a much more intensified 
metaphysical version of Diderot’s voyage to the New World.  
Blake’s metaphysical voyage to the New World has nothing of the touristy trappings 
Diderot presented in Supplément though something of the same contrastive meteorological 
reports are issued along with figures playing similar roles as A and B, anchoring a 
metaphysical narrative to something happening in real-time, in Diderot’s case a discussion 
amongst two erudite thinkers. Blake’s entire narrative is strewn over numerous poems, some 
short; others long, written over a decade plus period with linkages no more than resonances, 
fitting for any project of poetry. The “A and B” entry point in Blake’s narrative takes place in 
The French Revolution (1791) where the Bastille and the character, Fayette, are the only two 
figures grounded in world-historical time, all others are or would be either metaphysical 
offshoots of these two, or articulations of like form of other world-historical figures, for 
example, Isaac Newton, who will appear shortly. The first meteorological report comes as 
one from the Bastille, accompanied by its metaphysical guardian, the Duke of Burgundy, the 
ideal figure of a once confident monarchic absolutism long since withered and replaced by a 
vestige so impotent a mass of French protesters are able to gather at the walls of this proud 
fortress and audaciously issue lists of demands of their own. The Duke makes his own 
demands in reply: 
Seest thou yonder dark castle, that moated around, keeps this city of Paris in awe. Go command yonder tower, 
saying, Bastile depart, and take thy shadowy course. Overstep the dark river, thou terrible tower, and get thee up 
into the country ten miles. And thou black southern prison, move along the dusky road to Versailles; there/ 
Frown on the gardens, and if it obey and depart, then the King will disband/ this war-breathing army; but if it 





The second world-historical figure is Fayette, who resides in these “gardens” to be “frowned” 
upon and he issues a directive by the authority of the National Assembly that the army must 
retreat even without the Duke’s demands being met:  
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And the vote was, that Fayette should order the army to remove ten miles from Paris./ The aged sun rises 




The fecund air of the Assembly’s garden and the beams of the rising sun after the vote; the 
miasma of the moated boundary of the Bastille and the breath of the Duke’s war horses are of 
like juxtaposition to how Diderot contrasts the low density fog hugging the fertile ground in 
Tahiti and the thickness of air of Bougainville’s homeland that enters into his ship, a 
thickness, which ascends beyond mere literality, impinging on the metaphysical realm. This 
corruption was stated earlier in this citation: “Il aime les femmes, les spectacles, les repas 
délicats. Il se prête au tourbillon du monde d'aussi bonne grâce qu'aux inconstances de 
l'élément sur lequel il a été ballotté” (p. 169). To capture the corruption and sterility implied 
by this meteorological description, one need only remember the “voile gris” of non-
reproductive sexuality, punishable by Tahitian law as that unacceptable form of libertinage; 
and even earlier to Rousseau’s dietary plan for Julie (delivered through Wolmar) (p. 52) 
where sparsity of what is readily available is esteemed; indulgence of what is scarce, panned:  
Our meals are plain, but choice; and nothing is wanting to make ours a sumptuous table, but the transporting it a 




The Bastille in A Song of Liberty would see its miasmal quality take on figurative 
significance as a site firstly concrete-historical but drifting later to disembodied-empty time 
when all forms of corruption from Rome to London to the slave routes of Africa irrespective 
of periodicity cease to be after the “Storming”:  
[s]purning the clouds written with curses, stamps the stony laws to dust, loosing the eternal horses from the dens 




Fayette would too make his own metaphysical transition, ultimately as a hesitating hero, 
representing revolutionary fervour suddenly halted and given over to residual loyalty to the 
privilege embodied by the Ancien Regime, the moment of compromise being a chance 
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encounter with Marie Antoinette on a balcony where upon Lafayette showing the customary 
respects (kneeling and kissing the sovereign’s hand):  





 If A and B in real time bear witness to a metaphysical discussion between Orou, of the Otaïti 
tribe; and L’aumonier, in Vision of the Daughters of Albion, Blake introduces his 
metaphysical dialogue as a drama, featuring an “Orou”-type character, the autochthonous 
mixed-blood
451
 girl, Oothoon; a cameo by the Bastille, presented as Oothoon’s slavedriver, 
Bromion; and Fayette, featured as Theotormon, Oothoon’s jealous lover. Erdman explains the 
interaction between all three characters this way: 
[…] supplied by the oratory of Oothoon, a female slave, free in spirit but physically bound; Bromion, the slave-
driver who owns her and has raped her to increase her market value; and Theotormon, her jealous but inhibited 
lover who fails to recognize her divine humanity . . . the frustrated lover . . . being analogous to the wavering 




Three themes present here are inflections of issues already raised by Diderot in the dialogue 
between L’aumonier and Orou. The first comes by way of the artifice A and B see in French 
society as the basis of “private property, creation of false moralities, of laws, of customs, of 
philosophy, of religious institutions” (p. 173-74), which Blake presents as Bromion’s raping 
bed. The second comes as jealousy, the principle worry for L’aumonier (but not, Orou) and 
the basis of the hesitation afflicting Fayette in the presence of Maria Antoinette; and now 
Theotormon, who can neither stand up to Bromion nor for his lover, Ootthoon. Lastly, it is 
Oothoon, who embodies the same generative sexuality Diderot described as the basis of 
sexual mores amongst the Otaïti: 
Art thou a flower! Art thou a nymph! […] I dare not pluck thee from thy dewy bed! The Golden nymph replied; 
pluck thou my flower Oothoon the mild/ Another flower shall spring, because the soul of sweet delight Can 
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never pass away. She ceas’d & closd her gold shrine/ Then Oothoon pluck’d the flower saying, I pluck thee 





This last description would later become the meteorological terrain of America and all its 
fecundity in the Preludium of the eponymous poem, the source of revolutionary fervour once 
the Orc has awoken:  
When pestilence is shot from heaven […] Their awful folds in the dark air; silent she stood as night […] But 




Starting with the miasma of the Bastille and moving to the bounty of the American plains 
Blake establishes the meteorological backdrop for his metaphysical voyage to the New World. 
Like any backdrop, however, what is still needed is a stage for an ultimate conflict; and it is 
here where Urizen faces off against Los, with the fate of humanity hanging in the balance. 
The dispensation for this ultimate conflict has a vegetal dimension in being a return to an 
Edenic motif, articulated by Blake as Golganooza. The bombast aside, Blake is taking serious 
accounts of the state of human knowledge of his day; and it all falls on those now familiar 
camps: “positive” and “negative” science. 
Urizen is first introduced in Visions of the Daughter of Albion as the “Creator of men” 
by what appears to be the same weights and measures Schiebinger speaks of when modelling 
the “economy of nature” on “free love”:  
Thy joys are tears! Thy labour vain, to form men to thine image/ How can one joy absorb another? are not 




It only takes the reminder of Rousseau’s presentation of Grimm that something inherently 
relational (and thus “negative”) can appear in “positive” formation, i.e., “different joys”, “a 
Love”; and it takes Blake’s reminder that this again (as Smith pointed out earlier) is the 
product of “labour” in the marketplace. Blake considered it ominous indeed for “positivity” 
to encroach on what is otherwise “negative terrain”; and Donald Ault, in Visionary Physics: 
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Blake’s Response to Newton, elegantly comes to the heart of the issue, and presents a concern 
that happens also to fall in line with the contention this dissertation aims to develop: 
Science […] is least dangerous when it is obviously partial and reductive, and most dangerous when it most 
closely approximates the complete and definite structure of the Imagination itself. At such a point apocalypse 




If Diderot gave Bougainville’s scientific “facts” a density set apart from the low humidity of 
Tahiti: “C'est un véritable Français, lesté d'un bord d'un Traité de calcul différentiel et 
intégral, et de l'autre d'un Voyage autour du globe” (p. 171) then Blake too would place such 
“facts” on the miasmal side of the pneumatological ledger. The conceptions the two writers 
lay on this side of the ledger share important similarities. For Diderot, it was the sterility of 
those amongst the Otaïti that constitute the miasma, those, who defy the tribal injunction to 
wear the “voile noir” or “gris” and go out in public to seduce those of healthy constitution, 
stealing in process what is otherwise fecund seed. For Blake, sterility and seductiveness are 
qualities belonging to Urizen, who too goes into the world, dissimulating fecundity, in his 
case through operations of the “positive” sciences of the day. Take his formal introduction in 
Blake’s The [First] Book of Urizen: 
It is Urizen, But known, abstracted Brooding secret, the dark power hid./ Times on time, he divides, & 
measur’d/ Space by space in his ninefold darkness Unseen, unknown! Changes appeard/ In his desolate 




Earlier Darwin saw something of this same miasma hidden behind similar mensurations and 
divisions, feigning germination: “[he] would see something troubling within the interstices of 
these “colour’d points”; and identify perenniality [of reproduction] as the ease of gliding over 
and seeing uniformity in tradition” (p. 168). If this is here the “Times on time” division Ault 
even attributes to Hume;
458
 the “Space by space” is Newton’s universe, that Berkeley also 
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criticized for the fluxions he saw buried in his calculus leading to those infinite 
quantifiabilities, or “positivities”, leaving open crypts strewn all over the natural and human 
worlds, whose ferment he animates with allusion to the undead: 
[…] he used Fluxions, like the Scaffold of a building, as things to be laid aside or got rid of, as soon as finite 
Lines were found proportional to them. But then these finite Exponents are found by the help of Fluxions… And 
what are these Fluxions? The Velocities of evanescent Increments? And what are these evanescent Increments? 
They are neither finite Quantities nor Quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the 




Ault described how these fluxions reduce to scientific objects but he could have also included 
in his list the artistic chiaroscurism of Casid’s thesis, which was also ‘fleeting and indefinite 
abstracted perceptual particulars’.
460
 Citing Blake’s poem Jerusalem, Ault emphasizes this 
shared ground this way:  
Art & Science cannot exist in minutely organized Particulars/ And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the 




For Diderot it was the “generation rule” of the Otaïti that be the object lesson for French 
society, the basis for political reform; for Blake, it was this “Definite & Determinate” 
American girl, Oothoon, whose “happy copulation”462 was not only the truth buried beneath 
the dual affliction “Bromion” and “Theotormon” wrought but also the prophecy of Los’ plan 
for redemption through a cosmological revolution beginning on the American plains, 
culminating in the poetic finale, Jerusalem on the grounds of the garden of Golgonooza. In 
The [First] Book of Urizen this final battle finds its harbinger. After the “Oothoon”-like 
figure, Enitharmon, gives birth to Orc, Urizen kidnaps him and binds him to a rock on the top 
of a mountain as it is foreknown this infant is the promise of the rescinding of Urizen’s power. 
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 William Blake, ‘Visions of the Daughter of Albion’, op. cit., 50. * ‘Then is Oothoon a whore indeed! And all 
the virgin joys/ Or life are harlots: and Theotormon is a sick mans dream/ And Oothoon is the crafty slave of 
selfish holiness/ But Oothoon is not so, a virgin fill’d with virgin fancies/ Open to joy and to delight where 
every beauty appears/ If in the morning sun I find it: there my eyes are fix’d/ In happy copulation, if in evening 
mild, wearied with work; Sit on a bank and draw the pleasures of this free born joy.’ (Full quotation)  
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The conflict even at this nascent stage in Blake’s imagination already breaks to what is either 
the sterility of “positivity; or the fertility of “negativity” 
They took Orc to the top of a mountain. / O how Enitharmon wept! They chain’d his young limbs to the rock 
With the Chain of Jealosy/ Beneath Urizens dreadful shadow […] And Urizen craving with Hunger/ Stung with 
the odor of Nature/ Explor’d his den around/ He form’d a line & a plummet/ To divide the Abyss beneath. He 
form’d a dividing rule: / He formed scales to weigh;/ He formed massy weights; He formed a brazen quadrant; / 
He formed golden compasses/ And began to explore the Abyss/ And he planted a garden of fruits/ But Los 





As it was for Diderot and his political reform, revolution for Blake had this same 
pneumatological beginning: healthy germination; and all the necessary meteorological 
conditions. But the depths of “negativity” in this dissertation have often descended beneath 
this fertile bedrock; reaching well into the murkiness of all manners of sterility. Firstly, it was 
Rousseau and his metaphysics of incest (with Madame Warnes, p. 69) and his metaphysics of 
child-abandonment (p. 71); then, it was Sade, who, likewise, made incest a point of intense 
focus along with all its divers forms (non-reproductive libertinage) including his own answer 
to Rousseau sending every child he ever begot to the poorhouse: infanticide. In shifting to 
Aline et Valcour it is worth considering Sade alongside the metaphysical voyagers: Diderot 
and Blake, and use the extent of their “negativity” to indicate just how far Sade descended. 
4.2 Sade and the Kingdoms of Butua and Tamoé 
In the opening statement to his first chapter of The Revolutionary Ideas of the 
Marquis de Sade Geoffrey Gore speculates about William Blake writing Sade into his poem 
The French Revolution placing him alongside other characters like Fayette and Newton: 
The Bastille trembles […]  And the den named Horror held a man Chained hand and foot, round his neck an 
iron band, bound to the impregnable wall[;] In his soul was the serpent coil'd round his heart, hid from the light, 




Even if Blake had someone else in mind in this prison cell in the Bastille Gorer’s comparison 
is still compelling given what the two authors shared as a similar “negative” approach and 
how their characters matter very little as individuals in world-historical time. Like Diderot 
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and Blake, Sade travelled to the New World on his own “maison flottante”; and shared 
similar interests in meteorology, renunciations of scientific facts; and extoling of sexual 
musings in attempts to answer difficult philosophical quandaries. Aline et Valcour was 
originally written in the Bastille but was only published in altered form in 1795, changes 
Sade (through Lever) justifies this way:  
[…] some minor corrections [were made] so as to give the work ‘that male and severe physiognomy that is 




As it was with Diderot, the book has a whole cast of “A” and “B” characters, who occupy 
real (albeit fictitious) time. Sade includes Valcour as a fill-in for himself and even provides 
an extensive biography for this character in Tome 1, which ends up being a version of what is 
Sade’s own autobiography. These characters are then linked to metaphysical ones in Tome II 
some with actual ties of consanguinity with those characters in Tome I: Léonore (Tome II) 
turns out to be the unknown daughter of the villain, Président de Blamont (Tome I) and 
Sainville, Léonore’s lover, as well as the surrogate for Valcour (and hence Aline’s lover), is a 
family friend that even ends up commemorating Aline and her mother Madame de Blamont 
after their tragic deaths at the end of the book.
466
 Some characters have strictly metaphysical 
ties: Président de Blamont is part the malevolent King of the anthropophagic African 
kingdom of Butua in Tome II; part, the king’s interlocutor, Sarmiento, an apologist for 
libertinage. Unlike reformer Diderot, Sade and Blake were both partisans of the French 
Revolution and Argus-eyed witness of its narrative, unfolding in real-time before their eyes. 
Aline et Valcour is Sade’s literary answer to it just as much as poems from The French 
Revolution (1791) to Jerusalem (1804) were Blake’s answer. However, the depth of 
“negativity” has already placed Sade on different terrain vis-à-vis Diderot and Blake (as the 
previous section has shown). In bringing this chapter to its culmination it is worth briefly 
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laying out just how Sade envisaged the revolution unfolding, which happens also to come 
through metaphysical voyages of his own to two contrastive kingdoms in Tome II of his 
novel: the malevolent African Kingdom of Butua and the South Pacific island kingdom of 
Tamoe, ruled by the benevolent ruler, Zamé. How Aline et Valcour has been read by theorists 
in posterity needs considering before arriving at the metaphysical meaning of these 
destinations. 
 The first critic of Aline et Valcour was Renée Pélagie Cordier de Montreuil, the 
Marquise de Sade. In one epistolary correspondence with her husband, in which she critiques 
with notable vigour the first draft, written in the Bastille, she establishes the point of entry for 
how future reviewers would approach the work. Taking issue with how she saw her husband 
too enamoured with the amorality of anthropologists of the day, she argues that a law passed 
by the government of a foreign land condoning say incest or sodomy does not make it right 
even after having passed scrutiny of its highest legal body. What matters is nature’s 
pronouncement of the necessity to reproduce.
467
 The following rebuttal by Madame de Sade 
recapitulates by index the basis of Sade’s metaphysical project, the one explored in this 
dissertation since opening up the inquiry in Chapter 2: “Sodom”: 
The moral and physical constitutions of people are infinitely varied. Why that? Because people do not built on a 
truth principle, and truth requires unity; passions being varied, and being the principle of different peoples 
which follow them stupidly without reasoning, variety therefore produces these contrasts. The multiplicity of 




Anne Brousteau in “La Perversion de la Forme Épistolaire” carried this same concern for 
unity into the modern critique of the work, mentioning Jean-Louis Cornille’s scathing rebuke 
that where other epistolary works succeed in melding together an otherwise disjunctive letter 
format through believable synergisms of addressers and addressees:  
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Aline et Valcour fut un cuisant échec sur ce plan, tant les imbroglios y paraissent invraisemblables, les 




Brousteau mentions some “perversion du genre” that would have struck Cornille including 
the interchangeablility of all the story’s virtuous characters: letters are often written “à quatre 
mains” or addressed to multiple intended readers “de manière à créer une véritable solidarité 
épistolaire et sentimentale à l’intérieur du group”. She also mentions the conspicuous absence 
of intrigue on the part of the libertines: Président de Blamant and Dolbourg, who bluntly 
reveal their plot in letter without “le potential de perversité que recèle la letter comme l’a 
admirablement montré Laclos”.
470
 Just as characters are here ill-formed and out of sync with 
the unity of literary convention Brousteau sees Sade’s novel as a whole being a brio of genres 
and intellectual traditions
471
 never fully integrated, in her words: “hétérogénéité thématique, 
générique”.
472
 The demand for unity of both Madame de Sade and Jean-Louis Cornille is 
really an inversion of how d’Alembert aimed to order human knowledge in that bottom-up 
arrangement of the Encyclopaedic project: it is the “encyclopaedic arrangement of words, or 
rather objects through which sciences [and arts] come together and communicate with one 
another […]” (p. 91). Sade’s warning to readers to be philosophical and take Les 120 
Journées as a banquet of six hundred different plates
473
 is a bottom-up call of rebuke to 
d’Alembert; and in the “avis de l’éditeur” to Aline et Valcour Sade issues his top-down 
rebuke:  
Le constraste de ces deux gouvernements [les royaumes de Butua et Tamoé] plaira sans doute, et nous sommes 
bien parfaitement convaincus de l’intérêt qu’il doit produire. Nous attendons le même effet de la liaison de tous 
les personnages établis dans ces lettres, et du rapport, plein d’art, que les uns ont avec les autres, malgré leur 
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 Sade, 120 Day, op. cit., 254.  
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étonnante disproportion. Leur principes devaient être opposes comme leur physionomie, et si l’on s’est permis 




Sade even chides those readers who cannot tolerate the cacophony of voices the book 
presents - calling them:  
[…] esclaves des prejudges et de l’habitude, ils feront voir que rien n’agit en eux que l’opinion, et que le 




And Madame de Sade recognizes the built-in equivocation in Sade’s justification for showing 
this cacophony unresolved, a cacophony that does nothing to inoculate virtuous readers to the 
wiliness of corrupt characters but only fosters new explorations into further corruption, these 
portrayals of verisimilitudinous evil.
476
 As was the case for Les 120 Journées, Sade is here no 
longer aiming at that now familiar “elliptic limit” at rock bottom where d’Alembert 
consolidates the “positive” base for the Encyclopedia, the one Sade dismantled earlier in his 
illustration of that “grave and learned professor of Scholasticism at the Sorbonne” who likes 
swallowing belches (p. 90). This time Sade is reaching for the top, those grand systems 
purporting “positive” unity: religious, political, cultural or otherwise. What this scholastic 
professor from Sorbonne was for d’Alembert; the kingdoms of Butua and Tamoé are for 
those designs to unify the world in the “Age of Discovery”; and by extension those 
cacophonous voices both instigating and later contesting the Revolution, ones, with which 
Sade was all too familiar at the time of his writing Aline et Valcour in the Bastille; and 
editing and publishing it in the midst of the Revolution in order to showcase his revolutionary 
stripes:  
Ce que cet ouvrage a de singulier encore, c’est d’avoir été fait à la Bastille [… l]a mannière dont, écrasé par le 
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Sade presents this epistolary novel/ travelogue in a manner quite different than those 
discussed so far in this chapter; however, one tie that binds all these novels together is the 
interest in inflecting arguments with salient pneumatological qualities. 
 For Sade, the metaphysical voyager, that thickness of air Diderot told belonged to 
Bougainville’s ship when arriving on the fair-weathered island of Tahiti, is actually given a 
geographical location in Aline et Valcour, in Africa, in what is now modern-day Zimbabwe. 
In his unplanned arrival in the kingdom of Butua, Sainville was greeted with these weather 
conditions: 
[…] le rest de l’année est d’une si cruelle ardeur, qu’il n’est pas rare de trouver des animaux dans la champagne 
expirer sous les rayons qui les brûlent; c’est à l’extrême chaleur de ce climat qu’il faut attribuer, sans doute, la 
corruption morale de ces peuples; on ne se dout pas du point auquel les influence de l’air agissent sur le 
physique de l’homme, combine il peut être honnête ou vicieux, en raison du plus ou moins d’air qui pèse sur ses 





If Bougainville’s “Traité de calcul différentiel et intégral” was left on board his ship when he 
set out to discover Tahiti, in Butua Sade infuses the whole kingdom with the same “positive” 
thickness already argued was an attribute of science. On first glance, the notion that Butua is 
a site of scientificity rings just as absurd as seeing France and Spain sharing Butua’s 
meteorological conditions.
 479
 However, in “L’Anthropologie Religieuse Dans Le Voyage de 
Sainville et Léonore” Aurélia Hollart draws together these otherwise disparate geographies 
this way:  
[… le] style ethnographique concour[t] à l’assimulation d’un discour parallèle, où la legend se mêle au discours 




Hollart presents Sainville and Sarmiento in Butua gathering facts from encounters with 
customs and laws of this hermitic kingdom, facts bottom-up: incarn[ation du] témoin”, “[…] 
une connaissance de manière directe et empirique” and “l’expérience au déjà vu” and then 
unifying them top-down by a “démarche de compilation et de generalisation des différents 
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faits observés par les voyageurs”.
481
 Hollart shows Sarmiento’s “discours polémique plus 
large” and Sainville’s impassionate rebuttal - often punctuated with sentimentality drawing 
on the woe of longing for his kidnapped lover - to be more than just the case of a difference 
of opinion concerning a remote tribe in Africa. She demonstrates the limit spectators 
encounter when facing the world as coeval interpreters, i.e., the perennial failure to find that 
“elliptic point of alignment where objects inorganic, organic and conceptual alike stand at 
some nadir” (p. 26), and unlike the elliptic point that was at bottom for d’Alembert; this one 
comes atop those “grand systems purporting “positive” unity”. Hollart identifies this gap as 
neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical - but elliptic. He describes it this way: “contenant en 
critique des lacunes et des excès de l’étude de l’autre”.
482
 The implication for the debate 
between these two European discoverers is (elliptic) fissures of three that render the problem 
of unity impossible: the two in debate and the local, the target of the inquiry: 
La transcription de la découverte se double alors d’un propos explicative dépassant le cadre local. On peur dire 
que le jeu est d’une certain façon faussé par la superposition de ces deux discours; le texte se trouve en quelque 
sorte piégé par l’imbrication du commentaire dans un témoignage prétendument neuter. Mais on peut se 




And Hollart inserts the question of atheism in this failure, asserting that the demonstration of 
the “relativity of morals” be Sade’s overriding concern. But does not atheism impugn on a 
“relativity of morals” too? In Chapter 1.2, St-Martin noted Sade’s non-position concerning 
theories of “ovisme”, “animalculisme” and “épigenèse” but isolated the latter to make the 
case for atheism: the “obsolescence sperm-ova “hérédité” obtruded upon the divinely created 
homunculi of preformationism” (p. 40). In a similar manner, Hollart sees Sade sealing off any 
possibility to get beyond the “positive” baseline, where two or more truth statements about 
the same world can carry their weight with equally “positivity”. As Klossowski has 
demonstrated, God was very much vital to Sade’s investigatory approach but only as far as he 
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was absent in a “positive” sense, which Klossowski does not adequately clarify in bringing 
Sade back to the Christian God in Sade, Mon Prochain (p. 40). It is better to call Sade’s 
plunge into atheism as a plunge into “negativity”. Sainville’s voyage to Butua is rife with 
such “negative” inquiries such that it is better to deal with the notion of a “relativity of morals” 
as that, which lies on the now familiar “negative”-“positive” scale. Noticing the 
“complémentarité du chacun des elements” in the debate between Sainville and Sarmiento 
that pinches out “le cadre local”, Hollart suggests that Butua in its inception was in fact the 
Old World. 
 In “The Marquis de Sade: First Zimbabwean Novelist” D.N. Beach calls Sade a 
“subtle racist” and observes that the ghastly things he wrote taking place in Butua were no 
worse than those happening in Europe in many of his other works.
484
 Catching Sade red-
handed in this apparent hypocritical moment ends up being a Pyrrhic victory for the author: 
Butua was in its inception meant to be Europe of the Ancien Regime. Sade could not have 
been more direct on this point than writing how the dangers of the school of libertinage in 
Europe, in Butua: “il en deviant une loi”.
485
 In his description of the education system in 
Butua with its own “negative” design, Sade engages Rousseau and the hermitical home-
school curriculum he established for the young Émile. The relation between the two was 
established earlier: “Rousseau having described “virtue” as fundamentally erotic it is now 
possible to see “vice” simply as its amplification. It is with “vice” that Sade fills the “plenum” 
of the world” (p. 72). Where Rousseau sought an enclave free of those now familiar “positive” 
forces of his contemporary society; and Diderot sought Tahiti outside the ship of 
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Bougainville, Sade by presenting Europe in the guise of the “Other” is denying shelter to 
those seeking utopias outside the Western orbit. This is much like Blake’s monistic move to 
universalize the Bastille and Fayette in his poetic forays into the New World. Sade plunges 
into negativity in Butua in much the same ways he does in Les 120 Journées but the top-
down orientation creates different thematics of emphasis and de-emphasize. One plunge 
comes with the appearance of the king at a deeper rung of “negativity”, probably about the 
same level as mid-December in Champville’s narration of the 150 Complex Passions when 
paedophilia, incest and then blasphemy begin to merge. In the school system of Butua, the 
young are allotted roles and primed for participation in festivals following a religious 
calendric system much like those structuring Les 120 Journées. The staging of all participants 
anticipates the stations they are to have in adulthood like a rite of initiation of sorts:  
La defloration se fait aux pieds de l’idole. Le chef commence, il est suivi du college entire. Les filles sont 
présentées deux fois, les garcon, une. Des sacrifies, suivent le cérémonie; à treize ou quatorze ans, les élèves 
retournent dans leurs familles; on leur demande s’ils ont été sanctifies: s’ils ne l’avaient pas été, les garcons 




The preeminent ceremony, one imbued with a deepest degree of “negativity” takes place in 
the capital city, the only difference “consiste dans le droit qu’a le monarque d’opérer”.
487
 
Notably, the blasphemy that infused Les 120 Journées is necessarily absent in Butua; and 
replaced by the severest of punishment for insubordination to this God-king and his priests. 
Blasphemy only matters as passion come from bottom-up and not top-down. In an even 
deeper plunge into “corruption”, one raising that enduring motif of “sterility” seen worked in 
Diderot and Blake’s pneumatological musings, Sade broaches an issue, which had been 
outside the parameters of concern in Silling Château: human extinction. Sainville cannot 
contain his shock during Sarmiento’s description of some of the other forms of ritual:  
[J]e ne tiens pas […] a voir la pédérastie érigée en initiation; à quel point de corruption doit être parvenu un 














At several other points in Sarmiento’s tour other examples of customs that inhibit fecundity 
are mentioned like those given in Beach’s translation, which include incessant stress by abuse 
and overwork limiting chances of pregnancy and lengthy edicts delaying coitus after female 
menstruation (eight days before; eight days after) and childbirth (three years later).
489
 Though 
plenty of sodomy took place amongst the “four heroes” and the members of their seraglio it 
was never framed as homosexuality as such; the notion can only ever be relevant from a “top-
down” concern that prioritizes reproduction of the species. Another example of a passion 
very special to Butua is cannibalism saliently understated in Les 120 Journées as such a 
passion too becomes relevant only from a bird’s eye view of humanity. From this vantage 
point those frenzied dismemberments of objects of desire in the ambit of Desgranges’ 
narration of the 150 Murderous Passions find what could have only been their ulterior 
meaning: extinction of the individual and species and a stab at what comes beyond: 
[Sarmiento justifies:] Ne comprends pas dans la corruption morale l’usage de manger de la chair humaine. Il est 
aussi simple de se nourrir d’un homme que d’un boeuf. Dis si tu veux que la guerre, cause de la destruction de 
l’espèce, est un fléau; mais cette destruction faite, il est absolument égale que ce soient les entrailles de la terre 




On the latter point of “sépulcre à des elements désorganisés” Sade meets up with the 
proposition d’Holbach introduces in his Le système de la nature, Vol. 1 where the changing 
of matter is the only law of nature: “[…] Nature contains no one constant form, yet thou 
pretendest thy species can never disappear […].
491
 In the corrupt system of Butua the 
libertine king, the depopulator of his people; derelict steward for future generations has the 
                                                          
489
 D.N. Beach, op. cit., 56. * ‘Women do all the work in the fields and houses under the whips of their husbands 
and are the butts of every evil whim of the men. These customs, two in particular, restrict the population almost 
to destruction. One is the belief that a woman is impure for eight days before and eight days after her period, 
leaving only eight in which she is fit to serve man; the other is that a woman is not touched by her husband for 
three years after each birth; in addition, from the moment a woman becomes pregnant, she is exposed to the 
contempt of everyone and denied access to the temples, and she does not dare to appear in public. Sarmiento 
feels that these practices might have been sensible in a period of over-population, but that they are ridiculous in 
Butua's present circumstances; as it is, the nation will be extinct in a century’. (Full quotation) 
490
 Ibid, 16. 
491
 Baron d’Holbach, System of Nature, Vol. 1, op. cit., 49. * ‘O man! Wilt thou never conceive, that thou art but 
an ephemeron? All changes in the great macrocosm: nothing remains the same an instant, in the planet thou 
inhabitest: Nature contains no one constant form, yet thou pretendest thy species can never disappear; that thou 
shalt be exempt from the universal law, that wills all shall experience change.’ (Full quotation) 
192 
 
sterile quality of Blake’s characterization of Urizen, the difference being in Blake’s 
description “positivity” underlies his anatomy, whose builders have already been introduced 
as Newton and Hume. Sade’s characterization is “negative” but the target is the same: France 
under the Ancien Regime with the same monist extension as Blake’s Bastille. The Kingdom 
of Butua was only ever meant to be the negative form of that other government deserving of 
installation amongst free people. It was Tamoé, the island kingdom in the South Pacific, ruled 
by the benevolent king, Zamé that was the model government for the French Revolution. 
 Although it is easy to see the island of Tamoé belonging to the same climatic zone as 
Diderot’s Tahiti, seeing Les Charmettes and Birmingham as also belonging is much less 
obvious. The pneumatological presentations of both Rousseau and Bentham have much in 
common with Sade and his Tamoé. Here Zamé describes a climate to which the reader is by 
now surely well-adjusted: 
Tu vois la temperature de ce climat […] well est salubre, douce, égale; le vegetation est forte, abondante et l’air 
presque tourjour pur: ce que noun appelons nos hivers, consiste en quelques pluies, qui tombe dans les mois de 
juillet et d’août, mais qui ne rafraîchissent jamais l’air au point de nous obliger d’augmenter nos vêtements, 
aussi les rhumes sont-ils absolutement inconnus parmi nous: la nature n’y afflige nos habitants que de très peu 
de maladies; la multitude d’année est le plus grand mal don’t elle les accable, c’est Presque la seule manière 




The temperature and weather conditions never change so much as to cause anything but 
clothing of the same material “fine et moelleuse” to be worn, whose raw materials are as 
constant as the fabrics readily available to make them on the island:  





It takes but a brief reminder of how Wolmar managed Clarnes estate according to a like 
principle of self-reliance and thriftiness to see the link. Just as Zamé “ne perm[it pas] 
l’exportation du superflu […]”
494
 including goods of European origin, ever present on the 
island’s boundaries (with incidental visits from the likes of Cook and Sainville) threatening 
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changing consumption habits of the locals into something “positively” malignant, Wolmar 
did much the same in his promotion of Clarnes as a micro-economy where native resources 
were consumed in moderation and the local brands (of trout, dress and furniture) were not 
“despised” in view of fashionable and popular continental ones (p. 52). In fact, Sade is giving 
here a pneumatological interpretation to what Wolmar otherwise speaks of in plain language:  
Voilà, mon cher, continuait le sage Wolmar, comment avec de l’économie et des soins on peut se mettre au-
dessus de sa fortune. Il ne tiendrait qu’à nous d’augment la nôtre sans changer notre manière de vivre; car il ne 
se fait ici presque aucune avance qui n’ait un produit pour objet, et tout ce que nous dépensons nous rend de 




Zamé even goes beyond the diet Wolmar sets up for Julie, that one of unseasoned meats 
attained only from local stocks; Zamé presents a vegetarian diet limited to “de legumes, de 
confitures, de fruits et de patisserie”,
496
 which stands in direct contradistinction to the 
cannibalism of Butua. Sarmiento linked this anthropophagic practice to glory on the 
battlefield and saw no difference between consuming human flesh his way and killing a cow 
for food: “Il est aussi simple de se nourrir d’un homme que d’un boeuf”.
497
 Zamé reverses 
Sarmiento’s contention, stating that:  
[…] c’est qu’il nourrit son orgueil beaucoup plus que son estomac […] il imagine qu’il y a la grandeur […] à 




and makes this not only a health issue:  
[…] qu’il soit bon d’engloutir dans ses entrailles la chair et le sang putréfiés de mille animaux divers; il ne peut 
résulter de-là qu’un chile âcres, qui détériore nécessairement nos organs, qui les affaiblit, qui précipite les 




but a moral one as well: “[…] pourquoi sacrifier nos frères quand la nature donne autre 
chose?”
500
 In linking meat to both the corruption of pride and putrefaction of the body Sade is 
drawing a clear alignment between two facets of pneumatological concern emerging from a 
cesspool. This link with Rousseau is really anticipated in Tome 1 of the book when Sade 
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presents Valcour in the guise of himself in his own autobiography. Although the veracity of 
the claim to have actually met Rousseau is lost in the blurred line between fact and fiction 
such a literary style straddles, Valcour, having had an audience with Rousseau and receiving 
from him both compliments and encouragement for his literary aspirations, verifies the 
metaphysical link that would appear later in the kingdom of Tamoé. Even in Valcour’s 
description of the “système odieux” (Butua) that would contradict the virtue of Tamoé, the 
issue of “choking air” introduced earlier by Darwin returns, confirms a pneumatological link: 
Rousseau vivait, je fus le voir; il avait connu ma famille; il me recut avec cette aménité, cette honnêteté franche, 
compagnes inseparables du genies et des talents supérieurs; il loua, il encouragea le projet qu’il me vit former de 
renoncer à tout pour me livrer totalement à l’étude des lettres et de la philosophie, il y guida mes jeunes ans, et 




Of course, Sade is known to have been a much more competent voyager of the realm of vice 
than that one of virtue; however, given that both belong to that same immaterial space of the 
plenum any difference in argumentation shrinks to the point of verging on alignment. The 
same can be said of voyagers like Bentham the substance of whose argument is not too far 
below the surface in Tamoé.  
 Madame de Sade was clearly uncomfortable with Sade’s fondness for the British at 
several points in Aline et Valcour, even suggesting it could “arouse resentment”,
502
 a 
euphemism for possible accusations of treason. She advised Sade to  
[…] bring about a panegyric of the French King, well situated without insipidity, and a reminiscence of his 




Here are a couple of examples of what Madame de Sade would have meant by this fondness. 
At one point in the narrative the Englishman, Captain Cook, acts as a deus ex machina, 
arriving in the nick of time to rescue Sainville from his captivity in Butua (now understood as 
the embodiment of the Ancien Regime) and helping him on his way to find his beloved 
Léonore. On a deeper level, the English also end up as an important countervailing force to 
                                                          
501
 Sade, ‘Aline et Valcour’, op. cit., 412 (Emphasis added). 
502





those corrupt ones in Sade’s pneumatology, for example, Sainville presents English utility as 
undermining that “ancienne industrie entierement de l’or”
504
 - gold here being the key 
pneumatological reference to money as holder of alchemical value
505
 under the aegis of the 
Catholic Church. He lectures Sarmiento on this point:  
Il n’y avait pas jusqu’à vos crucifix, vos reliquaries vos chapelets, ciboires, tous ces instruments idolâtres don’t 
la superstition degrade le culte pur de l’Éternal, que vous ne fissiez fair aux Anglais; ils surent enfin vous 
subjuguer au point de se charger de votre navigation de l’ancien monde, de vos vendre des vaisseaux et des 
munitions […] ils vous ravirent jusqu’à votre propre commerce intérieur: on ne voyait plus que des magasin 




Utility as the driving force for successful economic policy in England would have been 
visible to Sade from his side of the English Channel; and mentioning it brings again to the 
fore those members of the Lunar Society of Birmingham, who contributed to the formulation 
of this policy. Priestley and Bentham have been mentioned on this account but let another 
member be summoned: Matthew Boulton. The importance of his contribution to fiduciary 
policy at the time had both economic and pneumatological implications, the latter not 
surprising given the influence coming from his close ties with the Lunar Society of 
Birmingham. 
One way to understand Sainville’s attack on the gold of the Catholic Church is to 
frame the issue within a contemporaneous debate that considered how monetary value was 
distributed in a society; how currency was circulated amongst its members. One problematic 
issue that related to monetary policy of the time was the unwanted and exploitable effects that 
came whenever the production of coinage was aimed at standardization. Gresham’s Law 
stated that “bad coins drive out good coins” and this was the case whenever coins were 
recognized as having lower material values than their stated face-value. This could happen, 
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for example, to silver coins if parity with gold became too disparate and they flowed out of 
circulation to places where they are dearer. Gold coins when not properly standardized, for 
example, correct weighted ones could be siphoned, or “culled out” of circulation where 
profits were higher. These processes had broad economic implication as value either 
concentrated in certain areas; or dispersed out of others. If the value of coinage was imbued 
with the inherent value of sovereigns then this demanded a proactive monetary policy, 
designed to prevent one from being on the losing side of this fiduciary osmosis. In 
“Sovereign Counterfeits: the Trial of the Pyx”, Simon Wotham described one case where a 
sovereign played the culler of his own monies in an attempt to head off any drain from his 
coffers. After his 1611 Trial of the Pyx, that periodic test measuring degrees of 
standardization amongst extant royal coinage, James I issued an edict declaring money to be 
a “[…] disruptor of stable concepts of value, this culling out [being] literal proof that money 
was by nature amorphous, fluid and shifting”.
507
 Coins, especially gold ones, given their 
pneumatological meaning, were meant to share a metonymic link with the body of the 
sovereign, any depreciation in the coin’s value, posing a clear threat to the intrinsic value of 
the sovereign him- or herself. James 1 becoming the “culler” of his own money had a series 
of  unexpected consequences: a) if the move towards monometallism enhanced the value of 
gold - and as a consequence the sovereign’s own value - it would have been easy for subjects 
to forget this value when this mark of wealth was no longer a primary means of exchange in 
the marketplace but rather a collector’s item in the sovereign’s own treasury; b) if the 
sovereign sought to imbue his or her body in any and all coins in as transparent a manner as 
possible, this opened him or her up to a surfeit of different manipulations. Attestation of this 
latter consequence is revealed in a 1716 policy proposal signed by an anonymous B., who 
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warned those in authority about the epidemic of unscrupulous smiths profiting from the 
king’s silver coins:  
[…] if he wants to make our Money fit to work up into large Plate (that must be markt,) which will now pay him 
well for the refining it, He knows how to do that much easier than he can old Plate, that has Sodder in it; 
However, the Goldsmith can manage it more to his Advantage, save both Time and Fire, and make it answer his 
Purpose as well as if refin’d it, viz.
508
 
Here the nature of coins’ materiality and distribution lent itself easily to applications in other 
one-to-one relationships beyond what was intended. The consequences a) and b) converge in 
a more intensified way in John Powell’s account of the history of the Birmingham coiners. In 
“The Birmingham coiners, 1770-1816” Powell tells of how these coiners kept money in 
general circulation through counterfeiting, avoiding punishment by simply making one 
feature different on the reproduced form of the original: changing Georgius III to George 
Gordon on the counterfeit coin would have sufficed
509
 to avoid the accusation of 
counterfeiting while preserving the utility of the coin and making them available to a greater 
number of people. And with the invention of the die hubbing steam coin press by the 
commercial coiner, Matthew Boulton, this trend towards distributed utility would accelerate 
introducing an entirely new set of conditions once this coin press was in the hands of the state. 
It could not only flood the market with coins, depressing the need to counterfeit but also 
produce a more consistent and comprehensive imprint,
510
 ensuring the intrinsicness of the 
monarch be compounded in all transparency in the marketplace, for the utility of all who gain 
possession, without reference to the extrinsicness that would have otherwise circled back to 
the king (“negativity” of relations). In Sainville’s praise of English commercialism and 
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denigration of the Portuguese gold mines, Sade universalizes utility as the death knell of all 
tyranny upheld by the pneumatology of gold, the Catholic Church being an originary source 
of the corruption. The pneumatology of Boulton’s coins can be likened to those of Tamoé’s 
climate, which too was “salubre, douce, égale” (p. 191).  
 The problems Boulton’s coins pose for monarchs share filiation with that egg analogy 
introduced earlier in Chapter 1.3 by Montaigne in his reflection on “unlikeness” in laws 
passed by legislators: “Likeness does not make things ‘one’ as much as unlikeness makes 
them ‘other’ […] Nature has bound herself to make nothing ‘other’ which is not unlike” (p. 
39). Eggs seen as individuated in Montaigne’s account of that famously perceptive man from 
Delphi are the counterfeiter’s coins, against which the full force of the king’s resentment is 
directed. Bentham has already attributed resentment, or antipathy, to tyrannical governments 
in need of reform (p. 155). Laws - not coins - occupy his attention although both can be seen 
falling out of Montaigne’s same concern for unlikeness, which would have had 
pneumatological meaning for Montaigne, a Renaissance philosopher. Zamé gives his own 
egg analogy in his discussion with Sainville on the topic of crime and punishment and the 
parallels with Bentham’s formulation are telling: 
Supposons un ɶuf place sur un billard et deux billes lances par un aveugle: l’un dans sa course évite l’ɶuf, 
l’autre le casse; est-ce la faute de la bille, est-ce la faute de l’aveugle qui a lance la bille destructive, de l’ɶuf? 
L’aveugle est la nature, l’homme est la bille, l’ɶuf cassé le crime commis. Regarde à présent, mon amis, de 




Zamé goes on to explain how reforms ought to be aimed at modifying billard balls not nature 
itself as:  
[…] il n’y a rien de nous, rien à nous, tous est la nature, et nous ne sommes jamais dans ses mains que l’aveugle 




Laws are thus occasioned by the very state of nature and Zamé sees its corruption coming out 
its other end: in punishment. It is here where his reforms intervene on what would otherwise 
be the consequence of law:  
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[r]endez-les meilleur en les contraignant d’être utiles [… m]ais ne les jetez pas inhumainement dans ces 
cloaques empestées, où tout ce qui les entoure est si gangrené, qu’il deviant incertain de savoir lequel achèvera 




Zamé dresses his protestation of incarceration with like pneumatological terminology to 
Bentham. This is really Zamé’s version of the “silken threads” discussed earlier in Bentham’s 
juxtaposition of “laws of terror, spirits and fictions” and those “of utility, bodies and material 
interest” and Zamé’s remedial treatment for wrongdoers:  
[…] faites-la-lui réparer en le rendant utile à la société […] qu’il dédommage cette société du tort […] mais ne 




bears resemblance to how Bentham in his panopticon aims to bring the criminal into the light 
of full transparency and modify him by inculcating desired behavior. Zamé, however, 
outdoes Bentham in extending “utility” beyond simply the confines of religious reform, 
which he advocated as a rational dissenter. Bentham was keenly aware of the impact utility 
had on the pneumatology of religion. Here is how Bentham saw the workings of utility on 
even the most “ill-constituted government”: 
[…] men’s moral sensibility is commonly stronger, and their moral biases more conformable to the dictates of 
utility: their religious sensibility frequently weaker, but their religious biases less unconformable to the dictates 
of utility: their sympathetic affections more enlarged, directed to the magistrate more than to small parties or to 
individuals, and the more to the whole community than to either: their antipathetic sensibilities less violent, as 
being more obsequious to the influences of well-directed moral biases, and less apt to be excited by that of ill-




Sade, however, presents Zamé as the antithesis of the king of Butua, whose own minimal 
interest in laws was purposely designed to propagate passions and in so doing create new 
forms of crime. Zamé had his own reason for promoting a policy of minimalizing laws:  
[…] il faut des dépositaires aux lois […] si les lois sont justes, boneset en petit nombre, elle n’ont pas besoin 




And this reason falls outside this negative apparatus embodied in the figure of Butua’s God-
King. Atheism was the pneumatological alternative. In a statement very similar to the one 
Bentham gives, Zamé argues that it is the very nature of religion to produce laws:  
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[…] bien éloigné de calquer mes lois sur les maxims erronées de la plupart des religions recues, bein éloigné 




By this same token, and fitting the atheistic project that would have been at the time of 
editing Aline et Valcour the pulse of the French Revolution, he presents atheism as the 
corrective pneumatological measure: 
[…] j’ai cru que s’il existait réellement un Dieu, il était impossible qu’il punît ses creatures des défauts place par 
sa main meme; que pour composer un code raisonnable, je devais me régler sur sa justice et sur sa tolerance; que 
l’athéisme le plus decide devenait mille fois preferable à admission d’un Dieu, don’t le culte s’opposerait au 




The very existence of God is accepted by Sade never to have been even a choice for 
humankind to make as it was believed its very aspect infused the entirety of the world. 
Furthermore, part of the logic in the reforms Zamé sought was to sever complete ties with the 
“laws of terror, spirits and fictions” of Bentham’s characterization. Zamé is also offering a 
draw bridge out of the domain of Silling Château. To appropriate Bentham’s own words:  
[for Sade atheism was] the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon 




And this fashioning started from the earliest of ages on the island of Tamoé. 
The implementation of reform began in the education system Zamé established for the 
youth of Tamoé, which Sade sets up in contrast to that system already seen in Butua. 
Separated by gender but given the same education (except girls are not taught physical 
education), youths were educated in the same manner Rousseau educated Émile according to 
his pedagogic progressivist approach but within a nationalized system:  
[…] vous n’en voyez à l’éducation des enfants, me [Sainville] dit Zamé, cultivez leur gout et leurs inclination, 




As it was the case in Diderot’s Otaïti, preparation for marriage is one of the culminating steps 
in the education of Tamoé but with two added reforms. One was the right to divorce with 
provisions established ensuring harmony for all members affected in the aftermath, for 
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example, children from a previous marriage had to move out of paternal home and become 
wards of the state as: “les pères aimeront mieux les derniers enfants”.
521
 The right to divorce 
was also one of the celebrated liberties in the new French revolutionary society. The other 
reform departs from the harsh treatment sterile members received in Diderot’s account of 
Otaïti. Zamé takes special care to ensure the old, the sick, the widowed and those who choose 
singlehood by their own volition are taken care of and have roles to play in society. Zamé 
reflects on sterility and teaches Sainville the law of the land: 
Il exista dans tous les siècles et dans tout les pays, une classe d’homme qui, peu propre aux douceur de l’hymen, 
et redoutant ses nɶuds par des raison ou morales ou physiques, préfèrent de vivre seuls, aux délices, d’avoir une 
compagne […] Tamoé, moins fameuse que la république qui subjugua l’univers, a pourtant des célibataires 
comme elle, mais nous n’avons point fait de lois contre eux. On obtient aisément ici la permission de ne point ne 




With legislation on divorce and rules, governing the status of being sterile by circumstance or 
choice, Sade is moving past a metaphysics of proximal concern for what is “generation”-only 
- a “positive” concern for progeny. This is comparable to say Rousseau’s metaphysics of 
child abandonment (and interestingly, Rousseau’s children became wards of the state just as 
the children from “broken homes” on the island of Tamoé would become). In this way 
something far more distal, and thus more “negative” is opened up for consideration. However, 
one part of Zamé’s education program would seem to contradict his pneumatology of 
atheism; and this is the special place for God in education for twelve and fourteen year old 
boys and girls:  
[…] seulement alors on leur apprenait les devoirs de l’home en société, et ses rapports avec les êtres dont il tient 





Raising this question here aims to deal with the “distal” metaphysics just mentioned, that one 
pushing beyond mere concern for generation. Worship in Tamoé had a pneumatological 
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focus matching the weather conditions on the island opening Sainville’s arrival, i.e., sunny 
weather:  
[…] les habitants de Tamoé adoraient le Soleil autrefois, [Sainville] n’[a] fait que rectifier leur système, en leur 
prouvant qu’ils se trompaient de l’ouvrage à l’ouvrier, que le Soleil était la chose mue, et que c’était au moteur 




It only takes d’Holbach’s reflection on pagan religions to situate Tamoé within the domain of 
those who “adore[] active nature and of the great whole considered relatively to its different 
operations and qualities”.
525
 In Chapter 1.2 Sade was placed in an antecedent position to that 
famous boundary d’Holbach drew up between polytheism and monotheism once those 
“‘leisurely’ metaphysicians and theologians […] ‘subtilly’ partition[ed] off ‘nature from 
herself’ and from nature’s ‘energy’ creating an ‘incomprehensible being’”. The proximal 
concern for tribal generation above all else, i.e., Diderot’s Otaïti, raises the specter of this 
“incomprehensible being” as the idea of the tribe overwhelms all else that nature could 
contain including what was sterile and thus not of the Otaïti. Although in Blake’s formulation 
generation too was privileged, in the Plate 91 of Jerusalem he seems to add a warning to 
those, who give proximal answers to concerns for what is either “congenial to man’s 
happiness” or “inimical to his welfare”, these questions, relics of the first transition into 
monotheism as per d’Holbach. Blake (through Los) states: 
Terrified Los sat to behold, trembling & weeping & howling. / I care not whether a Man is Good or Evil; all that 
I care/ Is whether he is a Wise Man or a Fool. Go, put off Holiness/ And put on Intellect: or my thund'rous 




In David Whitmarsh-Knight’s line-by-line interpretation of Blake’s work, he would even add 
to Los’ “wrath list”: “pseudo sacrifices of the fertility worship and natural religion and 
morality”
527
 and this fits nicely with what has been presented in this section as Sade working 
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against all “grand systems” purporting “positive” unity religious, political, cultural or 
otherwise. Although a much more extensive metaphysics is instituted in Tamoé beyond the 
proximal concern for generation seen in Diderot’s Otaïti and Madame de Sade’s criticism of 
non-reproductive sex, Zamé is still stomping for one grand system purporting “positive” 
unity, a system for Tamoé only. Richard Robert in “Les Impasses De L’Écriture Politique” 
recognizes this contradiction in considering the kingdoms of Butua and Tamoé side by side, 
articulating the problem he sees this way: 
La façon dont Sade mine ainsi soigneusement le modèle de Tamoé finit par convaincre le lecteur attentive que 
les deux royaumes, plutôt que de fonctionner comme un exemple et un contre-exemple, sont renvoyés dos à dos. 
Certes Tamoé ressemble advantage à une proposition, mais sur le fond elle est menace d’un échec moins 
spectaculaire, mais tout aus patent que celui de Butua. Entre le survoltage et le sous-voltage, entre les intrusions 
abusives du bien et celles du mal, les deux royaume se respondent commme deux faces de la question posée par 




He would go on to offer “une troisième voie”, which he argued was found not long after 
Sainville left Tamoé; when he happened upon a group of gypsy-bandits, which Robert argues 
are “la micro-societé […] qui constituerait donc une échappée hors du système dialogique 
Butua/ Tamoé”.
529
 Such a deployment would allow Tamoé to remain the allegory for the new 
revolutionary society; Butua, the repudiation of the former Ancien Regime; and Sade to 
preserve his now familiar methodology of non-commitment, or better, his pneumatology of 
atheism. Le Brun has already suggested such a description in her notion of “vitalist atheism”: 
“[… only Sade] could preserve us from the deception of a thought originally designed for 
unmasking, but which had subsequently turned in an ideology of remasking” (p. 40-41). In 
lieu of Sade’s pneumatological play with apparent contradictions, one faulty yet pervasive 
manner of reading them needs to be confronted as it contributes to a frequently held 
misconception concerning the history of the period. The emergence of a new negativity far 
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different than any one discussed so far is anticipated albeit prematurely in Peter Fowler’s 
“When Opposites Attract: Moral Polarity in Sade’s Aline and Valcour”. This new negativity 
falls in line with the progression seen developing throughout this dissertation from 
posteriority, anteriority and finally interiority, the accumulative effect of all residing at the 
most recent end. However, discussion of interiority is really only appropriate at the correct 
historical juncture and this needs clarification. Faulty readings like Fowler’s also has had the 
effect of skewing the meaning of important terminologies related to the period, including 
ones like sensibilité. One misconception in reading Aline et Valcour will lead off the 
exploration of the third and final mode of discovery completing the journey started by Sade 




















 La philosophie dans le boudoir 
5.1 Before there was Hegel: the Emergence of a New Kind of “Negativity” 
 
 Before a metaphysics of success can be formulated, it is necessary to explain why it is 
that until now an explanans for success has been mostly unavailable. Much has been made of 
the importance of “negativity” to cover the fullness of the explanandum being sought in the 
pursuit of this success. “Positivity” has been developed as having a scope far too narrow to be 
of any use in this regard. This chapter will present that important metaphysical construct that 
although claiming “negativity” only masquerades as such and ends up inundated with 
“positivity” through and through. Dialecticism would be epistemologically foundational to 
formations of both statements and the sources of these statements going forward well into the 
nineteenth century and (modern) beyond. Dialecticism was first articulated by Hegel, who 
mediated his own experience with the fruits of the French Revolution through this theoretical 
framework. This chapter will contrast Sade and Hegel’s responses to the French Revolution, 
responses that happen to be both as equally theoretical but built out of very different 
conceptions of “negativity”. 
What would the kingdoms of Butua and Tamoé look like if both their 
pneumatological atmospheres were to be emptied out by some de-pneumatologizing vacuum? 
Fowler offers a glimpse in his presentation of Président de Blamont and Aline as two 
polarities, these two characters of course being for Sade those entry points into Sainville’s 
pneumatological exploration of the two kingdoms in Letter XXXV. From the outset, Fowler 
does not believe Sade when he asserts in his “Avis de l’Éditeur” that for all the characters to 
take the stage in the narrative “[…] de bien forts, cela n’a jamais été que pour faire voir avec 
quel ascendant” (p. 191). Fowler sees instead a novel “[…] with no competing voices”
530
 at 
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all but one with two clearly partitioned camps, which, citing Jean M. Goulemot, he puts into a 
“distribution des deux univers romanesques” with the two realms being “trop de vertu de côté 
de Vertfeuille et trop de vice chez les libertins”.
531
 This choice of “trop de” has a particular 
resonance given its filiation with another “trop de” famously used by Sartre to define “being-
in-itself” against its “being-for-itself” counterpart, the latter, the only one of the two endowed 
with the attribute of “possibility”: 
Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It is. This is what consciousness expresses in 
anthropomorphic terms by saying that being is superfluous (de trop) --- that is, that consciousness absolutely 
can not derive being from anything, either from another being, or from a possibility, or from a necessary law. 





Hollart presented earlier a much different formal structure to account for what appeared as 
moral polarities, those ones she saw at play in Sainville and Sarmiento’s competing visions 
concerning the kingdom of Butua. And Robert’s “troisième voie” of seeing the “micro-
société” of the Brigandos upend these complementary kingdoms of Butua and Tamoé is 
another example. Unlike the “de trop” structure, Hollart’s conceptualisation satisfies the 
conditions for “negativity” presented in this dissertation: “Hollart identifies this gap, neither 
symmetrical nor asymmetrical - but elliptic - this way: “contenant en critique des lacunes et 
des excès de l’étude de l’autre”” (p. 193). In Sartre’s characterization, “de trop” is 
conspicuously devoid of the relations integral to how “negativity” has been laid out up until 
this point. What’s more, Sartre’s presentation seems to resemble that familiar “positive” 
articulation first seen in Rousseau’s narration of Grimm’s bout with lovesickness. 
“Uncreated”, “without connection with any other being” and, better yet, “superfluous”, this 
figure is Smith’s homo economicus of the fashion world; the embodiment of those 
materialists of desire Hunt and Schiebinger discussed. All the above comprise a metaphysical 
trope lying in wait to be generalized amidst the tumult of the French Revolution and made the 
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model, by which all would engage anew with objects in the world. Even as early as 1721 
when Montesquieu in his Persian Letters had a Persian interlocutor named Risa write to his 
fellow co-traveller, Usbek, on what peculiarities he heard while eavesdropping on a pair of 
sycophantic schemers from Paris, the structure of “interiority” had already been given “life 
and death” importance. It was as if the failure to charm was of the same metaphysical 
consequence as failing to acquire “objects” (food) for biological needs in the “anteriority” 
phase: 
Yesterday I had hoped to shine with three and four old women who certainly did not overawe me, and I had 
some absolutely beautiful things to say. I spent more than a quarter of an hour working around to them, but they 
would never keep to the point. Like the three Greek fates they cut the thread of everything I said. If you ask my 




In his model of conflictual symbiosis, Fowler sees libertines needing the virtuous to be the 
target of their denigration in order to enact their sought after defeat of Christianity, while the 
virtuous need the libertines to bring about suffering and the concomitant sensible display in 
need of an audience to behold.
534
 Like that sycophantic schemer and those old women, whose 
manner of engagement did not afford him the opportunity to enact his “life or death” 
articulation, Madame de Blamant, in Fowler’s view, treads on a similar ground where 
authentic relations need not even be present. Observing her virtue in action, Fowler sees this 
same concern for others ultimately referring back to the beginning of her own articulation. If 
Madame de Blamant’s suffering, as Fowler interprets, is destined for an audience, whose 
communion ends up as an “orgy of sentiment”: “il y a des larmes si douce dans nos situation”, 
she can just as easily contradict these “relations” by referring back to the beginning of her 
own articulation set before a sympathetic audience she imagines:  
[…] ces instants délicieux, où l’on fuit l’universe, où l’on s’enfonce dans un antre univers obscure ou sans le 
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What is here present is another example of what Smith introduced earlier as that “economy of 
sympathy”, the example given: the self-satisfied Stedman showcasing his sensibilité before 
suffering and dying slaves (p. 171) and even claiming the pain he felt before the violent 
spectacle be greater than the victim’s his or herself:  
From different Parents, different Climes we came/ At different Periods; Fate still rules the same/ Unhappy 




However, this form of sentimental articulation has been given a “positive” scaffolding, built 
out of what Casid offered in her gardening analogy as “illusions of perennial abundance 
(reproducibility) and a well-balanced composition of variety (chiaroscuro)” (p. 171). 
Pneumatology was not only the “negative” alternative to recover what popular audiences (and 
those who theorize about them) co-opted for materialist readings in the marketplace, for 
example, popular readings of Erasmus Darwin. It was as well the principle theoretical basis 
for reading Aline et Valcour. The question of dialectics implied by this scaffolding does need 
to be accounted for as it crops up not only in secondary sources of the period, e.g., Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente, but also in primary 
sources as well. It was Hegel’s use of the term in his 1807 Phänemonologie des Geistes, on 
the eve of Napoleon’s militaristic incursion into greater Europe that primed the tradition for 
its reoccurrence in posterity, its influence infusing works of such luminaries as Marx, 
Heidegger and Sartre. Dialectics was born neither ex nihilo nor even in the cultural milieu 
surrounding Jena in the Holy Roman Empire; it came on the wind of the revolutionary tide 
blowing out of France. Hegel even said so himself:  
I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation 
to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world 
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Fowler’s reading of Aline et Valcour is illuminating in its misplacement as it anticipates the 
metaphysics of dialecticism
538
 too premature to attribute to Sade at the time the novel was 
prepped to be published (1791)
539
 as that self-proclaimed prophesy of the French Revolution. 
However, the relevance of Fowler’s reading was not too far removed from that time when 
Sade could actually begin to grapple with and formulate his own conception of dialecticism 
in his own work. It is in La Philosophie dans le boudoir where a sea-change in Sade’s 
attitude is detectable, a change in attitude caused by both his experience in and observation of 
the Revolution, unfolding before his eyes. This new perspective will then be set against 
trends developing conterminously in the sciences of the age, trends that too anticipate the 
arrival of this new metaphysics. Finally, from developing this, that last mode of discovery 
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will be laid out, completing the promised tripartite progression - the final stage being the 
“metaphysics of success”. 
G.W.F. Hegel published his 1807 work Phänemonologie des Geistes at a time of great 
upheaval. The armies of Napoleon were advancing on the Germanic states and would soon 
incorporate the whole region into that French satellite, the Confederation of the Rhein. Much 
of the legacy of the French Revolution had been distilled in the foreign policies of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. He wielded many of its same promises of liberty, equality and fraternity (or, more 
pertinently, citizenry) against all forms of tyranny lying outside France’s borders. There is no 
clearer demonstration of this policy than in the pan-European dimension to the Napoleonic 
Code that promised such things as the abolition of the noble caste; freedom of religion; and 
something of a policy of equal opportunity for vocational advancement - all of which were 
installed on the condition of a French military victory. In “Consolidation of Power and the 
Napoleonic Codes - Comment on the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the 
Napoleonic Codes” Kris C. Kirkwood highlights how the “right to free contract” removed 
traces of “negative” interference in both citizens’ relationships to the state; and, as well, 
entrepreneurs’, to their enterprises, these interferences coming from religious and feudal 
customs.
540
 This made for new possibilities such as having the right to annul marriages by 
terminating mutually agreed-upon “contracts” (divorce) and to claim legal protection over 
what one declared as personal property.
541
 Kirkwood, citing Tigar and Levy, summarizes this 
way the nature of these new relations:  
Fundamentally the Code proclaimed only two commandments: A material one, that everyone should keep what 
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What came with the violent manner these “positive” reforms were implemented was a 
growing cultural self-awareness of victimhood felt not just collectively but “personally” as 
well, irrespective of freedom’s promises. It is no wonder, as Napoleon approached Jena; 
Hegel was attempting to remedy these contradictions through those famous dialectical 
resolutions, to which belonged one novel formulation of humankind’s relationship with the 
world: “consciousness”. Something of this new form of “negativity” has been given a 
preliminary run-through in juxtaposing Sartre’s’ “de plus” and Hollard’s “en critique des 
lacunes et des excès de l’étude de l’autre”, a comparison raised for the purpose of considering 
the anachronism Fowler introduces in his interpretation of Aline et Valcour. In fact, Sade 
grappled with the same kinds of contradictions Hegel would, but more than a decade earlier. 
A summary of these contradictions has already been introduced in discussion of the 
inauthenticity on display in Sade’s eulogy for Marat and Le Pelletier. Sade sensed the same 
contradiction inherent in the universalist program the French Revolution fostered and the 
narrowness of personal concern it engendered, e.g., political factionalism, career 
advancement but, more importantly, personal safety. Both Phänemonologie des Geistes and 
La Philosophie dans le boudoir speak to similar observation about similar events at really 
two different phases of the French Revolution. The conclusions they make, however, are 
entirely distinct and are really the histories of two distinct formulations of “negativity”. 
 Seaver and Wainhouse take note of the slight change in inflection to the original 
epigraph of the frontispiece to La Philosophie dans le boudoir in the version published ten 
years later when Sade was an inmate at Charenton asylum. The original epigraph had stated: 
“La mere en préscrira la lecture à sa fille” to the new version: “La mere en proscrira la 
lecture à sa fille”. Questioning the degree of creative control Sade actually had over his 
oeuvre in his state of confinement, the two compilers/ editors call debate over the change 
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“moot” as going from “préscrira” to “proscrira” is of only incidental concern.
543
 But the 
reversal is far too diametrical to dismiss so hastily as unimportant: how can making the work 
something mothers would forbid (proscrira) their daughters to read only ten years after 
having claimed the opposite be held as something minor? The importance of the original 
epigraph is that it encapsulates a timely message Sade was delivering to those young French 
citizens of the period. In many ways it was Rousseau’s instruction to Émile but delivered at a 
time when the Physiocrats’ vision of “honesty”, “plain-dealing” and “self-reliance” was 
ebbing (p. 51) and a new reality of “positivities” of laws, claims to rights and performance 
demands becoming the norms for living in a new revolutionary society. The young maiden, 
Eugénie, apprentice to the licentious Madame de Saing-Ange and the rake, Dolmance, is 
inculcated with just as much urgency and concern for her well-being as Émile was by 
Rousseau. In the following passage, Rousseau expressed his aim to instill independence in 
Émile and promote resistance to social forces destined to mould and enfeeble this young boy: 
God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil. He forces one soil to yield the 
products of another, one tree to bear another's fruit. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural 
conditions. He mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave. He destroys and defaces all things; he loves all that is 
deformed and monstrous; he will have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his 




Sade, speaking through Madame Sainte-Ange and Dolmance, sets up a counter-education 
program to the one Rousseau had designed and continues to follow the same “negative” 
course already seen making Rousseau and Sade kindred spirits. Of course, Sade chose vice 
over its cognate: virtue as the teaching style. Sade’s work demanded new solutions to new 
sets of problems in entirely new historical circumstances compared with those extant three 
decades earlier when Rousseau published Émile. And where Hegel would offer acquiescence 
to these similarly new conditions - and ultimately establish a manual for those in posterity to 
follow - Sade in La Philosophie dans le boudoir offers a robust rebuttal, a defence of his 
                                                          
543
 Richard Seaver, Austryn Wainhouse, ‘[Preliminary Commentary to “Philosophy in the Bedroom”]’, Marquis 
de Sade: Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, & Other Writings, op. cit., 180.  
544
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, or On Education, op. cit., 37. 
213 
 
trademark “negativity”. The book comprises six dialogues of general metaphysics, delivered 
half in orgiastic reveries; half in contemplative discussion in recovery (metaphysical “pillow 
talk”) with the insertion in the fifth dialogue of a political tract called “Français, encore un 
effort, si vous voulez être républicain” read aloud by Dolmance, whose curious inclusion has 
bewildered many, some of whom have taken it to be unnecessary and artless.
545
 As was the 
case in Aline et Valcour, initial narratives link to parallel ones, in manners by no means 
fortuitous. This polemical tract, coming midway through the dialogues, appends a “special 
metaphysics” to the “general” one that is presented in the rest of the dialogues. The target 
audience for the polemic would have been well acquainted with the vagaries of the Jacobin-
led “Reign of Terror”, whose subject matter the political tract broaches. Given the subtle ties 
La Philosophie dans le boudoir shares with Phänemonologie des Geistes, the two will be 
juxtaposed for what they distinctively elucidate about the emergence of the epistemological 
conception of “interiority”.   
 La Philosophie dans le boudoir iterates many of the same themes brought up in the 
other works already discussed and it is worth reviewing some of them to demonstrate how it 
was continuity that brought Sade to his critical positioning, concerning the new condition he 
saw enveloping him. In Les 120 Journées sensibilité was assigned a mobility to descend the 
depths of the precipices of “negativity”, depths established as that chute following deeper and 
deeper progressions of the calendar and the narrations of those storytellers of Silling Château, 
marking the passage of an almanac. In his anachronism Fowler wants to see Sade and 
sensibilité as that shallow circularity marking the dialectical turn. “Sensibilité can suggest a 
tearful response to happy as well as unhappy events”, says Fowler and follows these options 
in the direction of “malheurs” where the extent of Sade’s inquiry falls to this circular 
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question: “[…] does misfortune enhance the sensibilité of the virtuous to the point where they 
might actually wish to suffer (?)”.
546
 In La Philosophie dans le boudoir Sade sees sensibilité 
much like how he traced the journey of his “four heroes” towards say that point of blasphemy 
in the first week of December under the aegis of the narrator Champville. Dolmance gets to 
this point rather quickly and encourages Eugénie to follow suit into these depths:  
[…] one of my largest pleasures is to swear in God’s name when I’m stiff. It seems then that my spirit, at such a 
moment exalted a thousand times more, abhors, scorns this disgusting fiction; I would like to discover some 
way better to revile it or to outrage it further; and when my accursed musings lead me to the conviction of the 
nullity of this repulsive object of my hatred, I am irritated and would instantly like to be able to re-edify the 
phantom so that my rage might at least fall  upon some target: imitate me, charming women, and you will 




The shallow depth of concern, coming out of the dialecticism shown to be grounded on “a 
reference back to one’s own articulation set before an imagined audience”, i.e., Fowler’s 
interpretation of Madame de Blamant (p. 212), has the same proximal concern in production 
as the “generation rule” evinced by Diderot did in his exploration of the island population of 
Otaïti. Sade already resorted to a distal concern in his defence of sterility, described as an 
anodyne against proximity. Zamé’s concern for the sterile amongst the population of Tamoé 
and this island’s law concerning divorce are familiar examples (p. 206). To Eugénie’s 
question on whether or not her impending sodomization by Dolmance be natural or not, 
Dolmance makes out of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah a “miracle” of nature much 
like the “lavas “submerge[ing]” Vesuvius but with this irony: it be a “torture by fire” set 
against those who would enact such a crime against generation.
548
 Dolmance scoffs in a “let-
the-punishment-fit-the-crime” argument that the “misuse” of “procreative sperm” hardly 
qualifies as destruction since much of its contents are wasted anyway. In a reversal of the 
terms he implies that for every drop wasted by the “populator” in trying to reproduce they 
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merit the same punishment as the one the sodomite is obliged to incur.
549
 In both these 
examples, Sade is consistently asserting a “negative” position, bucking those “positive” 
trends he most certainly recognized infiltrating French society. Hegel would have recognized 
similar trends in his context and now it is time to analyse how his position diverged from 
Sade’s.   
Hegel gave evidence of how negativity would increasingly be built out of a cleavage 
between human experience and the natural world. Negativity became for Hegel the seat of his 
notion of the “in-itself”, a murky site where the implications of individuals “determinately” 
cavorting with (other) objects (as a “for-itself”) befell a position of not only needing objects 
but also “need being” ones. This position cannot be seen as too different from the 
implications already built out of Sade’s eulogy for Marat and Le Peletier: “objects pursed” 
(anteriority) and “objects doing the pursuing” (interiority) find a new theatrical model for a 
new society, one engendered by the French Revolution (p. 145). Hegel’s dialectical resolution 
followed this logic:  
The limitation of being […] cannot limit the action of consciousness, for here consciousness is a 




Hegel goes on to compare this relationship of “itself to itself” with animals in the animal 
kingdom; and if a moral scientist like Sade could draw in both determinate and indeterminate 
forms, organic and inorganic alike, Hegel made it structurally impossible, introducing an 
insurmountable isolation: 
[the individual’s] realization is simply in a reciprocal relation with itself; just as in the case of indeterminate 
animal life, which breathes the breath of life, let us say, into elements of water, or air or earth and within these 
again into more specific principles, steeping its entire nature in them, and yet keeping that nature under its own 
control, and preserving itself as a unity, in spite of the limitation imposed by the elements, and remaining in the 
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Sade would have rejected this isolation, calling all forms of this “control and preserv[ation…] 
as a unity” “ne plus ultra of human reason” (in the case of humankind) or some illusional 
self-importance in however way it is expressed amongst other organic and inorganic forms. 
He offered a “negative” scale, by which all could be united:  
[…] if man is thus proven as ancient of the world […] he is but as the oak, as grain, as the mineral to be found in 




Sade’s pantheism here dialogues in an interesting way with how Spinoza in Ethics aimed as 
well at surmounting the isolation making humankind the measure for all that belongs to its 
domain. He articulates it this way: 
 […] they find -- both in themselves and outside themselves – many means that are helpful in seeking their own 
advantage, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for light, the sea 
for supporting fish […] And knowing that they found these means, not provided for themselves, they had reason 
to believe that there was someone else, but from the means they were accustomed to prepare for themselves, 
they had to infer that there was a ruler, a number of rulers, of Nature, endowed with human freedom and who 




Sade would agree with Spinoza’s conclusion that this line of reasoning would customize God 
to be the supreme being of this small enclave, and only this enclave, this one that eats the 
same “fish” from this particular spot of the “sea”. Spinoza sees respite from this illusion in 
“rest” where only in movement do “the ideas which we have of external objects indicate the 
condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies”,
554
 i.e., fishes are less 
what they actually are than what they are for human use. As discussed in Chapter 1.3, God 
lies outside the contingency of nature, uninfluenced by movement. And movement for 
Spinoza is necessarily passionate so (restful) virtue is only possible through reason that 
brings about communion between God and humankind.
555
 Sade calls what Spinoza extolled 
here as virtue “inactive from pure selfishness”; and lauds the “whore” for her constrasting 
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 Sade takes the movement that troubled Spinoza in his view of the 
natural world to be the most general of all principles and God, the greatest of subterfuges:  
if it is proven that his God’s existence is impossible, and that Nature, forever in action, forever moving, has of 
herself what it pleases idiots to award God gratuitously […] he would be of all things the most ridiculous, since 
he would have been useful only one single time and thereafter and throughout millions of centuries, fixed in a 




Reason as rest and virtue as its beginning both constitute the “positive” pathway to God as 
anything perfectly restful is necessarily isolated, cut off from the “negativity” of all other 
extrinsic relations. Hegel’s definition of “Spirit” rises in a like manner as Spinoza’s - towards 
the knowledge of God:  
Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its 




In both their “positive” formulations, Spinoza and Hegel had an interest in warning readers - 
individuals and societies alike - of the perils “negativity” brings with it as relations. Spinoza 
called these perils symptoms of “inadequate ideas” while Hegel called them “the way of the 
world”. In Dolmance and Madame Saint-Ange’s lectures to Eugénie they spoke equally of 
these perils but offered much different solutions. It is worth setting up the contrast between 
these shared recognitions. 
In the section, “Virtue and the way of the world” Hegel builds on what he developed 
in the previous section of his work, “The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit” 
where the effluvia of all sentiment (of the heart) finds discord and ultimately falls victim to 
an alien necessity, which is the order of a cruel world,
 559
 or in Hegel’s words, “the way of the 
world”. In macro-form virtue fails for the same reason the “heart” does:  
                                                          
556
 Marquis de Sade, ‘Philosophy in the Bedroom’, op. cit., 209. * In Dolmance’s denigration of the virtuous 
woman he implies that her counterpart, the whore, is the one to deserve the accolades for her selflessness: 
‘There is ambition, there pride, there you find self-seeking, and often, again, it is a question of mere 
constitutional numbness, or torpor: there are beings who have no urges. Are we, I ask, to revere such as them? 
No; the virtuous woman acts, or is inactive, from pure selfishness. Is it then better, wiser, more just to perform 
sacrifices to egoism that to one’s passions’. (Full quotation) 
557
 Ibid, 209-10. 
558
 Hegel, op. cit., 263. 
559
 G.W.F Hegel, op. cit., 222. * ‘[…] reality is […] on the one hand a law by which the particular individuality 
is oppressed, a violent ordering of the world which contradicts the law of the heart, and, on the other hand, a 
218 
 
[…] it wants to consist in bringing the good into actual existence by the sacrifice of individuality, but the side of 




Both levels collapse here on account of how the architecture of “consciousness” was 
developed in his dialectic. The “law of the heart”, he described as
 
movements seeking to unite 
with objects and produce new forms; these movements ultimately end up working for the 
“for-itself”, however. Whatever sentiment may imbue these movements, they are unable 
themselves to be enshrined into the final conglomerate, a conglomerate not recognized by the  
[…] in-itself”[;] it is taken rather as “something already given […] hold[ing…] its essential nature […] to be for 




Hegel’s elegiac account of the loss of virtue here is given a much different reception by Sade, 
who is happy to extend it a lifeline even as it lay interred in a corpse of its former self. Far 
from denigrating virtue Dolmance celebrates it and tells Eugénie that  
[…] so long as the man who must live amongst other men appears virtuous, it matters not in the slightest 




At a point in the narrative when Sade first foreshadows Eugénie’s participation in the murder 
of her own mother, he has Dolmance present to her instructions on performing the most 
convincing of dissimulations for the most cut-throat of deeds. He used as a model Nero and 
his display of heartfelt sympathies for Agrippina (his mother) on the very barque he used to 
set her ablaze.
563
 Unlike in Hegel’s account where negativity is the difference between the 
“for-itself” and “in-itself” at the moment of articulation - the tracks of difference 
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instantaneously covered up by the articulated “in-itself” as the new baseline - Sade makes of 
the whole of both structures a ruse. Deception is the admission that the whole of the 
performer/ performance be fraudulent, to the effect of either sinking “interiority” itself into 
the “negativity” of its predecessors: “anteriority” and “posteriority”; or making out of 
“interiority” something of a “negative” possibility, otherwise impossible if Hegel’s claim to 
the “positive” in-itself be accepted wholesale. This bouleversement is on display throughout 
that pamphlet Sade inserts into the Fifth Dialogue: “Français, encore un effort”. This peculiar 
political tract has been a stumbling block for many who have grappled with its enigmatic 
meaning. It is to this document that the focus will now shift, this document, expounding the 
“special metaphysics” to what has so far been the “general” in the rest of La Philosophie dans 
le boudoir. 
Sade’s “special metaphysics” was delivered after his barely missed appointment with 
the guillotine during the Reign of Terror that only began to subside with the execution of its 
architect-in-chief, Robespierre. Released six weeks after the death of this revolutionary 
leader, Sade was certainly motivated to set his pen to vitriol against the legacy this iconic 
figure bequeathed to the revolution. In the first section to “Français, encore un effort”, titled 
“Religion”, Sade warns of the imminent return of God to society and entreats all citizens to 
be on guard and make:  
[o]ne more effort; since you labor to destroy all the old foundations, do not permit one of them to survive, for let 




Sade sees “the infamous Robespierre wish[ing] to call him [God] forth”
565
 and Lever 
suggests that it was Robespierre’s resurgent theism
566
 that would have brought Sade to this 
recognition. In his inaugural dedication of the Festival of the Supreme Being, Robespierre 
summons God back from the revolution’s ashes as if by metaphysical incantation:  
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If the satellites of tyranny can assassinate you, it is not in their power entirely to destroy you. Man, whoever 
thou mayest be, thou canst still conceive high thoughts for thyself. Thou canst bind thy fleeting life to God, and 





It was neither a pragmatic decision to bring God back from disrepute to fill say a societal 
niche he saw lacking in the chaos of the revolution nor a strategic one to expose what he 
believed were dissimulating aristocrats hiding behind fervent atheism: “[…] declaring war on 
divinity is only a diversion in favor of royalty”.
568
 Rather the reason was a decision to offer 
up a metaphysical position he believed was the only one suitable for the course of the 
Revolution. It would have been difficult for Sade to outdo in radicalism the actions of the 
Jacobins and the metaphysical position this movement’s leader imparted; however, the tract 
Dolmance recites in the presence of his fellow libertines is just such a document. In Sade mon 
prochain Klossowski distinguished Sade’s “kingdom of integral man” from the Jacobins and 
their “wishes to make the natural man live”.
569
 This could be interpreted as Sade’s 
remonstrance to the most extreme of the revolutionaries for failing in their revolutionary 
stupor and personal opportunisms to recognize that something irreversible had taken place in 
the history they were enacting. Robespierre, however, would have agreed with the spirit of 
Sade’s critical assessment though from a different metaphysical position. For this reason 
Klossowski’s assertion can not actually cover Robespierre on this point. Slavoj Žižek comes 
to the heart of the matter, spelling out the scale of Robespierre’s metaphysical vision for the 
Revolution, a vision Žižek describes as guided by “Divine Violence”, a vision that countered 
a revolution that was  
[…] respecting social rules, subordinating to pre-existing norms […] reduced to a strategic intervention serving 
precise and limited goals.
570
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 In “Français, encore un effort” Sade sets violence to the same amplitude as this “divine” 
variant Žižek speaks of but pushes beyond what depths Robespierre reaches in his own 
plunge into sensibilité, depths not too far in profundity from points Sade had reached in 
works such as Les 120 Journées. The lesson learned from Dolmance’s recital would only be 
revealed in post-discussions, in that debate between Dolmance and Madame Saint-Ange’s 
brother, Le Chevalier. In this heated exchange Sade gives voice to Robespierre through 
Dolmance’s attack on Le Chevalier, who ventriloquizes Robespierre’s detractors, whose 
surreptitious schemes brought about his downfall. Through Dolmance, Sade would then shift 
Robespierre’s metaphysical ground in a new direction. The novelty of Sade’s position here 
constitutes what has already been called his “special metaphysics”. 
The synonymy Žižek implies in making both “virtue” and “terror” cognates in the 
book’s title is certainly no surprise considering how “negativity” has been presented in this 
dissertation. There has been something ferocious in what fills out the “plenum”, a ferocity on 
display in Rousseau’s presentation of “virtue” particularly potent in his Dialogues, surprising 
even Jacques-Henri Meister, who called the work, one of a “dark imagination” and “delirium” 
(p. 63). And there is of course parallel virtue and vice in not only Rousseau’s “insensitive” 
character, Wolmar, in La nouvelle Héloïse and Sade’s four “heroes” of Silling Château but 
also the scale of objects, with which Rousseau and Sade worked in their respective oeuvre, 
for example, Wolmar’s special (“negative”) diet for Julie and the coprophilic offerings by 
Sade at the dining table at Silling Château (p. 116). Žižek’s theoretical analysis of virtue and 
terror in Robespierre’s speeches is noteworthy for it really covers terrain extensively 
navigated in this dissertation and does so even evoking the question of “negativity” and 
“positivity”. Žižek utilizes as his exploratory rubric: “Humanism and Terror”, introduced by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He argued that the justification for this conjunction depended on 
whether or not Stalinist terror, beginning to become apparent in Western media at the time, 
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leads to the creation of a “truly human” society.
571
 Žižek sees this to be a “positive” outcome 
to this formulation but introduces three other variations including two that substitute the “and” 
for an “or”. The “negative” formulation: “Humanism and Terror” is the orientations spoken 
of by “Heidegger, conservative Christians, partisans of Oriental spirituality or deep ecology”, 
who see terror to be the truth consequential of the hubris imbued humanism.
572
 This 
“negative” species dialogues with what has been presented as Hegel’s vision of that 
“cleavage between human experience and the natural world” (p. 220). Of the first “or” 
variation, Žižek mentions the formulation: “Humanism or Terror”, the “liberal-progressivist” 
project (“positive” on the side of Humanism) that upholds humanism to the occlusion 
(“negation”) of any (Stalinist) totalitarian and fundamentalist terror. The other version of this 
“or” variant makes “humanism” the “negated” term; and “terror”, in his words, the “positive” 
one, explaining this radical position as one of “inhumanity”.
573
 To describe its formation he 
recruits Freud, Levinas and Lacan, whose theoretical departures assume human relations be 
something of abyssal voids; Žižek utilizes science fiction characters to familiarize the reader 
with what is otherwise uncanny in his assertion: 
The best way to approach it is via Freud’s reluctance to endorse in the injunction ‘Love thy neighbors! – the 
temptation to be resisted here is the ethical domestication of the neighbour – for example, what Emmanuel 
Levinas did with his notion of the neighbor as the abyssal point from which the call of ethical responsibility 
emanates. What Levinas thereby obfuscates is the monstrosity of the neighbor, a monstrosity on account of 
which Lacan applies to the neighbor the term Thing (das Ding), used by Freud to designate the ultimate object 
of our desires in its unbearable intensity and impenetrability […] this inhuman dimension can be defined as that 
of a subject subtracted from all form of human ‘individuality’ or ‘personality’ […] one of the exemplary figures 
of a pure subject is a non-human - alien, cyborg – who displays more fidelity to its task and to dignity and 




Critical in Žižek’s formulation here is the failure to adequately define “negativity”. In one 
case “negativity” is “negation” as what is used, for example, in the aforementioned final “or” 
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conjunction where “humanism” simply vanishes as a term for consideration. In another case, 
the second “and” conjunction, “negativity” is dialecticism where “humanism” and “terror” 
are incorporated into the final concept. Such a misconception naturally makes “positivity” the 
default symmetrical term to describe all of what is only nominally “negative”. What ought to 
have been done to describe “negativity” is follow what has been conceptualized as “negative” 
in this dissertation. This “subtraction [of] all forms of human ‘individuality’ or ‘personality’”, 
the “unbearable intensity and impenetrability” in the pursuit of the object and, as well, that 
“rejection of habit” he speaks of in the “inhuman dimension of the couple of Virtue-
Terror”
575
 are all important “negative” attributes of the “plenum”: its privilege of distal over 
proximal concerns, “ellipses” marking out its inner sanctum, filled with passion that medium 
that extirpates all objects and uniformities. What’s more, this is not the terrain of something 
as unnatural as an “alien” or “cyborg”; more to the point, Robespierre was very much 
interested in seeing negativity as a phenomenon of nature. In his “On the Trial of the King” 
speech he likens the “virtue” of the people to what appears “in our timid eyes as something 
like an erupting volcano or the overthrow of political society”
576
 and makes his extra-legal 
case for the execution of the king as one of a “negative” refutation of the inevitable “positive” 
outcome had the process been mediated by laws. Harkening back to his famous “defen[ce of] 
de Vissery de Bois-Valé’s right to erect a lightning rod on the roof of his house” (p. 25) in that 
trial Riskin raises as exemplifying the repudiation of “positive” facts of moral scientists of the 
period, Robespierre again sees “lightening” as a truth in an equally “negative” light: 
People do not judge in the same way as courts of law; they do not hand down sentences, they throw 
thunderbolts; they do not condemn kings, they drop them back into the void; and this justice is worth just as 
much as that of the courts. If it is for their salvation that they take arms against their oppressors, how can they be 
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Sade’s “Français, encore un effort” is a direct dialogue with Robespierre, delivered in a 
format with which Robespierre himself would have been familiar as chief political orator to 
the Convention. Aside from like contexts, the two are also dialoguing in a similar dialect of 
sensibilité and for all the emphasis being drawn to their contrastive metaphysic positions; the 
two share poignant similarities, which are worth highlighting before going on to the 
differences. 
The rhetorical tone of the political orators, Robespierre and Dolmance, could not have 
been any more different to the untrained ear. What would otherwise seem like respective 
clashes of moral rectitude and anarchic immoralism is but the mere case of virtue of the one 
and vice of the other, being positioned along the same spectrum in the “plenum” with vice 
emerging as the mere uptick in amplitude, surging past virtue’s “digital” concern for what 
what is either “congenial” or “inimical” to the welfare of humankind (p. 28). On the question 
of laws, Robespierre, in his speech on the “Draft Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen” expressly states that the less there are the better for any surfeit promotes inequality 
amongst citizens:  
You add more and more articles to ensure the greatest liberty for the exercise of property, but said not a single 
word to determine its legitimate character, so that your declaration appears to be made, not for men, but for the 




Sade would begin the section, “Manners” of his “Français, encore un effort” with the same 
call for parsimony in laws for the very same reason of inequality. He argues for “leniency” in 
laws as any forced generalization is an imposition of tyranny in their own right: “[…] it is a 
terrible injustice to require that men of unlike character be ruled by the same law.”
579
 
Transposing these two documents in question is a worthwhile exercise as both attest to just 
how spectrally close the author’s positions are; the only difference being the deep digitality 
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virtue upholds; and this digitality’s extirpation by vice. Article IV of the Declaration 
delineates “digitality’s” “negative” depth:  
Liberty is the power that man has to exercise all his faculties at will. Justice is its rule, the rights of others are its 




And from this, cascades panoply of enforcements of “boundaries” including rights to one’s 
discursive property (Article V), material property (Article VI) and bodily property (Article 
XXVII). Sade punctures the boundaries “virtue” assumes in the Declaration, doing so by 
unraveling the articles that necessarily follow from Article IV and, what is more, preserving 
the same spirit of equality implied in their enforcement. Sade advocates leniency for the 
“crime” of calumny and thus the inviolability of just that discursive property presupposed in 
Article V. Sade argues that:  
[…] it makes little difference if one imputes a little more evil to a man known for having done a great deal of it 
[… or] for this virtuous and sensitive man, stung by the injustice […] will apply himself to the cultivation of 




For material property, Sade advocates theft be something to be praised as it both instills 
rigorous concern for what one possesses; and it is a “crime” best suited for encouraging the 
distribution of material equality amongst citizens.
582
 Sade extends a similar logic of 
“equality” of bodily property to crimes of rape and murder, both of which are liberties, he 
claims, are perfectly endowed by nature and suitable for the integrity of the state. Sade calls 
on rape to be permitted as a  
[…] free flight and rein to those tyrannical desire, which […] torment man ceaselessly: content with having 
been able to exercise his small dominion in the middle of the harem of sultanas and youths whose submission 
your good offices and his money procure for him, he will go away appeased and with nothing but fond feelings 




As for murder, Sade speaks of it as the most natural of phenomena, one even lauded by 
nature, who is always in need of raw materials to go on with its art of regeneration:  
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For the king, whom Sade advises best not become embroiled in the tit-for-tat of the cycle of 
murderous exchanges, he recommends the wisdom of Louis XV, whose clemency to 
Charolais, the murder; and whose promised pardon for whomever would seek revenge for 
Charolais’ crime
585
 guarantees justice while preserving equality for all. The equality Sade 
expounds on in all these cases is of filiation with that in Robespierre’s vision, the difference 
being of course a minor modulation to what fills out the “plenum”. Nothing better 
exemplifies this filiation than both Sade and Robespierre’s opposition to capital punishment 
and advocacy of a pacifist foreign policy. Sade shared Robespierre’s antipathy for the legal 
killing of individuals deemed criminal according to the laws of a state, arguing such 
“proximal” bases as “individual” crimes and corresponding legal articles be not “in keeping 
with the indestructible principles of nature”; and it is only in such a “distal” position where 
capital punishment is suitable “for the security of individuals or the social body”.
586
 Failure to 
understand this distinction has earned Robespierre the accusation of hypocrisy in lieu of his 
murderous tenure as leader during the Reign of Terror. But his executive orders to keep the 
guillotine well-greased were all quite consistent with his metaphysics. Sade too decried 
capital punishment for much the same reason as Robespierre and again the issue becomes one 
of the “negativity” of distality and the “positivity” of proximity: 
[…] one feels, the necessity to make flexible, mild laws and especially to get rid forever of the atrocity of capital 
punishment, because the law which attempts a man’s life is impractical, unjust, inadmissible […] men have 
freely taken one another’s lives, simply exercising a prerogative received from their common mother; but it is 
impossible for the law to obtain the same privilege, since the law, cold and impersonal is a total stranger to the 




Something of the same logic underpins both metaphysicians’ opposition to war-mongering 
abroad even when following the banner of liberty. In his speech “On the War” Robespierre 
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entreats his listeners to ease off the drumbeat intensifying for calls to militarism by Brissot, 
the leader of the Girondins, who sought to transport the Revolution abroad. Robespierre calls 
such a policy a distraction from unfinished business on the domestic front, and worse, a new 
foothold for counter-revolutionaries to seize as, in his view, it was the pride of the 
“aristocratic toadies [who] are repeating the war cry”.
588
 Robespierre warns that the 
despotism that can make “liberty appear suspect and frightening” be a condition of 
“prejudice, the habits, and the education of the peoples”. All of these need to be changed 
gradually from the bottom-up and not top-down from an invading force; furthermore, he 
states: “no one likes armed missionaries”.
589
 The spirit of Robespierre’s pacifist foreign 
policy is inscribed in Article XXXVII of the Declaration where tyranny abroad is not 
described with the “us vs. them” designation inherent in the notion of national armies but 
with language implying tyranny be an issue of only domestic concern:  
Those who make war on a people to arrest the progress of liberty and annihilate the rights of man should be 




Sade also articulates a pacifist foreign policy where any influence spreading abroad ought to 
be that of imitability due to the fruits of good governance seen from afar - not by the  
[…] zeal to broaden your principles to lead you further afield; it is only with fire and steel you will be able to 




Sade makes foreign invasion something of a “proximal” concern for one’s own national pride 
as it is “for the vainglory of establishing your principles outside your country” and, like 
Robespierre, Sade makes such a “positive” concern a foothold for tyranny’s return:  
[…] you neglect to care for your own felicity at home, despotism, which is no more than asleep, will awake, you 




This “intestine disorder” could very well be a pneumatological reference to that corruption 
appearing countless time in this dissertation, against which moral scientists of the period 
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worked. If “Français, encore un effort” is a “vice-imbued” inflection of many of the 
“virtuous” speeches Robespierre gave as orator-in-chief to the Convention, what constitutes 
Sade’s “special metaphysics” is his refutation of Robespierre and his desire to steer the 
revolution back to God, a desire Sade well knew was a road with no return, one he had 
already tested in his metaphysics of failure in Les 120 Journées. As stated earlier, it is in the 
exchange between Dolmance and Le Chevalier where Sade offers his critical response to 
Robespierre, with whom he otherwise shared a similar depth of sensibilité.  
 The seraglio greeted Dolmance’s recitation of “Français, encore un effort” with great 
adulation and enthusiasm, stirring up a discussion that marks a critical moment in the oeuvre 
of Sade. It was Sade’s own self-correction of a failure he may have intuited was long present 
even in his own metaphysics, one particularly salient and on display in the new historical 
conditions he sensed surrounded him in 1795. Not satisfied with what had been seen as an 
“unnatural” path, suggested as finding its most succinct articulation years later in Hegel’s 
Phänomenologie des Geistes when the “interiority” of human subjectivity began to be 
unbound from the strictures of nature, Sade chose the natural path but not the same one as he 
had previously. He saw in that iconic figure, Robespierre, setting the Revolution on a course 
back to God, a return to an inevitable point of failure much like the one discovered on the 
path his four “heroes” of Silling Château found themselves, on that day the discovered 
praying Sophie and Adelaide (p. 160). Le Chevalier captures well the splitting of minds 
endemic to this period, a period caught on both a course away from God yet back to him. Le 
Chevalier takes issue with how Dolmance was attempting to purge in his inculcation of 
Eugénie all reference to sensibilité. Le Chevalier captures here the confusion inherent in a 
sensibilité expressed as either virtue or vice, caught up in the metaphysics of the natural 
world: 
Barbaric one [Dolmance], are these not at all human beings like you? And if they are your kind, why should you 
enjoy yourself when they lie dying? Eugénie, Eugénie, never slay the sacred voice of Nature in your breast: it is 
to benevolence it will direct you despite yourself when you extricate from out of the fire of passions that absorb 
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it the clear tenor of Nature. Leave religion principles far behind you – very well, I approve it; but abandon not 




Dolmance’s rebuttal to Le Chevalier’s deep-seated equivocation, which is necessarily 
Robespierre’s but also Sade’s own in his past musings, constitutes an abrupt metaphysical 
move that in one sweep preserves nature while acknowledging the pervasiveness of the new 
“phenomenology of spirit” that came as a result of the Revolution, a spirit that could in no 
way be discounted. Dolmance offers a way to become de-coupled from nature while still 
necessarily preserving it and all its “negativity”, something impossible in the shift to the 
“positive”, in that fetal “spirit”, or consciousness of his time, that one Hegel would soon 
articulate. Dolmance admonishes Le Chevelier to recognize nature for what it is, not to be 
emotionally upended by the sight of crime:  
Let your principles weed it out of you if you dread its sting; will it be possible to repent of an action with whose 




Dolmance then goes about closing the loop that follows back into the perpetuity of nature; 
and necessarily back to God. The first step is to sear the workings of the “heart”, the gateway 
to metaphysical failure. He articulates it this way: 
However, the heart deceives, because it is never anything but the expression of the mind’s miscalculations; 
allow the latter to mature and the former will yield in good time; we are constantly led astray by false definitions 
when we wish to reason logically: I don’t know what the heart is, not I: I only use the word to denote the mind’s 
frailties. One single, one unique flame sheds its light in me: when I am whole and well, sound and sane, I am 
never misled by it; when I am old, hypochondriacal, or pusillanimous, it deceives me; in which case I tell myself 
I am sensible, but in truth I am merely weak and timid. Once again, Eugénie, I say it to you: be not abused by 
this perfidious sensibility; be well convinced of it, it is nothing but the mind’s weakness; one weeps not save 
when one is afraid, and that is why kings are tyrants […] Ah, Eugénie, believe me when I tell you that the 
delights born of apathy are worth much more than those you get of your sensibility; the latter can only touch the 




The apathy, of which Sade speaks, was a germane conceptualization of a process at work in 
object formation in the history of scientific inquiry, one that would go about both forming the 
“interiority” inchoate in Sade’s time and withering the influence of the antecedent stages: 
“posteriority” and “anteriority” (not completely however). The juggernaut of this process was 
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guided by scientists and philosophers, whose prioritization of “positive” objects in research 
into the natural world - and denigration of “negative” ones - set the tone for how reality 
would be confronted during the French Revolution and well into the nineteenth century. It 
was philosophes like d’Alembert and Condillac, whose scientific methods would lay down 
the experimental foundation for someone like Lavoisier to come along, whose discovery of 
oxidization marked an inaugural moment in the History of Science when a genuine discovery 
can be said to have been made. This claim will soon be explained but getting to the point 
where Lavoisier conducted his famous experiments with combustion is a necessary first step.  
5.2 Pneumatology of Error 
 
 Dolmance’s presentation of the history of the object of scientific inquiry has an air of 
“delight” and “titillat[ion]” amiss in the elegiac one Hegel delivers in his “Preface: On 
Scientific Cognition” in Phänemonologie. Unlike this “single […] flame” in mind when 
apathy impeaches the heart from its seat of privilege, Hegel sees only a Spirit dispirited, 
having “lost its essential life”, “conscious of […] the finitude [of] its own content”, a content 
made up of only “empty husks”.
596
 Hegel calls on philosophy to help Spirit roll back this 
awareness of being an “insubstantial reflection of itself into itself” and usher in that return to 
the primordial state before science was “modern” science.
597
 In the following passage, Hegel 
unravels as if like an ancient scroll in reverse chronology those important episodes in the 
History of Science, itemizing each of them until arriving finally at the realm where this 
dissertation began its investigate, that one of pure “negativity”: 
Philosophy is to meet this need [the recovery of the lost sense of solid and substantial being], not by opening up 
the fast-locked nature of substance [the experimental achievements of the likes of Lavoisier], and raising this to 
self-consciousness, not by bringing consciousness out of its chaos back to an order based on thought 
[Condillac’s epistemology], nor to the simplicity of the Notion [Newton’s rational mechanics], but rather by 
running together what thought has put asunder, by suppressing the differentiations of the Notion and restoring 
the feeling of essential being; in short, by producing edification rather than insight. The ‘beautiful’, the ‘holy’, 
the ‘eternal’, ‘religion’ and ‘love’ are the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the Notion, but ecstasy, 
not the cold march of necessity in the thing itself, but the ferment of enthusiasm […].
598
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Dolmance’s apathy is compelling for two reasons. Firstly, on the more recent end of the 
historical pathway, taken by the “object” of scientific inquiry it offers heated ferocity to a 
empty and de-humanized form, one attributed only “cold” lifelessness in Hegel’s account. 
Secondly, it was the subject of a lecture delivered to Eugénie, a young woman, whose gender 
was a contested term in scientific debates at the time. In “Metaphysics, Mathematics and the 
Gendering of Science in Eighteenth-Century France”, Mary Terrall tells of the rise of the 
Académie des Sciences in the late eighteenth century as a consolidation of a particular way of 
practicing science. She distills its operating principle from Condorcet’s formulation in his 
1782 induction speech before the Académie:  
The method of discovering truths has been reduced to an art, one could almost say to a set of formulae. Reason 




Analytic, and distinctly not metaphysical; professional, and purged of all signs of 
dilettantism, Terrall assigns to these two scientific approaches the rubrics: “algebra” and 
“animal magnetism”. Both are distinguishable by what Jean-Sylvain Bailly calls “error”, a 
notion, to which he even adds a pneumatological dimension:  
[…] the sciences, which grow by the acquisition of truths, gain even more from the suppression of error; an 




The two rubrics bifurcate into gendered assumptions whereby science as “algebra” is 
distinctly masculine, the guiding spirit for what Terrall sees as a growing meritocracy of 
professional men, vying for greater articulation of skills, with the discipline itself being the 
determiner of merit and no longer lineage or favors bestowed by the king. “Animal 
magnetism” connotes popular science especially entwined in the legacy of mesmerism where 
one claim to scientific authority came from those salonnières of the salons. This science, 
popularized by Mesmer, was considered a feminine space:  
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[…] the consolidation of the academy’s position, with its attendant denial of the value of metaphysical 
principles, coincided both with the backlash against women’s participation in the intellectual life of the Republic 
of Letters […] The positive values assigned to calculation and precision measurement were subtly gendered as 




However, Schiebinger proved early on that popular science offered its consumers just as 
much potential for the “positive” articulation of objects as engineers sitting before their tools 
of “precise measurements” and elaborate equations. Terrall fails to emphasize this possibility. 
The question of the difference between engineers and salonnières is a matter whose 
importance pertains to “interiority” and its different stages of formation. What is unique 
about Eugénie in Philosophie dans le boudoir is her hermaphroditic status, straddling the 
feminine, a metaphysician-in-training in the throes of passion, and the masculine, really on 
display as a surgeon-in-training, learning anatomy but, more importantly, the art of 
experimentation, her maiden surgery being her helping suture her own mother’s vagina and 
anus shut with a needle and thread in order to conduct a parallel investigation into 
microbiology, an investigation coming on Madame de Saint-Ange’s recommendation:  
I believe it is now of the highest importance to provide against the escape of the poison [the syphilis] circulating 
in Madame’s veins; consequently, Eugénie must very carefully sew her cunt and ass so that the virulent humor, 




Sade is drawing out here his own take on the history of the “object” of scientific inquiry, a 
history informed by his own experiences and observations of the French Revolution, one 
coming as a much earlier vantage point compared with what would be Hegel’s. And their 
respective conclusions could not have been any more different. The two rubrics Terrall 
introduces to explore issues of gender are useful starting points to intuit the increased 
convergence of “objects” of “interiority” central to the aim of this dissertation, a convergence 
really traceable to an evolution from popular to professional science. Coming on the sharpest 
point of this convergence is the possibility of witnessing discovery sui generis - not as a 
failed or even partially successful metaphysics, but one fully successful. Antoine Lavoisier 
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was the Prometheus-figure, the significance of whose feat is really invisible without Sade’s 
guidance. It would normally be a historical insult to compare the mild-mannered, virtuous 
and astute practitioner of chemistry to a libertine in the throes of sodomizing a fifteen-year 
old maiden but by now such a proposition should not seem far-fetched. Lavoisier is 
Dolmance, on the verge of learning the full potential of his metaphysics of apathy. 
 Franz Anton Mesmer’s influence on the French Revolution was significant enough for 
Robert Darnton to see it as providing the pneumatological basis for future revolutionaries like 
Marat and Brissot to attack the corruption and despotism of the ancient regime. The basis for 
this line of argumentation has already had a rehearsal in earlier discussions on Priestley’s 
epistemological egalitarianism and Bentham’s utilitarianism, all of which happen to be 
grounded in experiences of the French Revolution, albeit from afar. The upshot of these 
discussions held that “optimism” replaced the extremism of what had otherwise been those 
“antipathies and sympathies” filling out the “plenum”, “optimism” being a co-extensive fit so 
as not to fall into “the shallowness of an individual “positive” outlook (proximity) (p. 157) 
nor a “digitality” of d’Holbach’s now familiar “congenial”/ “inimical” adage (p. 28). Darnton 
speaks of Marat’s “popular sovereignty in scientific matters” as the basis for attacking the 
“despots” and aristocrats” in the Académie de Sciences,
603
 a position Priestley and Bentham 
would have too found reasonable given their own attacks on elitism in their own homeland of 
England. The theoretical basis, underpinning Mesmerist practices attests to its deep “negative” 
immersion, one that can be easily taken for a “plenum”, if the “objectness” of some of the 
descriptions of the component parts of its practice were shaved off and varnished with a “coat” 
of exclusively relational focus: 
In February 1778, Franz Anton Mesmer arrived in Paris and proclaimed his discovery of a superfine fluid that 
penetrated and surrounded all bodies. Mesmer had not actually seen his fluid; he concluded that it must exist as 
the medium of gravity since planets could not attract one another in a vacuum. While bathing the entire universe 
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in this primeval “agent of nature” Mesmer brought it down to earth in order to supply Parisians with heat, light, 




Handling objects in the “plenum” in this way is naturally fraught with the same problem of 
“coevality” seen earlier in how medically administered enemas as a palliative for illness in 
Renaissance medicine is destined for failure no matter how convincing the analogy may be in 
what say Agramont sees as the correspondence between constipation and the “putrefactions 
constricted in the bowels of the earth” causing earthquakes (p. 156). But it was these obvious 
shortcomings of Mesmerism that would initiate in the Académie a new line of 
pneumatological argumentation that, though derivative of its object of attack, would reverse 
the insult originally directed toward them by the likes of Brissot and Marat. It is at this point 
where Condorcet and Bailly return with their own pneumatology, a pneumatology of “error”. 
On a personal level, the battle lines here can be seen forming around that vendetta Marat had 
against Lavoisier for sardonically spreading the word amongst electors in the Académie that 
Marat claimed, in Arthur Donovan’s words, “his experiments with the microscope rendered 
the substance of fire visible”.
605
 This claim merited the insult of quackery and led to his 
automatic barring from membership. On an institutional level, these battle lines also formed 
around Académie members like Lavoisier, Bailly and Guillotine, sitting in tubs of magnetized 
water, testing by experiment the claims made by proponents of Mesmerism and concluding in 
their final report to the king that if such claims to science be allowed to co-exist amongst 
those produced by “professionals”, the whole institution of science would be in peril.
606
 The 
pneumatology of “error” brings metaphysics to the last stage of formation where authentic 
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discovery is finally possible. It is also the staging ground where “interiority” reaches its most 
dramatic focus and repertoire of effects. 
 To understand the principle behind a “pneumatology of error”, it is worth returning to 
the earlier mentioned “money problems” English kings confronted in their attempts to shore 
up value of their coinage while staving off unsanctioned utility that came when value was 
increasingly packed into and made transparent in the coins themselves (made intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic) (p. 203). The operations of the Birmingham counterfeiters and Boulton’s 
hubbing steam coin press were shown to both interrupt the value in extrinsic relations 
necessarily for the source of meaning to hold, the meaning of the king. Counterfeiters 
achieved this through point variables, i.e., changing Georgius III to George Gordon to 
promote utility and avoiding the accusation of counterfeiting by simply passing over the 
source where the coin should have otherwise derived its meaning. For the hubbing steam coin 
press, point variables had an accumulative effect whereby it was a machine that replaced the 
king as the source of emanation while saturating meaning in coin so consistently and equally 
recourse to extrinsicness was greatly reduced. In other words, it is only in objects’ differences 
that recourse to relations matter as Montaigne’s egg analogy has demonstrated. In “French 
Engineers Become Professionals; or, How Meritocracy Made Knowledge Objective”, Ken 
Alder could have seen a pneumatological potential in an engineer like Boulton but chooses to 
focus on French engineers of the Revolutionary period, who embody trends occurring in the 
science of dynamics. D’Alembert helped inaugurate dynamics, intensifying this science later 
in ballistic science of the French artillerymen in the Napoleonic Army. Alder offers this 
pneumatological account without calling it such: 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have memorably noted that “the solution to the problem of knowledge is the 
solution to the problem of social order” […] the rules by which Enlightenment engineers sought to obtain 
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These engineers are formed in the manner Sade had Zamé entreat “législateurs” to aim their 
reforms at the “bille” rather than nature since natural laws are always “blindly” overreaching 
in whichever direction they aim, resulting only in “ l’ɶuf cassé le crime commis” (p. 204). 
And as Shapin and Schaffer observe, it is improvements in how “objects” are pursued that 
ultimately double back to reform the pursuer of these object, all in keeping with the 
metaphysics of distality supported in this essay and the progressive bottleneck through which 
“interiority” has been set to arrive, an “interiority” following the pattern of, for example, 
those point variables seen in those Birmingham coiners’ promotion of utility.   
 Point variables promoting utility in coinage can also be said to be bases of 
contestation in that famous debate of science that pitted Maupertuis’ “principle of least action” 
against “D’Alembert’s Principle”, a debate on whose outcome the “pneumatology of error” 
really crystallizes. Just as Zamé saw only blindness in how nature saw fit to throw billiard 
balls, D’Alembert also castigated those, who would cast their inquiring eye in this same 
direction towards metaphysics, calling the fruit of such an approach, in Terrall’s words, 
“confused perceptions, susceptible to error, as when a blind man interprets shapes by tapping 
with his stick.”
608
 Maupertuis’s principle sought to strike a balance between what had become 
possible in the science of dynamic systems: the ability to quantify motion from point 
variables; and what was still obscure as a more global concern for the teleology of motion. 
He ended up treading in that familiar realm of extremes, where Bentham, for example, saw 
earlier cruelty in antipathies and sympathies. Terrall describes Maupertuis’ position this way:  
Nature had been designed so that every change required a minimal expenditure of “action”, and God calculated 
that quantity continuously. In basing mechanics on an extremum principle, Maupertuis brought a mathematical 
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D’Alembert had earlier called a “despicable science” such an interest in metaphysical 
“abstractions” like “time, space, matter and spirit” (p. i); and converted a theoretical rebuttal 
into an ad hominum attack on a modality of mind leading to such “erroneous” places, a 
modality feminized in qualities like passions and imagination. “D’Alembert’s Principle” 
limited rather considerations to veritable point variables Terrall lists as “inertia, equilibrium 
and the composition of motion” which like coins made by the Birmingham counterfeiters 
could “sidestep[] the question of motion of what caused the change in motion at the instant of 
impact”,
610
 or better, the “extrinsic relations necessarily for the source of meaning to hold, the 
meaning of the king” (p. 203), in the case of the “first cause” in the natural world, the “King 
of kings”. D’Alembert would have equally seen this problem distally as it pertains to the form 
of the “bille” that nature blindly throws: those non-professionals of popular science, a public 
as undifferentiated as the differential equations they cannot use, an inability that ultimately 
make them “dupes of unsanctioned knowledge”, victim of charlatans’ “errors”.
611
 Where 
Terrall describes pneumatology along gender lines, Alder sees it as the emergence of 
disciplinarity and the retreat of the “corrupting world of dilettantism”
612
 in the salons. In 
contrast to metaphysics, the inutile product of armchair theoreticians, he argues that scientific 
praxis was increasingly seen as the fruit of analytic mathematics. Accordingly, for 
“D’Alembert’s Principle”, point variables would be utilized as the empirical basis for 
discovery. Alder compares these two pneumatological positions this way: 
Time and again, engineers found that Newtonian mechanics did not lead directly to improved guns, waterwheels, 
boat hulls, or any of the other lumpy artefacts of material life. This is not to say mathematics was without value 
to engineers. On the contrary, the new analytic mathematics helped the engineers model those technologies 
whose behaviour could not be derived from first principles. For instance, the French engineers who created the 
science of machines […] in the years 1765-1830 deployed mathematics as a form of “descriptionism,” a way to 
quantify the relationship between certain measurable parameters and other measurable parameters. This was 
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And, of course, these tools, shaping objects in the material world, emerged necessarily from 
the same pneumatological distance shaping engineers, much like how Bentham’s panopticon 
in forming the material world reshaped metaphysically those within its purview.  However, in 
a new level of intensification, the panopticon would step even further back and reshape the 
architects themselves, who become Zamé’s “billes”. Foucault, being a historian of 
transformations - and not causes (p. i) - could have only seen disciplinarity bringing about 
what he famously called “man and his doubles” but now with a metaphysical approach in 
place the arrival at this point in the History of Science is smoother and much more analogic. 
Alder made a point of elevating the importance of Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval’s 
techniques beyond their practicality on the battlefield. He saw the meritocracy Gribeauval 
implemented amongst his engineers as a social system that “transcended politics”; and 
objectivity, error’s pheumatological nemesis, could be said to be the basis of this success:  
Meritocracy, then, made knowledge (appear) objective because it treated knowers according to the same logic 




Though shown to be rehearsed in the coteries of high society as Rousseau and Montesquieu 
prove in their respective studies of Grimm and Rica’s observation, “interiority” really took to 
“the stage” first in the theatricity of the Revolution, featured in this dissertation in Sade’s 
famous eulogy to the slain revolutionaries Marat and Le Pelletier. The metaphysics was given 
this “positive” interpretation: “Theatre actors have “positive” roles impelled to act according 
to “positive” features of what the particular theatre piece actually is: lines, props, a backdrop 
and all of this need not have a guillotine to enforce “inauthentic demands” (p. 138). Alder’s 
presentation of the Gribeauvalists is a much more intensified version of this theatricity, such 
that different roles are pushed so far to the front they leave the orbit of the performer and 
become indistinguishable from the objects being handled themselves, their correctness being 
a “positive” matter of mathematical verifiability. Such transparencies marks the end of the 
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metaphysical journey taken up in this dissertation and what remains now to do is take account 
of where this metaphysics ends up. If the “positivity” built to this point of refinement, 
calibrated to the extent where “errors” are even possible; a positivity cleaving off of the 
natural world as Hegel would have it, Sade comes to nature’s rescue with his character 
Dolmance, though the effort for nature is ultimately pyrrhic victory. Nature might have 
preferred the inherent inertness of the “positivity” standing in its midst to that “negative” 
thrust coming forward on the “sharp end” of the rapist’s cudgel, which is nature’s own 





















 Lavoisier  
6.1 “Crystal Ammunition” and a New Way to Farm Saltpeter 
 In Chapter One it was stated that though “Vila does well presenting sensibilité’s 
pathological tendencies when unhinged in individuals [she] presents it in a much more 
limited scope than Riskin, who sees the wider historical potential of sensibilité to produce 
social “pathos”, “pathos” defined here as “suffering”” (p. 49). It is clear by now what 
constitutes this “pathos”: the elusiveness of a metaphysics of success and a full description of 
what success would look like will now round out this essay. Another discussion introduced at 
the point of comparing Vila and Riskin was Starobinski’s “crystal and mirror” argument (p. 
50) against Furet, who linked the violence of the revolution with Rousseau and the 
“atomization” of the sciences he supposedly represented. It was stated that Furet’s line of 
argumentation followed closely a Burkean “spirit of machine” insult. Starobinski used the 
“crystal” and “mirror” metaphors very well, pointing out that the first material is of “union”, 
a “negative space for relations”; the second, the “positive” powder forming reductive 
sciences, which could also very well produce that reflecting effect Foucault has evinced in his 
notion of the scientific “double”. It can be argued that the violence of the revolution took its 
cues from Rousseau and the “crystal ammunition”, fashioned out of his “negative” science. 
Darnton sees the hatred of future revolutionary leaders like Marat lit up by debates on science, 
in forms spoken in dying languages such as the nature of fire or the pneumatics of hot-air 
balloons; in forums of science where “popular sovereignty” reigned supreme as the discursive 
starting point.
615
 The Gribeauvalists - along with their reflecting “mirrors” of “positivity” 
(meritology) and their ammunition, the cannonballs built of their new science of ballistics - 
were really historically less important during the Revolutionary period as Starobinski reminds 
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those in posterity. Fire has been given a very different metaphysical work through in this 
dissertation, one, which follows from those different stages of failure primed up until this 
point. Firstly, fire descended to great “negative” depths in Les 120 Journées, reaching utter 
failure in the conflagrations in the dungeon at Silling Château. As a prisoner of the Bastille, 
Sade wrote this work bearing the full weight of the Ancien Regime under the lettre de cachet. 
Fire then began to be channeled along pathways of pneumatological incline towards greater 
“positivity” until it could reach the surface of all matter, hovering, making itself available for 
some experimental successes just as Priestley specified was possible in his notion of 
epistemological egalitarianism/ accidental discovery. Phlogistonism was really the scientific 
principle at this stage; and revolution, the political, and Marat’s defense of both captures well 
the pneumatological link, one that is implied in what has been called Starobinski’s “crystal 
ammunition”. As it turns out, fire happens also to be the beginning of the “metaphysics of 
success” and this was so in the laboratory where Lavoisier first conducted his successful 
experiments with oxidization. Just how these experiments can be called events of “authentic 
discovery” will occupy discussion in this chapter. Before this can be fully demonstrated, 
however, the pneumatological aspects of this event need to be outlined, traced along that 
familiar “negative-to-positive” incline, which accounts for the nature of objects pursued in 
the world and the objects doing the pursuing. All of this will help set the stage for presenting 
discovery as “metaphysically successful”. So what is this discovery then? To repeat, it is one, 
in which the natural world is penetrated both epistemologically and physically. The 
epistemological component needs to be built up first before moving on to the physical.  
In discussing the debate concerning nomenclature in eighteen-century French 
“chymie” in her chapter, “Languages of Science and the Revolution”, Riskin gave an 
illustrative account of how a science debate had concerns for relations beyond mere matter. 
Riskin followed through on her development of those polarities of “moral openness” and 
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“solipsism” of various Enlightenment scientists, placing their gradients of sensibilité at the 
center of social change. These two antipodes can be said to be an inspiration for the “negative” 
and “positive” framing, developed in this dissertation. The debate surrounding Lavoisier’s 
“oxidization” experiments and their effects on the long-held “phlogiston theory” was really 
an experiment within a greater one of political and social importance, an experiment with its 
own reactant entities, catalysts, “heated” reactions and product entities. Riskin accounts how, 
on one side there were the “culture-ists”, who sought a chemical naming system that 
conformed to calling things as was agreed upon by convention ad initio, a veering towards a 
negative epistemology. “Oil of vitriol” ought to have been called just that as everyone, 
knowing what their own senses tell them, would also know how such a substance would 
smell: vitriolic. This would be a line of reasoning similar to the one already seen taken up by 
Robespierre in his “common sense” defense of de Vissery de Bois-Valé (p. 27). On the other 
side, there were the “social-ists” (not to be mistaken for the politico-economic version of 
Marx), who sought a naming system that spurned metaphorical and conjectural formulations 
of the “culture-ists”, choosing a system that was interpretative, categorizing knowledge as if 
in an epistemological void so as to create a system unique both unto itself and the pertinent 
specialists (the scientific community) whose knowledge could accumulate with every new 
push into this void: “sulphuric acid” - not “oil of vitriol” - with growing recognition that acids 
form one sort of product of oxidization.
616
 Riskin insightfully links this scientific debate on 
nomenclature directly to the one brewing in the political arena, a debate which would take a 
deadly turn during the “Reign of Terror” for those, who fell to the wrong side of these labels. 
Ultimately, the “culture-ist” faction “of the People”, who had Rousseau as their guiding 
influence, won the debate as the “social-ists’” solipsistic approach was deemed too elitist, a 
label happening not to be too dissimilar from that of the fallen “aristocratic” one. The 
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“culture-ists” thus saw themselves as the bearers of the “social openness” (“negative”) label. 
Despite the initial loss, Lavoisier’s application of Condillac’s “positivist” method would in 
the long run fare quite well as the ultimate winners of the scientific argument. A victory for 
“social-ist” solipsism on the issue of chemical nomenclature is one half of the story of the 
epistemological component of concern; the other half pertains to Priestley and how his 
politics and chemistry coalesced around his position of epistemological egalitarianism. 
Priestley watched from afar the French Revolution unfold as one of its ardent supporters. He 
also happened to oppose Lavoisier’s position in the chemical debate surrounding oxidization. 
“Culture-ist” scientists like Priestley already have their own victories as in the case of 
Franklin’s triumph over Nollet as the captor and articulator of lightning. But Joseph Priestley 
was Lavoisier’s version of Franklin’s Nollet though from the inverse methodological position. 
Priestley has already been credited for having discovered “fixed air” (carbon dioxide), and 
elucidating what has been called in this dissertation, a “metaphysics of partial success”. 
However, he is better remembered for representing the final throes of that dying scientific 
theory: Phlogistonism. Before the showdown over this contested theory is presented, it is 
worth reflecting on the pneumatological dimension of Lavoisier’s work as a public scientist. 
As it turns out his work also emerged from cesspools, ones that were important in the 
production of gunpowder. 
Albeit sarcastically, Burke captured well how discoveries amongst Rational 
Dissenters like Priestley boiled down to one of transposition between “fixed air” and “social 
reform”: ‘the spirit of liberty in action’ to ‘the wild gas, the fixed air’ (p. 150). The ferment, 
with which Lavoisier worked as an administrator and scientist, appointed by the crown to 
rationalize the gunpowder industry, raised a new relationship between science and society 
that also centered on a pneumatology of corruption. Donovan accounts how costs were kept 
artificially low for the refinement of one of the components of gunpowder: saltpeter, where 
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the economic counterbalance shifted against the refinement of table salt, making it more 
expensive, causing this household staple to have an inflated price for consumers. Donovan 
argues how the corruption of “economic irrationality” that favored “military force” could 
have easily been ignored at the expense of the citizens “if the system had in fact delivered 
adequate quantities of good gunpowder”.
617
 Added to this was the privilege given to 
“gunpowder” farmers called “droit de fouille” who were itinerate government agents allowed 
to search family farms and homes without invitation, “scraping” saltpeter from “barns, 
dovecotes and privies” and charging all logistics of the task (lodging, tools, fuel and 
transport) to the owner, offering only pittance as remuneration.
618
 If the ferment from 
Priestley’s fixed air was the epistemological egalitarianism and accidental discovery of his 
monism, these “cesspools” for Lavoisier were what was needed to be rationalized to 
maximize efficiency. And there was a societal component built into this need: removing 
collusion on salt refinement costs to undercut the authority of “gunpowder” farmers, which in 
turn favored the  





Donavan speaks of Lavoisier withstanding accusations of corruption made against him, in the 
form of conflicts of interest. It was thought that receiving prestigious science awards and 
opportunities of government funding while holding dual appointments at the Académie of 
Science and the royal Gunpowder Administration was highly suspect. The characteristic 
Donovan gives Lavoisier in the face of such accusations is a quality of sang-foid:  





This quality has been assigned earlier a metaphysical significance in Dolmance’s extolment 
of apathy - that burst of passion unbinding subjects from the centrifugality of nature and 
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sensibilité (p. 234). Riskin called this quality “solipsism” in Lavoisier’s chemical 
nomenclature. This was also the manner Lavoisier stood against detractors like Priestley 
concerning his experiments with combustion and the controversy his conclusions caused. 
The debate concerning the nature of fire between Priestley and Lavoisier takes a 
similar form as that one seen earlier between Diderot in his defence of Needham’s conception 
of the “animaculae”; and La Mettrie, who praised Geoffroy for doing “more than 
speculat[ing] that plants were fertilised by the powder in their stamen” by actually 
discovering specific plant parts (p. 9). This marked a clear metaphysical departure point for 
those renunciators of “fact” like Diderot and those celebrators of the tradition of Voltaire, 
rounding out those two respective camps of moral and empirical science. Similar to Diderot, 
who intuited from Needham’s “animaculae” an inclusive specimen for all organic life, 
Priestley saw fire imbued matter, organic and inorganic alike, the common denominator for 
everything. Phlogiston was that substance descended from “negative” sciences pre-dating 
even Montaigne though in this dissertation this Renaissance philosopher has been set as the 
earliest marker hereof. (Johann Joachim Becher obviously articulated the Phlogiston Theory 
first in 1667 but the idea goes as far back as the science of the Ancient Greeks.) McEvoy 
expresses the inclusiveness of how Priestley saw phlogiston penetrating all matter, using the 
false distinction between substance” and “quality”, where “qualities” easily flakes off the 
substance otherwise containing it and coming to be seen as a false separation: 
The sense of substance which was acceptable to Priestley is that in which “air and water” etc. are regarded as 
“substances”. Thus, water for example, has an independent existence in the way in which none of its properties, 
such as wetness, does. Robbed of any Lockean underlying substratum, or “cause of their union” such as 
substance is merely a constantly conjoined combination of properties that are thus distinguished from their 
“variable adjuncts”: and it is in this sense that they are said to inhere in themselves. This sense of “substance” is 
sometimes expressed as “things” by Priestley; and this is the sense in which he defends the existence of 




This illusionary “separateness” of “properties” and “substance” is of a similar digressional 
tendency in scientific research as “facts” are for say Geoffroy and his new plant parts, 
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accumulating off of what is otherwise the “substance” of the actual plant. And the inertness 
of these “facts” was given earlier that problem for materialism: the “scandal” where causation 
suffers “from an all too close relation with its effect” […] the latter’s strength drawing in the 
entire unity (p. 20-21). Furthermore, there was a need for dei ex machina for these 
“positivities” to work, without any genuine “negative” force. Some mentioned earlier 
included divine maintenance (Boerhaave) and dramatization (Warman). Although 
approaching the natural world in a “positive” vein, Lavoisier is not stricken by the same 
impotence “positivity” brought to these other cases. As one example of impotence, in her 
conception of “wheeling movement”, Warman, citing Philippe Roger, connects the 
insurmountable captivity La Mettrie confronted in his scientific writing with that of the 
“promenades” Sade was refused as a prisoner at Vincennes: 
Car à disocier le dispositif logique que Sade met en place, en utilisant La Mettrie, de la frustration associée dans 
l’espace carcéral à toute elaboration sur le movement, on connaîtrait la faute d’isoler l’écriture de ces condition 
d’accomplissement, pour avoir confondu celles-ci avec l’indésirable ‘vécu’ des biographies. Activité déréglée 
par nature, jeu insensé de déplacement et de substitution, le movement que Sade imprime à la sociétié s’étend 




This captivity is of the same natural order as that one already mentioned as the “drag of 
cosmology”, i.e., those chains of “terror, spirits and fictions” Bentham sought to break with 
the “silken threads” in his pneumatology (p. 161). But Lavoisier had no need for any of this. 
With the metaphysical singularity of both his status and achievement as a scientist now to be 
considered - and with Sade’s concept of apathy built from a now fully developed metaphysics 
of “negativity” - it is now possible to introduce what has been claimed is a “metaphysics of 
success” 
6.2  Metaphysics of Success 
At the outset, it is worth recapitulating what has come so far as discovery’s different 
modalities and setting the stage for how it is that Lavoisier’s contribution to the history of 
discovery is unique: 
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Discovery as “Metaphysic of Failure”: 
Discovery takes place within what has been called a “drag”, defined as the inability to 
become unhinged from nature. Recall in this regard Durcet’s frustrated words: “I know of 
nothing worse than your damnable regulations… one must reduce oneself to things… to 
things…” (p. 125). This “drag” complements in many ways the “uniformities of nature” 
Hume uses to undermine knowledge claims. However, it adds “negative” objects to the mix 
in order to widen scepticism’s shallowness in refusing to work with any object that is not 
“positive”. As has been shown, “negative” objects contain varying degrees of relational 
properties; and these were well captured in the “posteriority-anteriority-interiority” complex, 
developed in this dissertation. In this particular category of discovery, nature cannot be 
penetrated although knowledge is through and through, caught up in steep descent towards 
increasing “negativity”. 
Discovery as “Metaphysics of Partial Success”: 
This form of discovery has had mixed results. On one hand, it is successful because it can 
penetrate nature. Using his method of epistemological egalitarianism/ accidental discovery, 
Priestley was able to make discoveries that “raised the skirt of nature” (so to speak), that is, 
extract from it safely guarded secrets, for example, soda water. With his Panopticon, Bentham 
was able to craft subjects’ minds in a significant and novel way towards deeper “interiority”. 
This significance of point was delivered recruiting Zamé, Sade’s answer to Bentham’s 
“legislateur”, who, as king of Tamoé, declared that reforms should be aimed only at 
modifying individuals (billiard balls) - and not nature (blind force). This would be done to 
avoid what he called breaking eggs, or crimes (p. 204) that inevitably come when aiming 
laws at nature. On the other hand, failure in this form comes as knowledge not accompanying 
these discoveries, i.e., knowledge is not penetrated. Priestley could not understand the 
oxidizing process he unleashed in his soda water experiments; and in Bentham’s panopticon, 
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understanding was still caught up in a “surrogate cosmos” and could not escape a new 
“uniformity” Hume raises as the guarantee for the impossibility of knowledge (p. 102). 
Discovery as “Metaphysics of Success”: 
Lavoisier’s discovery of oxidization will be considered for what it says about 
“authentic discovery”, or what has been established in this paper as a “metaphysics of 
success”. The two characteristics of such a discovery must meet the following requirements: 
a) nature must be penetrated (as was the case with the first part of the previous discovery); 
and b) knowledge must be penetrated as well so that understanding complements that, which 
has been discovered in nature.  
The rarity of the convergence of these two elements that make up authentic discovery 
has been underestimated in major analyses on the subject. It is worth citing one significant 
example in the History of Science to justify this claim: the model of scientific success 
proposed by Hillary Putnam. One thinker has, however, formulated a conception of discovery 
that in many ways parallels the model of “authentic discovery”, being proposed in this paper - 
that one developed by Thomas Kuhn. What is needed, however, is to demonstrate how the 
model presented in this paper departs from that one given by Kuhn. 
Hilary Putnam 
In section “Reference and Understanding” of Moral Science, Putnam speaks of 
modern science as notably successful in how the knowledge it affords links up seamlessly 
with the natural world, describing the epistemological correspondence this way: 
‘[w]hat ‘succeeds’ or ‘fails’ is not, in general, linguistic behaviour by itself but total behaviour. E.g., we say 
certain things, conduct certain reasonings with each other, manipulate materials in a certain way, and finally we 
have a bridge that enables us to cross a river that we couldn’t cross before. And our reasoning and discussion is 
as much a part of the total organized behaviour-complex as is our lifting of steel girders with a crane. So what I 
should really speak of is not the success or failure of our linguistic behaviour, but rather the contribution of our 
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Salient in this claim is a lack of engagement with the kinds of priorities raised in this paper as 
significant to the history of discovery.  
Firstly there is the respective triviality and non-triviality of the bridge and its 
materiality given in Putnam’s above illustration. If a bridge is needed to cut travel time for a 
community scourging for food on the more bountiful side of a precipice then the discovery of 
a method to scale the span is caught up in what is now considered cosmological drag. How 
so? The limit of sunlight in a day requiring time-saving strategies and the more basic need for 
food to meet “anterior” biological needs downgrades the discovery of a bridge to a type 
incomplete, one, where knowledge is penetrated, i.e., an object long and strong enough for an 
individual to cross a span is found, but nature remains intact throughout the process, i.e., 
nothing about the discovery of this object and its application for human purposes alters the 
constitution of nature and its sovereignty over human actions. However, after some threshold 
of length and weight of a bridge a limit is reached where a material of unprecedented natural 
properties is required to achieve the same goal: enter Putnam’s “steel girders”. This would be 
the case regardless of whether or not some degree of “total organized behaviour-complex” is 
required to build a rope bridge across a gully or a multi-lane highway across San Francisco 
Bay. Putnam’s conception fails to account for this nuance and misses the significance of what 
epistemological breakthrough was required for there to be some chemical composition in 
steel to allow for girders to achieve such a feat.  
Secondly, there is the notion of different graduations of success and the 
acknowledgement that science has not always been “total organized behaviour-complex” 
seamlessly overlain the external world. Implicit is the belief that modern science emerged 
precipitously overtop earlier traditions like religion and magic, whose cognates: alchemy, 
astrology and pneumatology are simply nugatory precursors. This, in a nutshell, is the 
proposal of Edgar Zilsel, who claims modern science be the result of fortuitous 
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transformations in the nature of human economic behavior, namely stemming from the rise of 
capitalism. Logical positivists like Rudolph Carnap argue similarly that science is only 
“cognitively meaningful” the moment it can be supported by “statements about the world that 
are empirically verifiable or logically necessary”
 624
 - in other words, only statements 
attaining a certain acceptable degree of positivity can count as scientific and thus true.  
Thomas Kuhn 
Another sophisticated model of scientific discovery has been proposed by Thomas 
Kuhn in Structures of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In his chapter “Anomaly and the 
Emergence of Scientific Discovery” Kuhn comes to the same point of focus as the one now 
featured in the closing arguments of this dissertation: the showdown between Priestley and 
Lavoisier over the contentious subject of oxidization. Kuhn establishes his argumentation on 
similar theoretical grounds as those selected for this paper and at times even veers closely to 
what has been established as the metaphysical parameters of discovery. This is evident in his 
desire to present discovery as not only a phenomenon distinctly not digital: 
[o]xygen was discovered,” misleads by suggesting that discovering something is a single simple act assimilable 
to our usual (and also questionable) concept of seeing. That is why we so readily assume that discovering, like 




but also something of a dual process where discovery consists of both penetrations of nature 
and knowledge - or to use Kuhn’s own words, “recognizing both that something is and what 
it is”.
626
 He juxtaposes the contributions of three significant scientists involved in the 
discovery of oxygen, that precipitating event of the Chemical Revolution. These contributors 
are C.W. Scheele, Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier. He poses the question about who, 
within this group, deserves credit for the discovery of oxygen. Kuhn discounts Scheele’s 
contribution on account his research was only published after the definitive announcement of 
                                                          
624











the discovery of oxygen. He then focuses his search on the details of Priestley and Lavoisier’s 
experimental conclusions to determine where credit lies. He argues that the assignment of 
credit to any one of the two is not as conclusive as many in posterity have claimed where it is 
unproblematic to assign Lavoisier the distinction of discoverer. Kuhn dispatches with this 
confidence by problematizing each one’s findings, taking aim at a shared failure to recognize 
definitively “that something is” and “what it is” - to use the criteria of discovery just 
mentioned. If Priestley discovered oxygen in an impure form (“if holding impure oxygen in 
one’s hand is to discover it, that had been done by everyone who ever bottled atmospheric 
air”) and calls it something that it is not: “dephlogisticated air”; Lavoisier can be said to be no 
more successful when he claims oxygen to be “air itself entire” (understating the possibilities 
of other components) and calling it a “principle of acidity” combined with the 
pseudoscientific substance: “caloric, a matter of heat”.
627
 Both misidentifying “that [oxygen] 
is” and erroneously naming “what it is” amounts to dual failures in both aspects of the 
epistemological framework set up for discovery in this paper: penetration of nature and 
knowledge. The absence of an analytic definition of absolute discovery aside, Kuhn does 
acknowledge something of a quality sui generis in Lavoisier’s intuition that something be 
removed from the atmosphere during combustion - and not added as phlogiston was thought 
to be, mutatis mutandis. However, Kuhn’s theoretical model of discovery is not built to 
discriminate differences in discoveries, i.e., his examination of those seminal discoveries 
attributed to Newton, Lavoisier, Maxwell and Einstein end up being flat as they are all treated 
equally in his paradigm model of discovery. What will be put forward as the final stage of 
this essay is a conception of discovery that adds depth to the flatness, imbued Kuhn’s 
negative structure of discovery. As is now well understood the ability to assign depth has 
depended on a pneumatological model of discovery that considers both the object of 
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scientific inquiry and the objectness of the pursuer of this object, an interface aspectually 
monistic and historical, unfolding in this paper through the phases of that “posteriority-
anteriority-interiority complex”. The focus now is “authentic discovery”, a modality of 
discovery imbued with metaphysical success and positioned at a particular epistemological 
juncture in the history of humankind. This juncture is formed from the intensification of the 
interiority presented in the previous chapter, one situated at the very limit where ontology 
shifts from revolutionary participants as role-player to tips of fingers (or instruments) of 
scientists (p.). As the contrast with the negativity of Hegelian dialectics has shown, this 
juncture preserves nature as a factor of consideration, something Hegel’s conception of Geist 
does not allow.  
Lavoisier represents a unique development in the pneumatology of scientific inquiry. 
He is really a precursor to what was bracketed out earlier when “crystal ammunition” was the 
topic of discussion - crystal, that one half of the analogy presented by Starobinski. The other 
half was, of course, “mirrors”, pertaining to the latter half of the Revolution when “positive” 
sciences began to predominate, creating those reflections that Foucault would apperceive as 
the “doubling” effect of “man”. The ammunition at this stage was ballistic, comprising 
cannonballs, produced by the French engineering corps under the auspices of Jean Baptiste 
Vaquette de Gribeauval. Simply stated, Lavoisier primed what would be for the 
Gribeauvalists their all-important “pneumatology of error”, that one, describing that new 
manner of engaging objects in the external world; and the new quality of the object doing the 
engaging. This brings us to the conclusion of this study, one, undertaken with the goal to 
trace the “object” of scientific inquiry through the oeuvre of Sade. 
The metaphysics of Lavoisier’s oxidation experiments have as their conditions of 
success the “pneumatology of error”. It is worth recapping some of its important features 
introduced already and consider how they pertain to Lavoisier. Firstly, Lavoisier’s 
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achievement follows the same pathway already seen trending “gribeauvalist” where 
professional science creates a “more intensified version of theatricity” pushing theatrical 
roles so far to the front that they leave the orbit of the performer and become 
indistinguishable from the objects themselves being handled, their correctness being 
“positive” matters of mathematical verifiability (p. 243-44). Another feature of Lavoisier’s 
achievement is how chemical nomenclature produced the scaffolding for his discovery. 
Riskin discussed how the terminology Lavoisier used to describe his experiments were first 
purged of all references to common usages, e.g., long held customs and accepted language of 
sensations of the natural world; and then replaced with “positive” terms, articulated with the 
necessary sharpness enabling further pushes into the “epistemological plenum”. In addition, 
Lavoisier has been shown building his discovery out of those familiar “cesspools”, the source 
of all pneumatological inquiry in this dissertation. Fire can be said to be phenomenally 
similar but he also studied, in Donovan’s words, the “vapors arising from the animal 
excreta”
628
 to discover how to produce saltpeter more efficiently and abundantly for the good 
of the nation. He did this by aiming reforms at an industry where “economic irrationality” 
and parasitic practices by “gunpowder” farmers were sources of corruption. And, finally, 
Lavoisier does all of this with his characteristic “sang-froid”, much like Dolmance’s “apathy”. 
Both detach themselves from the centrifugality otherwise pulling them back into a descent 
into “negativity”: “closing the loop that follows back into the perpetuity of nature, and 
necessarily back to God” (p. 233). Lavoisier’s administrative style of professionalism and 
efficiency are visible in how he consolidated offices to streamline government processes; and 
how he remained icy to the popular revolutionary sentiment, engulfing his world. On both 
these accounts his inegalitarianism is really a pneumatological counterpart to Priestley’s 
“epistemological egalitarianism”. The elitism on all these features ultimately cost Lavoisier 
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his life at the guillotine. However, his sang-froid spirit would be bequeathed to subsequent 
scientific practices and attitudes in the later part of the Revolution and, as well, into the 
nineteenth century. 
Ultimately, Lavoisier’s experiments with oxidation comprise two metaphysical 
successes. The first one is the successful penetration of nature: capturing assorted calces of 
metal and the corresponding acids they form; the second is the successful penetration of 
knowledge: explaining the process by which changes in the before-and-after weight of a 
burnt metal, elicit some transfer of an unknown substance making the metal heavier after 
being burnt - and, in the experiment being controlled, the substance would have had to have 
been removed from air (oxygen). This debunked the premise of Phlogistonism because 
something was clearly added when this theory asserts that something needed to have been 
released in the form of that subtle substance, phlogiston. In Lavoisier – The Crucial Year: The 
background and the Origin of His First Experiments on Combustion in 1772, Guerlac 
described this discovery this way: “This fait capital, Lavoisier later called it – that the calx of 
metal is heavier than the regulus.
629
  
Just as Sade’s “negativity” has been raised against Hegel’s as a way of preserving 
nature in what otherwise was a drift into “positivity” in constructs like “consciousness” 
(Being-in-itself), Sade’s “apathy” is acting as that same preventative measure for Lavoisier’s 
metaphysics, which could easily be relegated to that realm of “positivity” his chemical 
nomenclature seems to resemble. But Risken proves this nomenclature was no simple 
arbitrary list of signs and symbols but one that could penetrate into the “epistemological 
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void” of the world. This is an abrupt departure from the inertness that came with early 
discussions of materialism (La Mettrie and Warman). So what then is the difference if both 
are based on “positivity”? In a nutshell, these “signs and symbols” are the “mind’s 
calculations”
630
 of Dolmance as he stands before the objects of his world. His “sodomizing 
penis” is the “distality” that stands before him as he can finally see to it that nature is properly 
penetrated with a force of “negativity”. It also comes with sterility as it is no longer bound by 
the drag of the world, which would have been the case if Eugenie’s vagina had been the 
target. Reproduction is proximity. And one wonders whether throughout this process nature 
enjoys the abuse. Presenting sodomy this way upgrades Foucault’s “new species” to one of 
metaphysical significance where “changing […] discourses” and “modalities of power” are 
much greater than residences in homosexual bodies (p. 36). In closing this chapter, it worth 
quickly reflecting on Sade’s suspicion that nature just might. In a letter to his wife where he 
defends the proclivities of their “love life”, he reflects on two schools of thought on the issue 
of sodomy: the Jansenist:  
[…] the Presidente […] being a good Jansenist, she’s all against the molinizing of wives. She maintains that M. 
Cordier has never rammed anything but her vessel of propagation and that whoever steers any other course is 
doomed to sink in hell. 
 
And the Jesuit:  
[…] I who had a Jesuit upbringing, I who from Father Sanchez learned that one must avoid plunging in over 





Nature comes across here as preferring coming to blows when the full impact of negativity 
can be felt - and not anything less that can slip past and miss its mark. Nature seems to resort 
to its “deathcrush”
632
 to remedy these errant moments.  
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7.1 Pneumatology in Rousseau, Hegel and Sade’s Metaphysics 
 
Finding Sade’s proper place in the History of Science has depended on 
reconceptualising that body of knowledge historically anathema to science: pneumatology. 
Pneumatology has been built in this dissertation as a countermeasure to tendencies that 
always seek to reduce knowledge and knowers to things with positive constitutions. These 
countermeasures have consisted of the following important epistemological formulations laid 
out in this dissertation: passion and the plenum. 
Passion: 
Knowledge is bundled in different ways with formations of knowers, who define and 
produce the objects of this knowledge, and this relationship has a dynamic history that has 
been shown to resemble more the negativity of distension than the positivity of linearity. The 
“posteriority-anteriority-interiority” complex was built to account for all objects’ possible 
orientations towards other objects in the world from the most indirect (posteriority) to the 
most enclaved (interiority) - with directness (anteriority) being the baseline orientation for 
much of organic life that is visible. Passion was assigned the role of monistic unifier across 
the whole of this spectrum. 
Plenum: 
Knowledge has been investigated with a shift in emphasis from what is knowable 
about matter and its qualities - where positivities are always rife - to what is knowable about 
matter and its aspects where filiations between objects intimate something of a global 
knowledge, one set in this dissertation in the plenum. An example of the distinction between 
qualities and aspects of objects was given in the introduction in the comparison of La Mettrie 
and Diderot’s very different responses to Needham’s animalculae and continued on in 
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explorations of fire where presentation from Sade’s conflagration in Silling Château in Les 
120 Journées, Priestley’s defense of Phlogistonism or Lavoisier’s discovery of oxidization is 
taken principally as a general phenomenon - one not reducible to qualitative descriptions of 




Passion and the plenum are conceptually linked. The dissolution of all positivities, 
which is necessary for the plenum to be what it is, depends on passion acting as the solvent 
for the whole range of these objects. (This terminology was borrowed from Brian Fay and J. 
Donald Moon’s usage (p. 33)). This dissertation has given to Sade’s metaphysics a 
pneumatological foundation as it investigated ways his evolving oeuvre revealed modulations 
within the “negative” structures of this pneumatology, modulations that followed world-
historical events surrounding the French Revolution. In this regard, Sade is placed within the 
metaphysical legacies of those two great purveyors on either side of the Revolution: 
Rousseau and Hegel. By way of a conclusion, it is worth confirming the significance of Sade 
in the intermediary position by demonstrating how it is that the pneumatological progression 
used to order the three work of focus in this dissertation is corroborated by Rousseau and Hegel 
in their own pneumatological ruminations. Similarities aside, Sade does differ from the two 
of them, the terms of the difference depending on understanding that other scale introduced in 
this dissertation, the “negative-to-positive” one. 
It was stated at the most mature stage of the presentation of the “posteriority-
anteriority-interiority” complex that the emergence of science on the most recent end did not 
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Sade’s narration of the execution of Constance in Les 120 Journées (p. 116) qualifies as such a case. Another is 
his depiction of Madame de Mistival’s murder by her daughter, Eugénie, in Philosophie dans le bourdoir where 
Sade introduces the analogy of Nero’s murder of his mother, Agrippina, into the scene. Sade speaks of ‘Nero 
caress[ing] Agrippina upon the deck of the very bark with which she was to be engulfed’ (p. 221) although it 




wipe away the orders of what had come before it and this is so no matter how adamantly 
some like Comte recommended positivism be chosen as the sole orientation for society: 
“Positivism is alone destined to prevail in the ordinary course of things. It alone has been 
making constant progress from many centuries” (p. 146). Even the very possibility of holding 
a position on such “positive” ground was recognized earlier by D’Alembert to be like 
standing in a space far too narrow to hold the full magnitude of what really occupies it; and 
far too incidental to remain there for very long (had what occupied it managed to fit the space 
in the first place): “The realm of erudition and of facts [of theologians or metaphysicians like 
the Aristotelians] is inexhaustible; the effortless acquisition made in it lead one to that one’s 
substance is continually growing, so to speak. On the contrary, the realm of reason and of 
discoveries is rather small” (p. 91) (Emphasis added). The code word for positivity in the 
Enlightenment has been shown to be reason. This dissertation argues that through passion (in 
all its now familiar modulations) Sade was able to decisively knock reason off its pedestal of 
epistemological authority (See Chapter 2). And it is through passion that Rousseau too swept 
reason aside and discovered his alternative metaphysics based in l’amour. The ability to work 
outside reason requires a theoretical construct to help avoid the kinds of inconsistencies in 
argumentation often attributed to forms when reason is absent. The “negative”-to-“positive” 
scale, proposed in this dissertation, provides the kind of order needed to navigate the 
interstices between “non-reason” to “reason”. 
7.2 The Two Sisters; and Lifting up the Skirt of “Mother” Nature 
 This dissertation ends where Sade is really set to begin filling out the limits of the 
argument he has developed up to this point in his oeuvre, “La Philosophie dans le boudoir". 
The just mentioned mature work, Juliette, published in 1797, is really the keystone for the 
entirety of his oeuvre and making mention of it now is to hint that this dissertation is the mere 
seed of a much more comprehensive project to come. Justine, literally the “sister” novel to 
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Juliette, has purposely been passed over as well even though the work was published in 1791, 
with even earlier versions preceding it. The two “sister” novels really deserve to be spoken of 
under a unified conceptualization and this is a harbinger for how this future project will be 
structured. To sum up, it is worth telescoping into the future of Sade’s erudition a little in 
order to adumbrate just how the metaphysics presented in this dissertation links up with what 
Sade wrote about towards the twilight of his writing career. Sade published “Une Idée sur les 
romans” in 1800, as an introductory piece to his work, Les Crimes de l’Amour, and in this 
introductory piece he shares his vision of what constitutes great literature and what does not. 
He takes account of many of the notables of European literature, past and present. Wainhouse 
& Seaver, in the foreword to the essay in their 1966 compilation of Sade’s works call the 
piece a “trifle conventional”,
634
 and perhaps by some standard it is so but they then go 
through a litany of examples of Sade contradicting principles he claims should not be broken 
in good literature, one being: “the novelist must not depart from what is probable”.
635
 One 
wonders if they would complain about the probability of Sainville meeting such a tribe as the 
Butua or Tamoé. Is probable only that which satisfies verisimilitude? Cannot fantasy be used 
to reveal something that is claimed as real but only in metaphysical terms? This dissertation 
has made efforts to answer these kinds of questions on behalf of Sade, whose foray into 
“negativity” and all its cognates: passion, imagination and relations do not even have a proper 
language of expression. (Words always have that unfortunate habit of falling into the trap of 
“positivity”.) But Sade demands of writers to strive to discover just such an evanescent 
language:  
If his imagination is held in check, let him yield to it, let him embellish what he sees: the fool culls a rose and 
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This statement applies to scientists as well and Sade gives the most precise account of just 
what Lavoisier’s combustion experiments were. The throes of pleasure of an incestuous 
relationship: 
O you wish to venture upon this difficult and thorny career, bear in mind that the novelist is the child of Nature, 
that she has created him to be her painter, if he does not become his mother’s lover the moment she gives birth 
to him, let him never write, for we shall never read him. But if he feels that burning need to portray everything, 
if, when fear and trembling, he probes into the bosom of Nature to seek his art therein and extracts models to 
follow, if he possesses the fever of talent and the enthusiasm of genius, let him follow the hand that leads him; 




The significance of this statement, said to be a “trifle conventional”, takes the whole of 
Sade’s very personal journey to be understood - from his prison cell in the Bastille, his 
meandering through the paroxysms of the Revolution and all the way up to the publication of 
“Une Idée” when he was on the verge of facing his second major incarceration, this time at 
Charenton - at the behest of Napoleon himself - where he would live out the rest of his days.  
This dissertation has offered a first-of-its-kind full articulation of a hunch presented 
by many scholars, who have engaged with Sade over the years, that he was a significant 
intellectual of science in his age. I have demonstrated this point through close analysis of 
three of Sade’s most important minor works: Les 120 Journées de Sodome (1785), Aline et 
Valcour, ou le Roman philosophique (completed in 1793 but not published until 1795) and La 
Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795). What remains now to do for a future project is test the 
claim made here by shifting the focus to Sade’s two major works: La Nouvelle Justine ou les 
Malheurs de la vertu (1797) and Juliette; ou les Prospérités du vice (1797). The chronologies 
of both books have earlier geneses, alterations and revisions, spanning about the same time 
period as the three minor works, considered in my dissertation. (Justine, for example, started 
out as the short story, Malheurs de la Vertu, written in the Bastille in 1787, and had two other 
versions at different points of the Revolution.) This means that Justine and Juliette together 
may constitute an even more comprehensive statement concerning the shifting state of 
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“objects” of scientific inquiry than the ones given only piecemeal in the exploration of his 
minor works in this dissertation. If the conceptualisation, proposed in this dissertation, is 
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